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ASSESSING THE NEW JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
Christopher J Peters* 
The author critiques recently prominent arguments for "judicial 
minimalism" in constitutional decision making. Current minimalist argu-
ments, the author contends, are primarily "policentric," that is, focused on 
the role the judiciary can play in bolstering the accountability and delibera-
tiveness of the political branches. Drawing in part on a previous article, the 
author offers an alternative approach to minimalism that is "juricentric"-
focused on the inherent democratic legitimacy of the adjudicative process and 
the unique competence of that process to produce decisions about individual 
rights. He argues that a juricentric approach supports what he calls "proce-
dural" minimalism: the practice of presumptively deciding constitutional 
cases in the "narrowest" and "shallowest" way possible. He also argues, 
however, that a juricentric approach undermines the case for "substantive" 
minimalism: the practice of presumptively deferring to the political branches 
in deciding the issues necessary to resolve constitutional cases. 
To choose ways of not acting was ever the concern and scruple 
of my life. - Bernardo Soares l 
INTRODUCTION 
Much of the way we think about the institution of judicial review, and 
about its uneasy place in the American constitutional democracy, can be 
laid squarely at the feet of two brilliant men who happened to share the 
same first name. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 78, famously 
began his defense of judicial review by dismissing the judiciary as the 
"least dangerous". branch.2 Nearly as famously, Alexander Bickel took 
Hamilton's description as the title of his germinal 1962 book about judi-
cial review.3 Hamilton may have believed in the infirmity of the judiciary, 
but Bickel assuredly did not; his title was intentionally ironic, and his 
book was an entreaty and ajustification for judicial self-control in a world 
that the Supreme Court, with Brown v. Board of Education, had recently 
proven its ability to change dramatically with a stroke of the pen.4 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I thank Michael 
Don, Richard Fallon, and Cass Sunstein for their comments on earlier drafts; Michelle 
Chaudhuri and Douglas Salzenstein for their excellent research assistance; Dean Joan 
Mahoney and Dean Emeritus James Robinson for summer research funding; and, as 
always, my wife Trish Webster for her unflagging support. 
I. Jose Saramago, The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis, at v (Giovanni Pontiero 
trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 1991) (1984) (quoting Fernando Pessoa, Livro do 
desassossego [The Book of Disquiet] (Maria Aliete Galhoz & Teresa Sobral Cunha eds .. 
Atica 1982) (composed ca. 1913-1935)). 
2. The Federalist No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
3. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) 
(1962). 
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The extent to which the Court has succeeded in changing 
society, in the school desegregation context and others, is hotly debated. See, e.g., Gerald 
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Today virtually no one shares Hamilton's professed confidence "that 
the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments 
of power"-so weak that "it can never attack with success either of the 
other twO."5 During the latter half of the twentieth century, however, 
most of the consternation over judicial review came from the right side of 
the political spectrum.6 With the changing winds of political fortune 
showing their effects on the Supreme Court, this is no longer true. Two 
stalwarts of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Mark Tushnet and 
Duncan Kennedy, have recently published books assailing judicial re-
view.7 And from more traditionally liberal quarters has come a call, led 
by Cass Sunstein, for something Sun stein labels '1udicial minimalism"-
"a distinctive form of judicial decision-making" by which a court "settles 
the case before it, but leaves many things undecided."8 Sunstein's plea 
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 336-43 (1991) (concluding that litigation rarely succeeds in 
producing lasting social change); Mark A. Graber, Law and Sports Officiating: A 
Misunderstood and Justly Neglected Relationship, 16 Const. Commentary 293, 307-10 
(1999) (describing the research of Rosenberg and other social scientists into the 
relationship between court decisions and social change). 
5. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 2, at 437. 
6. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 187-93 (1990) (arguing that 
judicial review is antidemocratic); Lino A. Graglia, In Defense of Judicial Restraint, in 
Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 135, 160-62 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. 
Lamb eds., 1982) (arguing that judicial review is a "negation of democracy"); Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A Matter of Interpretation 3, 23-25 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Matter of Interpretation] (defending 
textualism as the only means by which to constrain the discretion of judges). 
7. Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999) [hereinafter 
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away]; Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication 
(1997). 
8. Cass R Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court, 
at ix (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, One Case at a Time]. Sunstein also has extensively 
defended judicial minimalism in a pair of earlier works. See Cass R Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal Reasoning]; Cass R 
Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, llO 
HaIV. L. Rev. 4 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. 
I hope Professor Sunstein will not take offense at being described as a "traditional 
liberal." In many ways, as this Article suggests, his views are quite far from traditional. In 
my opinion, however, Sunstein's stunningly prolific body of work over the past 15 years or 
so evinces a greater affinity for the liberalism of Locke, the Framers, Mill, and Rawls than 
for the postmodern skepticism of, say, many adherents of the Critical Legal Studies [CLS] 
movement. In the free speech context, for example, Sunstein has drawn heavily upon 
Madison's "high premium on political (not economic) equality," and has rejected 
"dictation of social outcomes by large, centralized bureaucracies" in favor of more limited 
"[r]eform of the market." Cass R Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech, 
at xvii, xix-xx (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Free Speech]. As another example, Sunstein's 
list of the "substantive core" of minimalism in his most recent book reads like a catalogue 
of traditional liberal values, including "[p]rotection of political dissent," "[t]he right to 
vote," "[r]eligious liberty," " [p]rotection against physical invasion of property," and "[t]he 
rule of law." Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra, at 63--68. At the same time, Sunstein 
has learned and incorporated many of the more valuable lessons of CLS, such as the 
impossibility of true "value-neutrality" in government decisionmaking and the complexity 
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for minimalism has been influential, prompting a burgeoning responsive 
literature,9 garnering the endorsement of current and former federal 
judges!O and echoing to some extent in the two Harvard Law Review Su-
of the relationship between government policies and individual preferences. See, e.g., 
Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 1-7,68-92 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Partial 
Constitution] (arguing that status quo neutrality mistakes existing distributions for 
"neutral" situations); id. at 162-94 (arguing that existing preferences often are not fixed 
but rather are contingent on legal rules and other social factors). 
9. A Westlaw search conducted on March 27, 2000, turned up 146 law review articles, 
essays, reviews, notes, and the like citing Sunstein's 1996 Foreword, not counting four 
written by Sunstein himself. A cursory review of the items on this list suggests that roughly 
20% directly and extensively engage some aspect of Sunstein's arguments for minimalism. 
A search conducted on the same date produced 19 law review pieces (not counting 
Sunstein's own articles) citing Sunstein's 1999 book One Case at a Time, including two full 
reviews of the book, a brief book note, and a fairly extensive treatment in Jeffrey Rosen's 
Foreword to the Michigan Law Review's 1999 Book Survey issue, in which Rosen argues that 
Sunstein undervalues the importance of principled decisionmaking by the Supreme Court. 
See Jeffrey Rosen, Foreword, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1323 (1999). I discuss one particularly 
interesting review of Sunstein's book, written by Neal Devins, in Part l.B.3.b, infra. The 
only other full review of the book published in a law review generally praises it but argues 
for the importance of deep moral reasoning in Court opinions. See Paul J. Weithman, 
Book Review, 26 J.C. & V.L. 379 (1999). The book note is one paragraph long and entirely 
descriptive. See Book Note, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 774 (1999). 
10. Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the Seventh Circuit, has declared, "I like 
Sunstein's [minimalist] approach," which "is close to my own preferred stance, which I call 
·pragmatic.'" Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.V. L. Rev. I, 9 
(1998). Abner Mikva, formerly Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, has written that he is "most 
pleased that Professor Cass Sunstein has brought Bickel's ideas back into play with his 
advocacy of jUdicial minimalism." Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: 
A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1825, 1825 (1998). Judge Mikva also 
provided one of the dust jacket squibs for One Case at a Time. 
But has Sunstein's minimalism been influential in judicial opinions? A Westlaw search 
of the ALLFEDS database conducted on March 27, 2000, produced seven federal opinions 
citing Sunstein's Foreword. Of these, four expressly relied upon (their interpretations of) 
Sunstein's notion of minimalism as a basis for avoiding constitutional issues, although only 
one of these four was a majority opinion. See Maine Green Party v. Maine, 173 F.3d I, 5 
(1st Cir. 1999) (citing minimalism as a reason to enforce waiver of an argument not made 
before a magistrate judge); Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1763, 1764 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) 
(citing Sunstein's description of the "minimalist" Court decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 
V.S. 620 (1996), as support for denying rehearing in a case upholding a Cincinnati 
ordinance similar to the provision at issue in Romer); Women's Med. Prof! Corp. v. 
Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority on minimalist grounds for unnecessarily invalidating provisions of an Ohio 
abortion law); Causeway Med. Suite v. Ieyoub, 109 F.3d 1096, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997) (Garza, 
J., concurring) (grudgingly following the Supreme Court's abortion precedents but 
criticizing them on minimalist grounds for "centralizing and constitutionalizing the most 
controversial issues of public policy"). One district court opinion acknowledged Sunstein's 
minimalist concern for "cautio[n] in applying traditional concepts" to new technology (the 
Internet in that case) but nonetheless subjected the defendant to personal jurisdiction in 
Massachusetts based on traditional "minimum contacts" analysis. Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462-63 (D. Mass. 1997). The remaining two 
opinions simply cited Sunstein's doctrinal analysis of Supreme Court decisions without 
discussions of minimalism per se. See Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1998) 
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preme Court Forewords that followed Sunstein's initial articulation of 
minimalism. ll 
This new judicial minimalism 12 hearkens, self-consciously and often 
somewhat defensively, back to the original minimalist manifesto, Bickel's 
The Least Dangerous Branch. But it has key points of difference with Bickel. 
Most important among these differences for my purposes here is the new 
emphasis on judicial minimalism less as a means of preserving the legiti-
macy and efficacy of the judiciary and more as a means of bolstering 
those qualities in the other two branches. While Bickel's project might 
be described as juneentne-it counseled minimalism chiefly as a method 
of protecting the judiciary's own place in the constitutional system-the 
projects of Sunstein and the other new minimalists are, if you will, polieen-
tne13-they defend minimalism almost solely as a way of deferring to and 
bolstering the legitimacy and efficacy of the political branches. Turning 
Hamilton's defense of judicial review on its head, the new minimalists 
seek not ways to "defend [the judiciary] against [the other branches'] 
attacks,"14 but rather ways to defend the other branches against attacks by 
the judiciary. 
This Article is a partial assessment of the validity of this new call for 
judicial minimalism. The partial nature of my analysis lies chiefly in the 
fact that 1 will not pursue one obvious (but to me not so interesting) 
avenue of attack on the new minimalism: its potential threat to predict-
ability, stability, equality of treatment,15 and other "rule of law" values. 
There is already a substantial body of literature debating the relative utili-
tarian merits of broad judicial rulemaking versus case-by-case, gradualist 
(Posner, Cl) (citing Sunstein's analysis of Romer); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 144 
F.3d 798, 813 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Sunstein's analysis of United States v. Virginia, 
518 U.S. 515 (1996) (VMl), vacated by 156 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
11. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits of 
Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 60-69 (1998); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 
54, 141-52 (1997). 
12. Although the term "judicial minimalism" usually is meant to refer to the practice 
of courts, I use it in my title and throughout the Article to refer also to theoretical defenses 
of, or entreaties for, the practice of minimalism by courts. That is, I use "judicial 
minimalism" to mean both a kind of theory about how courts should behave and a way in 
which courts do or might behave. 
13. Not "polycentric," as that term was used by Lon Fuller. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms 
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353,394-409 (1978). I discuss Fuller's views 
on adjudication and their implications for the new minimal ism in Part III.C, infra. 
14. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 2, at 437. 
15. I have argued elsewhere that equality of treatment for its own sake is not a valid 
reason for action by judges or other decision makers. See Christopher J. Peters, Equality 
Revisited, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1210, 1263 & n.84 (1997); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication 
as Representation, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 312, 365 n.182 (1997) [hereinafter Peters, 
Adjudication]; Christopher J. Peters, Slouching Towards Equality, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 801, 
805-07 (1999). 
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decisionmaking. 16 Instead, I focus my attention on the justifications of-
fered by Sunstein and others in support of judicial minimalism. 
My basic thesis is that the case for the new minimalism fails in crucial 
respects, because it significantly underestimates both the legitimacy and 
the competence of the judiciary in making decisions about individual and 
minority rights. The new minimalism rests mostly on two pillars: the idea 
that the political branches act with substantially more democratic legiti-
macy than the Supreme Court, and the idea that the Court is not a sub-
stantially better decisionmaker on issues of "principle" or "rights" than 
the political branches. But, 1 argue, both pillars topple under analysis. 
The fundamental (but underappreciated) participatory and representa-
tive characteristics of adjudicative decisionmaking significantly narrow 
the legitimacy gap between political and judicial decisions, even in consti-
tutional cases. And other salient features of adjudication-not only its 
frequently noted insulation from majoritarian politics, but also its relative 
opacity and its typical gradualism and particularism-make it generally 
much better at producing decisions about rights than the political 
branches. 
The picture of adjudication that I sketch is one in which the judici-
ary, and especially the Supreme Court, occupies a central place in the 
American ideal of deliberative democracy, a place coequal to those taken 
by the political departments. This view of the Court is, like Bickel's, pri-
marily juricentric, not policentric, and I argue that it undercuts many of 
the reasons Sunstein and others offer in favor of judicial minimalism. On 
the juricentric view, minimalism cannot so easily be justified as a means of 
shifting decisionmaking responsibility to the more accountable political 
branches, or as a way of reducing the risk and cost of decisionmaking 
errors. At the same time, the juricentric view suggests different, better 
reasons for minimalism than those offered by the new minimalists. 
Minimalism is necessary to preserve the representative accountability, and 
thus the democratic legitimacy, of adjudication, and to maintain the 
16. On the side of broad rules, see, e.g., Larry Alexander, "With Me, It's All er 
Nothin'": Fonnalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 530, 532-34 (1999) (arguing 
that "authoritative rules" allow communities to solve problems of coordination, expertise, 
and efficiency when abstract moral principles are agreed upon); Antonin Scalia, The Rule 
of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Law of 
Rules) (advocating establishment and refinement of broad general rules rather than case-
by-case discretion). For arguments generally against broad rules, see, e.g., Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning, supra note 8, at 121-35 (noting drawbacks of general rules, including 
ambiguities, exceptions, over- and underinclusiveness, and procedural injustice). For 
relatively balanced assessments of the tradeoffs between broad rules and less rule-based 
decisionmaking regimes, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 
42-61 (1990) (comparing legitimacy of decisionmaking by rules and by standards); Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke LJ. 557, 559 (1992) 
(contrasting the consequences of a standards-based decisionmaking regime with those of a 
rules-based regime); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Tenn-Foreword: 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 62-69 (1992) (summarizing 
arguments for rules and for standards). 
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gradualism and particularism that gives the Court its natural advantage in 
decisionmaking about individual rights. 
Thus I argue that the juricentric view generally supports what I call 
procedural minimalism but not what I call substantive minimalism. Al-
though the line between them is sometimes difficult to draw with preci-
sion, procedural minimal ism counsels fully and fairly deciding the case 
before the Court, while limiting the binding impact of that decision as 
closely as possible to the particular facts of the case. Substantive minimal-
ism, on the other hand, counsels altering or avoiding the decision of the 
case before the Court out of deference to the political branches. I con-
tend here that, while some degree of procedural minimalism is necessary 
to preserve the legitimacy and competence of the Court, substantive 
minimalism generally is not necessary to preserve those features and in-
deed risks affirmatively undermining them. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I describe the characteris-
tics and theoretical justification of the new minimalism, focusing espe-
cially on Sunstein's leading articulation of it. In Part II, I chip away at the 
first pillar of the new minimalism: the premise that judicial decisionmak-
ing, particularly in constitutional cases, is inherently less legitimate from 
the perspective of democracy than political decisionmaking. I argue that 
this premise is to a large extent erroneous. In Part Ill, I take aim at the 
second pillar of the new minimalism: the premise that the judiciary is not 
significantly better suited than the political branches to make decisions 
involving individual rights. I suggest that this premise too is mistaken. 
Together, Parts II and III form the basis of an alternative approach to 
judicial minimalism that is juricentric rather than policentric. 
In Part IV, I explain how the procedural type of judicial minimalism 
can be justified on a juricentric view of the Supreme Court's role in the 
American deliberative democracy. Procedural minimalism, I argue, is 
necessary to maintain the legitimacy and efficacy of Court decisionmak-
ing. In Part V, however, I contend that the juricentric view does not sup-
port the substantive type of minimalism-and in fact directly challenges 
its validity. 
I. THE POLICENTRlC CAsE FOR JUDICIAL MINlMALISM 
The new judicial minimalism is animated by the twin perceptions 
that judicial decisionmaking generally is less democratically legitimate, 
but not less fallible, than decisionmaking by the political branches. The 
minimalist response to these perceived shortcomings has two potentially 
contradictory manifestations. First is procedural minimalism, which holds 
that a court (particularly the Supreme Court) should do what is necessary 
to resolve a constitutional case, but should avoid issues not necessary to 
the resolution of that particular case. Second is substantive minimalism, 
which holds that the Court should presumptively avoid invalidating the 
government action challenged in a particular constitutional case, 
whether by upholding the action on the merits or by avoiding decision of 
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the constitutional issue. Procedural minimalism is thus about the scope of 
the Court's decision, regardless of whether that decision invalidates or 
upholds the legislation at issue in the case. In contrast, substantive 
minimalism is about the content of the Court's decision-about whether 
the Court should invalidate legislation or uphold it. 
In this Part, I elucidate the perceptions animating the new minimal-
ism, and the procedural and substantive consequences of those percep-
tions, by describing several examples of new minimalist theory. I focus 
especially on the ideas of Sunstein, the leading figure of the new 
minimalism. 
A. Narrowness, Shallowness, and Democratic Deliberation: Sunstein's 
Judicial Minimalism 
Sunstein's recent book One Case at a Time is the most comprehensive 
statement yet of new minimalist ideas. One Case at a Time draws upon 
arguments from a number of prior articles and reviews by Sunstein, in-
cluding his Foreword to the 1996 Harvard Law Review Supreme Court 
issue,17 and makes substantial use of ideas contained in Sunstein's earlier 
book Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict18 and three articles upon which 
that book was largely based.19 Because One Case at a Time incorporates 
and expands arguments offered in Sunstein's previous writings, I focus 
here on that book's account of minimalism. 
I. Narrowness and Shallowness. - Sunstein divides judicial minimal-
ism into two dimensions: narrowness and shallowness. A court decision 
is "narrow rather than wide" when it "decide[s] the case at hand" rather 
than "decid[ing] other cases tOO."20 That is, minimalism in its narrow-
ness dimension "tr[ies] to decide cases rather than to set down broad 
rules."21 A court decision (really, a court opinion) is "[s]hallow [r]ather 
than [d]eep"22 when it reaches a "concrete judgment[ ] on [a] particular 
case [ ], unaccompanied by abstract accounts about what accounts for 
[that] judgment[ ] ."23 Minimalism in its shallowness dimension thus 
"tr[ies] to avoid issues of basic principle" in deciding cases.24 
17. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 8. Other precursors to One Case 
at a Time include Cass R. Sunstein,justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 Yale LJ. 529 
(1997) (reviewing Scalia, Matter of Interpretation, supra note 6); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Right to Die, 106 Yale LJ. 1123 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, From Theory to Practice, 29 Ariz. 
St. LJ. 389 (1997); and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the 
Supreme Court, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1179 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Public Deliberation]. 
18. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8. 
19. Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (199.'1); Ca.~s R. Sunstein, 
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1993). 
20. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 10 (italics omitted). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 11. 
23. Id. at 13 (italics omitted). 
24. Id. at 11. 
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Both narrowness and shallowness are manifestations of procedural 
minimalism, as I define it above. Again, procedural minimalism is the 
idea that the Court, while fully and fairly deciding the case before it, 
should nonetheless limit the binding impact of that decision as closely as 
possible to the particular facts of the case. Minimalism in its narrowness 
dimension limits the binding impact of a decision in this way by avoiding 
the articulation of a broad rule that will apply in future similar (but not 
identical) cases. Minimalism in its shallowness dimension limits the bind-
ing impact of a decision by avoiding the articulation of deep principles 
that might themselves be applied in future similar (but not identical) 
cases. 
2. Deliberative Democracy and the ''Minimalist Virtues. " - Sunstein con-
tends that there is a "close connection" between the two dimensions of 
judicial minimalism-narrowness and shallowness-and what he calls 
"deliberative democracy."25 Sunstein's conception of "deliberative de-
mocracy" will be familiar to anyone who has read The Partial Constitution26 
or Democracy and the Problem of Free SPeech,27 two of his earlier books; it is 
professedly Madisonian, emphasizing the role of political representation 
in fostering deliberation by filtering the often uninformed or ill-consid-
ered preferences and viewpoints of the public at large.28 
As it relates to Sunstein's defense of judicial minimalism, this con-
ception of deliberative democracy has two important aspects. First, it re-
quires a system of political accountability that ties government decisionmak-
25. Id. at 24. 
26. Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8. 
27. Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 8. Sunstein also has fleshed out his conception 
of deliberative democracy in many law review articles. See, e.g., Sunstein, Public 
Deliberation, supra note 17 (contrasting judicial decisionmaking with political 
deliberation in the area of affirmative action); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 Yale LJ. 1539 (1988) (linking deliberative democracy with the traditional 
claims of republicanism); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 
Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985) (proposing revival of republicanism as foundation from which 
judiciary might evaluate political processes and outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689 (1984) (arguing that the 
constitutional prohibition of the distribution of resources based on raw political power is 
the embodiment of deliberative democracy). 
28. For example, in One Case at a Time Sunstein writes: 
[T] he framers rejected populist models in favor of a republican effort to promote 
more considered reflection through mechanisms designed, in James Madison's 
words, to "refine and enlarge" the public view .... The American system is one of 
representative rather than direct democracy, partly because of a judgment that 
political deliberation can best be promoted through a representative system. 
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 133; see also Sunstein, Partial Constitution, 
supra note 8, at 17-24 (describing background of Founders' establishment of 
representative, deliberative democracy); Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 8, at 241-50 
(describing importance of representation in fostering true deliberation). Madison's 
defense of political representation is most famously set out in The Federalist No. 10 (James 
Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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ing to the governed, a system that allows for political dissent29 and 
permits equal participation among citizens.3o Accountability is important 
to Sunstein not as a" way of effecting the "aggregation of private 'prefer-
ences' "31 in public policy, but mostly as a way of ensuring that "different 
information and diverse perspectives"32 will enter the deliberative pro-
cess, thus improving the quality of the decisions that process generates. 
Second, Sunstein's deliberative democracy requires actual deliberation 
in political decisionmaking, deliberation based upon reasons that are 
public-regarding rather than selfish and are rational rather than rooted 
in revelation or prejudice. Legislation must result only from "a process of 
reflection and debate," a process in which self-interest, religious beliefs, 
and "grounds that deny the fundamental equality of human beings" 
(such as racism) are not accepted as valid reasons for action.33 
a. Democracy-Permitting Minimalism. - Sunstein argues that judicial 
minimalism is justified because, and to the extent that, it either permits or 
promotes accountability or deliberation in the political branches. The con-
nection betweenjudicial minimalism and what Sunstein calls "democracy-
permitting outcomes"34 is fairly obvious: A court might permit deliberative 
democracy to function by "rul[ing] narrowly rather than broadly" or by 
"dedin[ing] to hear a case at all"35-the ultimate form of minimalism-
thus leaving ample space in which deliberative democracy can operate. A 
court also might "simply validate what democratic processes have 
produced."36 
According to Sunstein, democracy-permitting minimalism of this 
type has five categories of "virtues."37 First, it typically lowers decision 
costs by allowing the Court to avoid full resolution of complex 
problems.38 Second, it typically lowers error costs-"the costs of mis-
taken judgments"39-by limiting as much as possible the scope of the 
Court's judgments and thus their impact if they are erroneous.40 Third, 
it leaves space for "reasonable pluralism" in society by "bracketing the 
largest disputes"41 upon which broad agreement is unlikely.42 Fourth, it 
takes account of the "cognitive limitations" faced by judges, including 
29. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 64. 
30. See id. at 25. 
31. Id. at 24. 
32. Id. at 25. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 26 (emphasis altered). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 46. 
38. See id. at 47-48. 
39. Id. at 49. 
40. See id. at 49-50. 
41. Id. at 50. 
42. See id. at 50-51 (citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993)); cf. Posner, supra 
note 10, at 8-9 (contrasting Sunstein's minimalism with Rawls's project). 
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limitations on judges' ability to predict the consequences of their deci-
sions, by avoiding the foreclosure of adjustments and adaptations in fu-
ture cases.43 And flfth, it "allows democratic processes room to maneu-
ver,"44 a desirable effect in light of judicial fallibility and the possibility 
that even otherwise correct judicial decisions will be counterproductive.45 
On Sunstein's view, judicial minimalism can serve all of these values 
by simply allowing the political process to function unimpeded by inter-
ference from the Court; Such democracy-permitting minimalism can 
take either procedural or substantive form. Procedurally, the Court can 
permit democratic processes to function by limiting its constitutional de-
cisions to the facts of particular cases, thus avoiding foreclosure of demo-
cratic judgment in other cases. Substantively, the Court can permit dem-
ocratic processes to function by declining or avoiding the invalidation of 
political decisions in the decision of the particular case at hand. 
b. Democracy-Promoting Minimalism. - The link between minimalism 
and democracy-promoting outcomes is more subtle. A "[d]emocracy-pro-
moting outcome[ ]" is one that "attempt[s] to require deliberative judg-
ments by democratically accountable bodies."46 Such a result does more 
than simply leave intact the product of democratic deliberation; it affirm-
atively cultivates deliberative and accountable decision making in the po-
litical branches. Indeed, a democracy-promoting result might (and often 
will) take the form of invalidating decisions made by the political 
branches, although for reasons that tum on the inadequate deliberation 
or accountability underlying such decisions rather than on their conflict 
with more substantive constitutional requirements. Sunstein lists a num-
ber of examples of "minimalist" decisions that promote deliberative de-
mocracy in this way: invalidation on grounds of vagueness, invalidation 
pursuant to the nondelegation doctrine, application of "clear statement" 
principles, invalidation on grounds of desuetude, refusal to consider hy-
pothetical legislative purposes, and enforcement of a requirement that 
"all decisions [be] supported by public-regarding justiflcations rather 
than by power and self-interest."47 
These democracy-promoting forms of decision are procedurally min-
imalist because they do not go to what might be called the "merits" of the 
case; they decide particular constitutional cases without holding that the 
government decision or action at issue in them is, unavoidably and in all 
similar cases, constitutional or unconstitutional. In other words, like nar-
row and shallow decision making, democracy-promoting decisions defer 
until later resolution of the substantive constitutionality of a particular 
government action when such a resolution is not necessary to decide the 
case at hand. 
43. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 51-53. 
44. Id. at 54. 
45. See id. at 53-54. 
46. Id. at 26. 
47. Id. at 27. 
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3. Caveats. - Sunstein acknowledges the existence of valid argu-
ments against minimalism in particular circumstances. A minimalist deci-
sion in case A may "lead to dramatically increased decision costs for 
judges in cases B through Z," thus merely "shifting costs from [the prece-
dential] court to others."48 Minimalism also may actually increase error 
costs if it turns out that "a minimalist judgment in case A will produce a 
range of mistakes in cases B through Z, as lower court judges struggle to 
make sense of case A. "49 Minimalism also threatens "rule of law" values 
like support for planning and the desirability (springing from autonomy 
concerns) of giving "participants in democratic processes ... a clear back-
ground against which to work."50 To the extent that minimalist decisions 
underprotect constitutionally enshrined democratic values like freedom 
of expression, minimalism might actually weaken deliberative democ-
racy.51 And minimalism might be inappropriate in dealing with defects 
in the democratic process itself, such as the influence of powerful private 
interest groups or the underrepresentation of historically disadvantaged 
minorities.52 
"From these points," Sunstein concedes, "it is clear that we cannot, in 
the abstract, decide whether and how much minimalism is appropri-
ate."53 Generally, however, "[t]he case for minimalism is especially 
strong when the area [of substantive law] involves a highly contentious 
question now receiving sustained democratic attention."54 . 
4. Sunstein and Substantive Minimalism. - As described above, Sun-
stein's theoretical defense of judicial minimalism focuses mainly on proce-
dural minimalism-on techniques of deciding only the necessary issues 
and no more, such as writing narrow and shallow opinions and deciding 
cases on democracy-promoting grounds rather than "on the merits." 
Sunstein's applications of minimalism in particular cases, however, 
demonstrate that he has substantive minimalism in mind as well-defer-
ence to the political branches in the decision (or avoidance) of the neces-
sary issues themselves. 
48. Id. at 55. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 55-56. 
51. See id. 
52. See id. at 55-56, 275 n.24. Sunstein here draws upon the well-known theory of 
"representation reinforcement" articulated by John Hart Ely. See John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust (1980). One Case at a Time is perhaps the closest Sunstein has yet 
come in print to an endorsement of Ely's theory of judicial review. Cf. Rebecca L. Brown, 
Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 531,539 n.27 (1998) ("1 
think it is time to add Cass Sunstein's name to the list of those whose starting point for 
constitutional rights is the integrity of the political process."). 
53. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 56. 
54. Id. at 59. 
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For example, Sunstein defends the Supreme Court's decisions in 
Washington v. Glucksberlf5 and Vacco v. Quill,56 in which the Court upheld 
two state laws forhidding physician-assisted suicide against, respectively, 
due process and equal protection challenges, partly on the ground that 
"the Court should be wary of recognizing rights of this kind amid com-
plex issues of fact and value."57 This is substantive minimalism. Procedu-
ral minimalism would counsel not reluctance to recognize a right to as-
sisted suicide, but rather the recognition or rejection of the right in a way 
that is confined as closely as possible to the facts of the particular case 
being decided. 
Similarly, while Sunstein praises the Court's constitutional affirma-
tive action jurisprudence on the basis of its "meandering course" and "re-
fusal to issue rules" (that is, its characteristic narrowness), he also suggests 
that ultimately "the issue of affirmative action should be settled democrat-
ically, not judicially."58 Apparently Sunstein means that the Court, out of 
deference to the political branches, should avoid recognizing rights 
against affirmative action. Likewise, Sunstein defends four recent Court 
decisions involving the interaction between "new communications tech-
nologies"59 and the First Amendment60 partly on the procedural grounds 
of narrowness but also partly because the presence of factual and moral 
"flux" in this area "argnes in favor of judicial caution in invalidating regu-
latory controls"61-in favor, that is, of substantive minimalism, of a reluc-
tance by the Court to overturn political judgments even on the narrow 
facts of a particular case.62 
Although Sunstein's theoretical case for judicial minimalism centers 
on the avoidance of broad rules and deep theory in the Court's constitu-
tional decisionmaking-that is, on the formal or procedural aspects of 
Court decisions-his applications of that theory thus frequently suggest 
an additional focus on the content or substance of Court decisions-that is, 
on whether the Court is invalidating or upholding actions of the political 
branches. For reasons that will become apparent in Parts 11 and III, this 
expansion of focus is not surprising. The same policentric assumptions 
of judicial illegitimacy and inefficacy that underlie Sunstein's procedural 
minimalism also underlie his substantive minimalism. As such, if the 
Court is significantly less legitimate and not significantly more effective 
55. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
56. 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
57. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 76. 
58. Id. at 117-18. 
59. Id. at 173. 
60. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 
180 (1997) (Turner II); Denver Area Edue. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727 (1996); Turner Broad. Sys., Ine. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (Turner I). 
61. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 174. 
62. I explain below how a procedurally minimalist approach might properly take into 
account considerations of moral and factual "flux." See infra notes 261-262 and 
accompanying text. 
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than the political branches in making decisions about rights, then the 
Court should observe not only a procedural presumption against broad 
rules and deep theory, but also a substantive presumption against over-
turning the decisions of the political branches. 
5. Sunstein and Bickel. - It may be helpful to conclude this overview 
of Sunstein's argument for minimalism, and to set the stage for my cri-
tique of that argument and related arguments in Parts II, III, and V, by 
noting the obvious comparison between Sunstein's minimalism and the 
"passive virtues" Alexander Bickel promoted in The Least Dangerous 
Branch. Sunstein pays express homage to Bickel,63 but he also goes to 
some length to describe the "important differences" between Bickel's 
project and his own.64 The primary difference, Sunstein asserts, lies in 
the divergent assumptions of political theory underlying the two projects: 
My argument here finds its foundations in the aspiration to de-
liberative democracy, with an insistence that the principal vehi-
cle is the legislature, not the judiciary .... For Bickel, the Court 
was the basic repository of principle in American government; 
because of its insulation, it was the central deliberative institu-
tion. By contrast, a central point here is that the Court's con-
ception of the (constitutionally relevant) principle may well be 
wrong; I think Bickel erred in seeing the Court as having a sys-
tematically better understanding of "principle" than other 
branches.65 
Sunstein thus distinguishes his project from Bickel's primarily on the 
ground that Bickel's was what I have called juricentric-focusing on pre-
serving the Court's own place in the constitutional system-while Sun-
stein's is what I have called policentric-emphasizing the relationship be-
tween judicial minimalism and deliberative democracy within the 
political branches. As I explain below, my basic challenge to the new 
minimalism as conceived by Sunstein and others focuses on this policen-
trism. I contend that the new minimalism is somewhat myopic, not only 
in undervaluing the Court's role as the deliberative crucible of principle 
in our constitutional democracy, but also in ignoring the sense in which 
the Court is itself fundamentally democratic. 
B. Other Proponents oj the New Minimalism 
Sunstein's first comprehensive justification of judicial minimalism 
appeared in his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's 1996 Supreme 
Court issue.66 Each of the two succeeding Harvard Forewords also con-
63. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 5,39-41, 100,267 n.5; see also 
Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 8, at 51-53. 
64. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 267 n.5. 
65. Id. 
66. See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 8. Although Sunstein's 
Foreword was published in 1996, the issue containing it retrospectively covered the Court's 
1995 Term. The years I give in the text for the Harvard Forewords refer to their years of 
publication rather than the years of the Supreme Court terms that they cover. 
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tained significant strains of minimalism, although neither of them can 
accurately be described as minimalist in nearly as thoroughgoing a way as 
Sunstein's work. I discuss them here, and then briefly survey the work of 
some other recent proponents of judicial minimalism and related 
approaches. 
1. Richard Fallon. - In his 1997 Haroard Law Review Foreword,67 
Richard Fallon describes and defends, partly on minimalist grounds, the 
Court's use of doctrinal tests in constitutional cases. Fallon articulates 
two minimalist justifications for doctrinal tests. First, doctrinal tests allow 
the Court to avoid deeply theorized grounds for its judgments; they 
"abet[ ] incompletely theorized judgments by furnishing a framework in 
which determinations can be reached and ... explained as defensible 
within the doctrinal framework, even if the framework is not itself justi-
fied by any broader theory. "68 
Second, the Court's preference for certain types of doctrinal tests-
what Fallon calls "suspect-content" and "nonsuspect-content" tests69-al-
lows the Court to defer to the political branches "except in circumstances 
in which the democratic process is manifestly un trustworthy. "70 Suspect-
content tests include strict scrutiny, under the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses, of legislation that burdens suspect classes or infringes 
fundamental rights;71 nonsuspect-content tests include rational basis re-
view of other legislation under those clauses.72 Fallon contends that non-
suspect-content tests, which are extremely deferential to the political 
branches, are appropriately applied in areas of constitutional law charac-
terized by "reasonable disagreement" about the existence and scope of a 
constitutional norm.73 Where reasonable disagreement exists, "the basic 
commitment of the Constitution is to permit decision by democratic ma-
jorities and their elected representatives. "74 
Fallon clearly is not as minimalist as Sunstein. His defense of doctri-
nal tests is in an important sense nonminimalist: Such tests really are 
types of rules that, virtually by definition, apply in cases with facts that are 
67. Fallon, supra note II. 
68. Id. at 116. This argument echoes one made by Sunstein. See, e.g., Sunstein, One 
Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 11-14 (arguing there are two forms of "incompletely 
theorized agreements": agreements on particulars with disagreements on the basis of 
those particulars, and agreements on abstractions with disagreements on how to apply 
those abstractions to particular cases); Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8, at 35-61 
(defending "incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes" as useful means 
of facilitating court decision making, accommodating social pluralism, and allowing for 
change) (quotation at 37). 
69. Fallon, supra note II, at 68-69. 
70. Id. at 76. 
71. See id. at 88. 
72. See id. at 88-89. 
73. Id. at 89. 
74. Id. Following John Hart Ely, Fallon explains suspect-content tests as a means of 
allowing court intervention in areas where there is reason to suspect some defect in the 
political process. See id. at 88-90 (citing Ely, supra note 52, at 75-77, 105-79). 
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distinguishable from those of the cases in which the tests originate, and 
thus they are broader than the case-by-case gradualism that Sunstein ad-
vocates. But, like Sunstein, Fallon endorses elements of both procedural 
and substantive minimalism. Doctrinal tests for Fallon, like analogical 
reasoning for Sunstein, allow the Court to agree on, and the public to 
accept, particular results without skirmishing over deeper ideological is-
sues. This is a form of procedural minimalism, extolling as it does the 
virtues of deciding no more than is necessary to resolve the practical issue 
before the Court. And Fallon's enthusiasm for deferential nonsuspect-
content tests reflects the view that the Court should yield to the political 
branches in the face of "reasonable disagreement" about the meaning of 
the Constitution-a form of substantive minimalism. 
2. Michael DorJ. - In his 1998 Harvard Law Review Foreword, Michael 
Dorf defends a concept of "provisional adjudication" that contains signifi-
cant elements of both procedural and substantive minimalism.75 Dorf 
proposes that the Court, following a model of provisional adjudication, 
"worry less about finding the 'true' meaning of authoritative texts, and 
instead-while sensitive to its own institutional limitations- ... focus on 
finding provisional, workable solutions to the complex and rapidly chang-
ing legal problems of our age."76 
The procedurally minimalist aspect of Dorfs "provisional adjudica-
tion" would involve a frankly loose, less-precedent-bound version of the 
common law method, in which the Court would "treat more of its prece-
dents as provisional than is formally permitted under the doctrine of 
stare decisis,"77 even going so far as to "expressly designate some of its 
decisions ... as subject to experiment ... [or] as provisional, promising 
to revisit these matters at some future date."78 The substantively minimal-
ist aspect of provisional adjudication would require the Court to "give 
greater deference to state policies that arguably infringe constitutional 
rights than to equivalent uniform national policies,"79 and to "permit 
some doctrinal disagreements among the lower courts to go unresolved 
in order to discern the practical consequences of different legal 
regimes. "80 
Dorfs version of minimalism is in turns more radical and more tradi-
tional than Sunstein's. It is more radical in that Dorf does not share Sun-
stein's confidence in the common law method, contending that it is too 
slow to respond to rapidly evolving social conditions81 and that it relies 
too heavily on "intuition[ ] rather than empirical observation"82 (a weak-
75. Dorf, supra note 11, at 4. 
76. 1d. at 9 (citations omitted). 
77. Id. at 11. 
78. Id. at 73. 
79. Id. at 10; see id. at 62-65. 
80. Id. at 10-11; see id. at 65-66. 
81. See id. at 43-45, 53. 
82. Id. at 36. 
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ness Dorf claims the common law shares with, and perhaps partly derives 
from, the so-called Socratic method of legal instruction83). It is more 
traditional in that it ultimately proposes a role for the Court that is in 
significant respects nonminimalist, a role in which the Court's "central 
task" is "the articulation of fundamental ... values," leaving the imple-
mentation of those values mostly to the political process.84 This proposal 
is nonminimalist in its call for the Court to pronounce values that are 
broad and deeply theorized; it is substantively minimalist in its suggestion 
of deference to the political branches in questions of ground-level appli-
cation of those values. 
3. Other New Minimalists, and Some Cousins. - Like all intellectual 
movements, the new minimalism is fairly clear at the center but a bit fuzzy 
around the edges. Sunstein's scholarship of minimalism is the most ex-
tensive of anyone's since Bickel's, and mostly for that reason I think it is 
fair to treat him as a sort of exemplar or paradigm of the new minimalist. 
My selection of Fallon and Dorf for particular attention here is largely the 
product of using Sunstein's work as a template; the contribution of each 
of those scholars, as I suggested above, has important similarities to that 
of Sunstein, despite also displaying some significant differences. Fallon's 
and Dorf's contributions also merit special attention because of the fo-
rum in which they appeared: the widely read Forewords to the Harvard 
Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue. 
Let me describe now, briefly and roughly, the two characteristics that 
I take to be at the core of the new minimalism, as exemplified by its three 
proponents discussed above. First, the new minimalism displays both sub-
stantive and procedural aspects. It advocates sometimes rendering nar-
rowand/or shallow decisions of squarely presented issues (procedural 
minimalism), and sometimes avoiding decisions of squarely presented is-
sues altogether or deciding them in a way that upholds decisions of the 
political branches (substantive minimalism). The exact balance of these 
types of minimalism depends upon the particular theory. 
Second, the new minimalism is animated to a significant extent by 
some combination of two premises: the premise that decisionmaking 
about an issue generally is less democratically legitimate when done by a 
court than when done by one of the political branches, and the premise 
that courts generally are no more competent at making decisions about 
constitutional rights than the political branches are. I discuss both of 
these premises in more detail in Part I.C, below, and then attack each of 
them respectively in Parts II and III. Again, the exact proportion in 
83. See id. at 33-43. 
84. Id. at 79. The details of Dorf's proposal that the Court should mostly confine 
itself to the articulation of rather abstract values, leaving questions of implementation to 
political decisionmakers, are spelled out in Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 388-404, 444-69 
(1998). 
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which these two premises motivate minimalist thinking depends on the 
particular minimalist theory. 
My purpose for articulating these core characteristics of the new 
minimalism is to introduce briefly some other examples of it or of its 
close cousins. Most of my arguments against substantive minimalism in 
the remainder of this Article will apply to these other examples as well as 
to the work of Sunstein, Fallon, and Dorf, although the extent and 
strength of their application will vary from example to example. 
I begin with a discussion of the work of Robert Burt, which is in 
many ways an immediate precursor to the new minimalism but in some 
crucial ways a very different animal. I then briefly discuss the "discur-
sivist" versions of minimalism espoused by Neal Devins and Neal Kumar 
Katyal. Finally, I consider the recent argument for the outright abolition 
of judicial review advanced by Mark Tushnet. 
a. Robert Burt. - Robert Burt might be considered a progenitor of 
the new judicial minimalism. His 1992 book The Constitution in Conflict is 
an ambitious and challenging work in which Burt defends "an egalitarian 
conception of authority among the branches" in constitutional interpre-
tation.85 Burt advocates the use of many of the techniques of judicial 
minimalism espoused earlier by Bickel and later by Sunstein, including 
invocation of "clear statement" principles and of the doctrines of "void 
for vagueness" and ripeness.86 Burt also identifies and endorses the use 
of "middle-tier" constitutional scrutiny as what Sunstein would call a "de-
mocracy-promoting" minimalist technique, helpful in spurring delibera-
tion in the political branches.87 
But unlike Sunstein and, to a lesser extent, Dorf and Fallon, Burt is 
decidedly distrustful of the political process. His version of judicial 
minimalism is inspired not by a preference for political over judicial deci-
sionmaking, but by a conception of democracy as the absence of coer-
cion. For Burt, coercion is antidemocratic, whether its source is the Su-
preme Court or an overreaching political majority. Thus Burt endorses 
judicial minimalism not simply to give pride of place to the political pro-
cess, but rather to avoid or mitigate judicial coercion of the losing side in 
a constitutional conflict. At the same time, Burt supports frequent "par-
85. Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict 5 (1992). 
86. Id. at 359-60, 360-61, 361-62. Sunstein expressly acknowledges his debt to Burt 
in One Case at a Time. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 268 n.5. 
87. Burt, supra note 85, at 363; see also id. at 362-67. "[MJid-level scrutiny is an 
important jurisprudential innovation that holds considerable promise in many different 
contexts. Its great virtue ... is its conversational character: when the Court invalidates a 
statute on this basis, this action permits and even invites a legislative response." 1d. at 364; 
cf. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 163-70 (praising Court's VMI decision 
for invalidating discrimination apparently motivated by animus towards women while 
leaving the legislature free to pursue gender segregation in appropriate contexts); Jay D. 
Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny asJudicial Minimalism, 66 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 298, 303 (1998) (offering another minimalist defense of "middle-tier" or 
"intermediate" scrutiny). 
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ticularistic, contextually circumscribed, tentatively offered judicial inter-
ventions"88 as necessary to prevent one side in such a conflict from coerc-
ing the other.89 
It is a bit difficult to separate the substantive from the procedural 
implications of Burt's approach ... Procedurally, Burt advocates (and criti-
cizes the Court for failing to render) narrow decisions on controversial 
constitutional issues like the death penalty90 and abortion,91 lamenting 
the Court's abandonment of "small-gauge rulings" in the former con-
text92 and its disregard of narrower void-for-vagueness or equal-protec-
tion grounds of decision in the latter.93 Substantively, Burt sometimes 
appears to advocate complete judicial abstention from decision of such 
issues, as when he suggests that the Court might have used the doctrine 
of ripeness to decline adjudication of the abortion controversy.94 The 
difficulty is that Burt's approach does not lend itself comfortably to cate-
gorization into "substantive" and "procedural" aspects, because Burt's un-
derlying point is essentially that no institution-not the judiciary, and not 
a m.yority within the political branches-should conclusively decide an 
issue without the agreement of all those affected. by the decision. Thus 
Burt's minimalism is "substantive" in its distaste for judicial invalidation 
of political judgments, but "procedural" in its support for decisionmaking 
techniques that decide particular cases while keeping fundamental issues 
always alive for discussion. 
As this brief description suggests, Burt's minimalism is subtly but im-
portantly different from the minimalism of Sunstein, Fallon, and Dorf. It 
does not seem to be animated by the premise that the Court either is less 
legitimate or is equally or less competent than the political branches in 
making decisions about constitutional rights. Burt's minimalism stems 
instead from a distrust of coercive decisionmaking by any institution, not 
just the judiciary. In this sense it is less judicial minimalism than minimal-
ism across the board, prescribed for any institution that might make deci-
sions coercing people. 
b. "DiscUTSivist" Minimalism. - A recent trend in constitutional schol-
arship that is closely related to minimalism (and may even be a species of 
it) is what I will call "discursivism."95 The core idea of discursivism is that 
the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, should attempt to re-
solve constitutional issues by engaging in some form of dialogue or give-
and-take with the political branches rather than by imposing final and 
88. Burt, supra note 85, at 367. 
89. See generally id. at 353-75 (advocating or defending minimalistic interventions 
by the Court in polarized contexts such as school segregation, abortion, and gay rights). 
90. See id. at 327-44. 
91. See id. at 344-52, 357-62. 
92. Id. at 338. 
93. See id. at 348, 349-50. 
94. See id. at 360-61. 
95. "Conversationalism" might be a better term, but I find it humorously awkward to 
describe proponents of this approach as "conversationalists." 
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authoritative decisions of those issues. The motto of judicial discursivism 
might well be Neal Devins's statement that "[n]o branch should be the 
final arbiter of the Constitution's meaning,"96 with the emphasis, as I 
have placed it, on the word "final." On the discursivist view, the Court 
should decide issues in ways that stimulate rather than foreclose inter-
branch dialogue and, in doing so, should take advantage of the judici-
ary's special capacity for the language of principle. 
Devins advocates a discursivist approach in his review of Sunstein's 
One Case at a Time. According to Devins, Sunstein's brand of minimalism 
"[i]n some ways ... goes too far" and "[i]n other ways ... does not go far 
enough."97 It goes too far "in discounting the virtues of judicial review, 
especially with regard to occasions when the judiciary should embrace 
some interpretive theory of what the Constitution means and thereby play 
a leadership role in the shaping of constitutional values."98 Sometimes, 
Devins contends, courts should "invok[e] high-sounding principles when 
striking down elected government action,"99 because in doing so the judi-
ciary can more persuasively validate other political branch decisions that 
pass constitutional muster. IOO More generally, courts should not be 
afraid to speak in the language of principle-Sunstein's "deep" theo-
rizing-because "their willingness to speak about principle can be salu-
tary, even if the principles they identify are wrongheaded."101 Devins's 
basic point is that courts can and should contribute meaningfully to the 
ultimate resolution of contested constitutional issues by injecting the id-
iom of principle (rather than of self-interest or of cold cost-benefit analy-
sis) into the national discussion, and that this, rather than mere yea-or-
nay review of political decisions, should be their primary modus 
operandi. 102 
On the other hand, Devins thinks Sunstein's minimalism "does not 
go far enough" because it underplays techniques of actually avoiding de-
cision of an issue-the doctrines of "standing [ ] [and] ripeness, certiorari 
denials, and the like"103 that Bickel famously referred to as the "passive 
96. Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1971, 1990 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at 1992. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1990. 
100. This argument evokes Charles Black's thesis, echoed by Bickel, that the 
"legitimating function" of judicial review can be just as important as its "checking 
function." Bickel, supra note 3, at 29-31 (citing Charles L. Black,Jr., The People and the 
Court 34 (1960)). 
101. Devins, supra note 96, at 1990. 
102. Devins's view is partly animated by his belief that, in the long run, the Court's 
actual decision making means relatively little anyway. See id. at 1991 ("If elected 
government and the people disagree with the Court, they will countermand its 
decision making. "). 
103. 1d. at 1973, 1975. 
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virtues."104 Here Devins's critique seems primarily one of emphasis, as 
his arguments for the passive virtues track Sunstein's arguments for sub-
stantive minimalism, relying on "[i]nherent limits in judicial factfind-
ing,"105 "the risks of elected government reprisals to unpopular decision-
making" (with Roe v. Wade as the case in point),106 and the Court's 
historical lack of success "in hlocking a determined and persistent law-
making majority on a major policy."107 
Another discursivist is Neal Kumar Katyal, who contends that courts 
should be unapologetic "advicegivers" with respect to the political 
branches. !Os According to Katyal, "[a]dvicegiving occurs when judges 
recommend, but do not mandate, a particular course of action based on 
a rule or principle in a judicial case or controversy."109 Such "advice" is 
essentially dicta; it is the type of deep theorizing or reasongiving, unnec-
essary to the strict result of the case, that Sunstein generally ahhors and 
Devins often admires. For Katyal, the point of judicial advicegiving is to 
allow courts to avoid the problems of democratic legitimacy and judicial 
competence that arise when cases are decided hroadly-the standard 
bugaboos of the judicial minimalists-while at the same time providing 
some predictability in the law and, crucially, signaling to the political 
branches potential constitutional problems and potential solutions to 
them. Katyal writes: 
[A]dvicegiving is a natural adaptation in a world in which judges 
fear deciding issues due to the countermajoritarian difficulty; 
those jurists who want to avoid interference with legislative 
power announce narrow holdings, but superimpose broad ad-
vice (a form of dicta) by fully explicating the rationale and as-
sumptions behind a decision.110 
Like Devins, Katyal sees the Court as a coequal participant in the shaping 
of constitutional understandings. Katyal's judicial advicegiving is akin to 
Devins's principled leadership; it is the Court's unique method of con-
tributing to a tripartite (judicial, legislative, executive) resolution of con-
stitutional issues. As Katyal explains, "[t]he Court, hy providing advice, 
enters into a conversation with the political branches and embraces its 
partnership. "111 
Judicial discursivism as espoused by Devins and Katyal has much in 
common with Sunstein's brand of minimalism, particularly its emphasis 
on narrow judicial decisionmaking both as a way of respecting the supe-
104. Bickel, supra note 3, at Ill; see also supra Part 1.A.5 (comparing Sunstein's 
minimalism with Bickel's "passive virtues"). 
105. Devins, supra note 96, at 1978. 
106. Id. at 1979. 
107. Id. at 1980 (quoting Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. Law 279, 286 (1957». 
108. Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1709, 171 0 (1998). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1711. 
111. Id. 
1474 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1454 
rior democratic legitimacy of the political branches and as a way of avoid-
ingjudicial error. It parts ways with Sunstein, and to a certain extent with 
Fallon and Dorf, in advocating deeply reasoned judicial decisions as a way 
to initiate conversation with the political branches. Here the disagree-
ment seems primarily methodological, as Sunstein favors promoting de-
liberation through judicial passivity while the discursivists favor promot-
ing deliberation through relatively aggressive, though not necessarily 
decisive,judicial activity. Discursivism also evokes Robert Burt's emphasis 
on non coercion and coequal decisionmaking among the three branches. 
Discursivism thus seems mostly to be about procedural minimal-
ism-about deciding actual issues narrowly, with plenty of reasons and 
dicta thrown in to get the other branches, and perhaps the public, think-
ing hard about an issue. Devins's version also incorporates substantive 
minimal ism of the type favored by Sunstein, although perhaps to a 
greater degree. He advocates avoiding some constitutional decisions alto-
gether (and thus at least temporarily deferring to the political branches) 
in order to reduce the risk of judicial error. 
Finally, discursivism introduces a dimension of the debate over judi-
cial review that Sunstein only hints at: the possibility that constitutional 
issues might be aggressively decided by the Supreme Court but nonethe-
less left open in some sense for reconsideration by the other branches. 
This is the possibility of judicial review without judicial supremacy, and 1 
discuss it briefly in my treatment of the work of Mark Tushnet in the next 
section. 
c. Abolitionism. - Recently, some on the political left have revived 
the idea, mostly dormant in respectable circles since the early nineteenth 
century, that judicial review should be done away with altogether. 1l2 This 
is in a sense the apotheosis of judicial minimalism. Chief among those 
daring to suggest an end to the "great experiment" 1 13 of judicial review is 
Mark Tushnet, and I will focus exclusively and briefly here on his work. 
Tushnet's latest book, not-so-subtly titled Taking the Constitution Away from 
the Courts, is a playful and deeply thought-provoking critical examination 
of the utility and legitimacy of judicial review. Much of Tushnet's argu-
ment in the book challenges not judicial review but judicial supremacy: 
the notion, in its most powerful expression, that the Supreme Court's 
resolution of a constitutional issue is binding not just on the parties to the 
particular case decided, but on the political branches of government in 
every circumstance-litigated case or not-involving the same or an anal-
ogous issue, for all time (unless and until the Court changes its mind).1l4 
I happen to agree with a large part of Tushnet's argument against judicial 
112. This notion, however, has always had some supporters among contemporary 
political conservatives. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 6, at 137-42 (arguing for the ultimate 
form of "judicial restraint": the complete elimination of judicial review). 
113. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 154. 
114. Tushnet challenges judicial supremacy primarily in the first two chapters of his 
book. See id. at 6-32, 33-53. 
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supremacy, for reasons that are well beyond my scope here. A significant 
portion of Tushnet's book, however, attacks the more modest (and more 
well-entrenched) institution of judicial review-that is, the authority of 
courts to refuse to follow (or to "implement," or to '~apply") political deci-
sions that they believe to be unconstitutional when those decisions are 
placed squarely before them in a litigated case .115 It is of course the insti-
tution of judicial review with which judicial minimalism, and thus this 
Article, is primarily concerned. 
Tushnet's attack on judicial review differs significantly from the 
more moderate critiques offered by the new minimalists-not surpris-
ingly, since Tushnet advocates getting rid of the practice altogether 
rather than merely reining it in. Part of Tushnet's case-the most inter-
esting part-is unabashedly utilitarian. The Supreme Court, he con-
tends, is now and has been for some time less friendly to "liberal" goals 
than to "conservative" ones, and thus liberals concerned with good gov-
ernment have ample reason to want to reduce the Court's power. 1 16 We 
can safely put this refreshingly candid argument to one side, for it is well 
beyond the reach of this Article. II7 
More to the point here is Tushnet's nonpartisan critique of judicial 
review. Most of this critique is negative-that is, focused not on the af-
firmative evils of judicial review, but rather on what Tushnet believes to 
be the general lack of a good reason for having it. Tushnet's primary 
theme is that the political branches, in the main, are no less capable of 
making good constitutional decisions than is the judicial branch,1I8 open-
ing the possibility of what Tushnet calls "populist constitutional law." 11 9 
Tushnet also believes that judicial review ultimately does not serve the 
purpose that is usually claimed for it-providing a meaningful check on 
majoritarian excess-because the Supreme Court typically, if belatedly, 
tracks the values of the political majority in its decisions. I2o 
Tushnet's primary positive critique of judicial review evokes James 
Bradley Thayer's classic contention that the availability of judicial review 
renders the political branches less likely to make, and to take seriously, 
their own constitutional judgments-what Tushnet calls "[t]he 
115. See id. at 129-53, 154-76. 
116. This is the primary argument of Chapter Six. See id. at 129-53. 
117. It is, however, worth asking whether Tushnet should be concerned about getting 
what he wishes for. Should the Court in future years take a turn back to the (comparative) 
left-as it inevitably will, in my view-then I suppose Tushnet, unapologetically, can write 
another book, this time entitled Giving the Constitution Back to the Courts. 
118. Most of Tushnet's argument for this proposition appears in Chapter Three. See 
Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 54-71. 
119. Id. at x. See generally id. at 177-94. 
120. See id. at 129-53. Tushnet draws empirical support for this assertion primarily 
from Dahl, supra note 107. See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 
216 n.18. 
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[i]nfluence of the [j]udicial [o]verhang."121 Tushnet adds several re-
lated points which boil down to the claim-which is in some tension with 
the Thayerian argument-that when the political hranches do pay atten-
tion to constitutionality, their fear of judicial review shifts their focus away 
from good policymaking and toward the production of empty legalese 
intended to pass the Court's muster. 122 
Tushnet's abolitionist arguments are as substantively minimalist as 
they come: He advocates universal judicial deference to political judg-
ments in constitutional matters. 123 Thus most of my arguments against 
substantive minimalism in Part V of this Article apply to Tushnet just as 
they apply to more moderate advocates of minimalism. 124 But the aboli-
tionist core of Tushnet's arguments, radical as it is in comparison to the 
relatively modest assertions of Sunstein and other new minimalists, is 
mostly beyond my scope here. 
C. The Blueprint of a Critique 
The new judicial minimalism espoused by Sunstein, and echoed in 
key respects by Fallon, Dorf, and others, operates on the premise that 
decisionmaking by the political branches is generally preferable to deci-
sionmaking by the judiciary. Without this premise, a prescription of judi-
cial minimalism makes no sense; one might as well argue for legislative or 
executive minimalism. 125 
None of the new minimalists tells us in so many words why a prefer-
ence for political over judicial decision making is defensible. Let me sug-
gest, however, that such a preference must be based on a two-part 
calculus. The first part holds that political decisionmaking, generally 
speaking, is siguificantly more legitimate in a democratic sense than judi-
cial decisionmaking. The second part holds that any supposed advan-
tages of judicial over political decisionmaking, such as a greater ability to 
protect individual rights, are relatively small or infrequent. These two 
assumptions combine to form the calculus that underlies new minimalist 
arguments: In most cases, any advantages of judicial decision making are out-
weighed by the superior democratic legitimacy of political decision making. Thus 
the Court should proceed in a minimalist fashion, trumping or preempt-
ing the political process only in those relatively rare cases where it is clear 
121. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 57-58 (citing James 
Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893». 
122. See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 58-65. 
123. See, e.g., id. at 175 (proposing the following constitutional amendment: "The 
provisions of t.his Constitution shall not be cognizable by any court."). 
124. The exception is my argument that substantive minimalism is itself prone to 
judicial error. See infra Part V.C. This objection should not bother Tushnet, because a 
Court that never overrides political decisions (as he advocates) cannot commit errors in 
deciding when and when not to do so. 
125. For reasons discussed earlier, Robert Burt's minimalism probably does not share 
this premise. See supra Part l.B.3.a. 
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that politics surely has got it wrong and that the Court surely will get it 
right. 
In the next two Parts, I suggest reasons to believe that both compo-
nents of this comparative calculus are wrong, or at least drastically incom-
plete. First, as I contend in Part II, the assumption that political decision-
making is, as a general matter, significantly more democratically 
legitimate than judicial decision making overlooks the fundamentally par-
ticipatory and representative nature of the adjudicative process. Second, 
as I argue in Part III, the assumption that courts do not generally possess 
significantly greater competence than the political branches in the area 
of individual rights disregards the unique advantages of the adjudicative 
process for principled deliberation. 
II. DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILrIY AND THE COURT 
For Sunstein, the leading new minimalist, a crucial element in the 
legitimacy oflawmaking within our political system is "accountability." As 
he explains, in a system of deliherative democracy, "representatives are to 
be accountable to the public."126 Accountability, of course, would not be 
an issue in a direct democracy, in which every citizen participated directly 
in making laws. I27 Accountability becomes an issue only in a system of 
representation, in which some people make decisions in the name of, 
and with binding effect upon, most of their fellows. And ours is a system 
of representation; indeed, Sunstein would not have it any other way. Like 
his political archetype,James Madison, Sunstein believes that true delibera-
tion in a democracy can occur only in representative bodies capable of 
"refin[ing] and enlarg[ing] the public views."128 
And yet Sunstein, like most people, believes the American system is 
fundamentally democratic, even though most of us do not directly partici-
pate in making the laws. Are Sunstein, Madison, and the many others 
who have been willing to divorce a conception of "democracy" from di-
126. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 24. 
127. This is something of an oversimplification. Even in a direct democracy, the 
majority might have some obligations of accountability to the minority. This is the impulse 
that seems to animate the work of Robert Burt and the "representation reinforcement" 
theory of judicial review made famous by John Hart Ely. See Burt, supra note 85, at 40-41; 
Ely, supra note 52. But we can put this complex issue to one side for present purposes. At 
the very least, any problems of accountability are of a very different nature, and probably of 
a lesser degree, in a system of direct democracy than in a system of representative 
democracy. 
128. The Federalist No. 10, supra note 28, at 126; see also Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time, supra note 8, at 133 ("[AJ referendum ... bypasses the ordinary ... filters of 
political representation and hence raises special dangers .... The American system is one 
of representative rather than direct democracy, partly because of a judgment that political 
deliberation can be best promoted through a representative system."); Sunstein, Free 
Speech, supra note 8, at 241-42 (discussing deliberative function of system of political 
representation); Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 20-24 (same). 
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rect CItizen participation in lawmaking somehow missing the point of 
democracy? 
A. Representation and Accountability 
Sunstein and other defenders of representative government-I shall 
call them "republicans" for simplicity of reference-are not missing the 
point of democracy. Democracy is about the participation in lawmaking 
of those governed by the laws. But Sunstein and other republicans be-
lieve that the value of participation in representative government can be 
manifested in other, often better ways besides direct citizen involvement 
in lawmaking. 
The most obvious of these ways is voting. The highest form of politi-
cal participation for most American citizens is periodically casting a vote 
in an election. Another obvious form of citizen political participation is 
political speech, which of course is protected by the First Amendment. 129 
In order to conceptualize representative government as self-govern-
ment, however, Sunstein, Madison, and other republicans must engage in 
a little alchemy. They must transform citizen voting and citizen political 
speech into actual participation in lawmaking, in some recognizable form 
and to some significant degree. This is where the idea of accountability 
comes in. Representative government can be thought of as participatory 
government so long as the representatives-those actually making the 
laws-are tied sufficiently closely and reliably to the citizens-those 
bound by the laws. If political representatives are suitably "accountable" 
to their constituents, then the constituents are in a sense making the laws, 
even though they are not actually drafting the statutes or regulations, de-
bating them on the legislative floor or in an agency conference room, 
voting for or against their enactlnent or promulgation, and so on. The 
laws can be traced, and attributed, to "the people" in somewhat the same 
way the actions of an agent can be traced and attributed to the 
principal. 130 
129. Sunstein is particularly concerned with protecting these forms of political 
participation. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 64, 185-86 
(describing protection of political speecb as part of the substantive "core" of minimalism); 
id. at 64 (describing the right to vote as part of this core); Sunstein, Free Speech, supra 
note 8, at 241-52 (arguing that "the free speech principle should be understood to be 
centered above all on political thought"). 
130. But probably not in exactly the same way. The first Congress rejected the 
inclusion in the Bill of Rights of a "right to instruct" representatives how to vote, to be 
exercised by a majority of the representatives' constituents. See 1 Annals of Congo 733-47 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Roger Sherman argued against such a right by noting that "[ilf 
[representativesl were to be guided by instructions, there would be no use in deliberation." 
Id. at 735; see also Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 8, at 242 (discussing Congress's 
rejection of "right to instruct"); Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 22 (same). 
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The question then becomes how to ensure suitaHe accountability 
from representative to citizen. I31 In this regard, "[e]lectoral control is an 
important part of the system."132 "Electoral control" really has two closely 
connected elements: electoral coercion and electoral remediation. I33 Elec-
toral coercion is the mechanism by which elected representatives will 
avoid wandering too far from the wishes of their constituents for fear of 
losing their jobs at the next election;I34 in Madison's words, it is the pro-
cess by which representatives are "compelled to anticipate the moment 
when their power is to cease ... unless a faithful discharge of their trust 
shall have established their title to a renewal of it."135 Electoral remedia-
tion is the mechanism by which citizens, unhappy with the results of their 
representatives' efforts, can "throw the bums out" and replace them with 
new legislators who then can enact better laws. 
Electoral control is not the only mechanism of political accountabil-
ity, however. A process of interest representation plays an important but un-
derappreciated role in the system as well. I36 When citizens vote for rep-
resentatives, they are not simply voting for whomever they think most 
likely to be cowed into defending their interests by the pressure of the 
polls. (Whether this is who they often get is another matter.) They are 
voting for someone who they think shares their interests, at least in crucial 
respects. A representative who shares basic interests of her constituents 
has a motive to promote those interests quite apart from her desire for 
reelection, since they are her interests, too, as a private citizen. This is 
the point Madison was making when he wrote of the "communion of in-
terests and sympathy of sentiments" between representatives and constitu-
ents that would be created by the fact that members of Congress "can 
make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and 
their friends, as well as on the great mass of the society."137 
The idea of interest representation would seem to be especially help-
ful to a vision of deliberative democracy like Sunstein's, because it ex-
plains how a representative can be both politically accountable and delib-
131. Note the double meaning of "accountability" in this context: In a properly 
functioning system of representative government, representatives are accountable to the 
citizens, and-by virtue of this fact-the citizens themselves can be held "accountable" for the laws 
enacted by their representatives. 
132. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 24. 
133. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 341. 
134. I mean "wishes of their constituents" here in a very ecumenical sense, to allow for 
theories by which legislators should respond more to their constituents' true "interests," 
long term goals, and the like, in addition to, or instead of, their day-tCKiay "wishes." See 
infra notes 136-140 and accompanying text. 
135. The Federalist No. 57, at 344-45 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
136. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 342-46. 
137. The Federalist No. 57, supra note 135, at 345; cf. Letter from Edmund Burke to 
Sir Hercules Langrishe (Jan. 3, 1792), excerpted in Burke's Politics 477, 494 (Ross J.S. 
Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949) (explaining desirability of "a communion of interests 
and a sympathy in feelings and desires" between representative and constituents). 
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erative in decisionmaking.138 A representative solely concerned with the 
relatively immediate task of getting reelected might be tempted to trade 
off her constituents' interests for their shorter-term wishes; she might act as 
if she were subject to a "right to instruct," even if she thinks the "instruc-
tions" she is receiving from her constituents (through public opinion 
polls, for instance) really will not serve them best in the long run. The 
result of such an attitude-one all too familiar in modem politics-is a 
representative's reluctance or refusal to engage in meaningful political 
discourse, even in the face of facts and arguments to which her constitu-
ents are not fully privy. 
But a representative who, in representing her constituents' long-
term interests, also is representing her own can really deliberate about how 
best to serve them. She can listen to opposing arguments with an open 
mind; sbe can evaluate the implications of facts that her constituents do 
not have; she even can compromise on occasion in the name of a greater 
good. In deciding how to proceed, the representative can act as her con-
stituents would act, if they had the benefit of the information and argu-
ments available to her. 139 This is the conception of political decisionmak-
ing that Sunstein favors. 14o And it is a conception that is, if not 
impossible without an interest representation component, vastly more 
convincing with it. 
So "accountability" in a deliberative democracy is best conceived of 
as containing two components: electoral control and interest representa-
tion. These components transpose the democratic ideal of citizen partici-
pation in lawmaking to the context of representative government. Repre-
sentative government in tum adds, or at least supplements, the crucial 
deliberative component of deliberative democracy. Thus the participa-
tion of the governed in a deliberative democracy occurs on two basic 
levels: direct participation, through voting, political speech, and occasion-
ally devices like referenda, initiatives, and New England-style town meet-
ings; and indirect or "virtual" participation, through representatives, by 
means of a system of political accountability. 
138. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 345-46. 
139. See id. at 345; Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason 36 (1994) 
(describing Madison's belief that "[i]f the representatives of the people share the basic 
interests and desires of their constituents, then their deliberations should result in policies 
that will approximate what the people themselves would have chosen had they engaged in 
a similar process of reasoning about the information and arguments presented in national 
councils"); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 222 (1967) (quoting 
New York state legislator as asserting that, "[h]ad the ... people who had written me been 
in the possession of the knowledge which was mine, at least a majority of them would have 
taken [my] position"). 
140. See Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 23 (endorsing the Madisonian 
view that "[r]epresentatives should not mechanically translate the desires of their 
constituents into law .... Even desires, or current beliefs about what courses of action are 
best, should not be frozen. The framers insisted that existing views might be a product of 
partial perspectives, of limited experience, or of incomplete information."); see also 
Sunstein, Free Speech, supra note 8, at 244-48 (making similar points). 
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B. Adjudication as Representation 
A fact too often overlooked is that these complementary elements-
direct participation and indirect participation through representation-
are present not just in decisionmaking by the "political" branches of gov-
ernment, but in adjudication as well. Adjudication, even constitutional ad-
judication, is driven primarily by the participation of the litigants, not by 
the court itself.141 One of the litigants (usually acting through counsel) 
initiates the case, by filing a lawsuit or a criminal prosecution. Each liti-
gant locates relevant facts and determines whether and how to present 
them to the court. Each litigant identifies relevant legal authorities, syn-
thesizes the facts and authorities into legal arguments, and makes those 
arguments to the court. When the court-meaning the judge, or panel 
of judges-makes a decision on the merits, or indeed on procedural mat-
ters, that decision typically is responsive to the facts presented and argu-
ments made by the litigants. In most courts, dispositive decisions are me-
morialized and defended by judges in written opinions, largely to ensure 
precisely this responsiveness. 
The role of the judge or judges in all of this remains relatively pas-
sive, even under modern rules of procedure and evidence. It consists 
mostly of rendering a decision that is responsive to the proofs and argu-
ments. To the extent the judge's role extends beyond simply deciding 
the substantive and procedural issues presented in the case by the liti-
gants, it usually is limited to one or more of three kinds of activities: (1) 
tending to scheduling and other docket-related matters;142 (2) narrowing 
and clarifying the issues that will be contested at trial;143 and (3) encour-
aging settlement.144 Moreover, these activities are primarily the province 
of trial judges, not of appellate panels. 
It is thus rather narrowminded to think of adjudication as decision-
making by judges. Adjudication is decisionmaking by judges and litigants; 
the boundaries of a judge's or panel's decision are set by the decisions 
the litigants make with respect to what facts to present, what arguments to 
141. The brief description of participatory adjudication that follows derives from my 
more detailed treatment in Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 347-56, which itselfwas 
inspired by a number of sources, primarily MiIjan R. DamaSka, The Faces of Justice and 
State Authority (1986), and Fuller, supra note 13. 
142. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994 & Supp. 
N 1998) (requiring district courts to create and implement "civil justice expense and delay 
reduction plans"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (giving district judges broad authority to control 
scheduling of litigation). 
143. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (allowing district judges to "take appropriate 
action" with respect to, inter alia, "the formulation and simplification of the issues"); Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 42 (allowing district courts to order consolidation of actions or separate trials). 
144. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (requiring district courts to "consider ... careful 
and deliberate monitoring" of cases, including "explor[ing) the parties' receptivity to, and 
the propriety of, settlement"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) (allowing district judges to 
encourage "settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the 
dispute"). 
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make, and how to present and make them. It is true, of course, that liti-
gants often complain about judges ignoring what they consider to be im-
portant facts or rejecting what they consider to be decisive arguments. 
Indeed,judges often do this. But judges are subject to criticism when they 
do this-a point whose significance can hardly be overstated. 145 Judges 
do not write their opinions without regard for whether they will be per-
ceived as adequately responsive to what the litigants have done and said. 
Such considerations surely are foremost in their minds. Nor do judges 
(for the most part) write opinions in which they make up facts, or rely 
upon evidence not in the record, or rely upon evidence that they them-
selves have elicited outside the parties' own efforts, or even, in most cases, 
rely upon legal arguments not urged by one of the parties. 146 
Sunstein cheapens somewhat these de facto, institutionalized con-
straints on the judicial role when he classifies judicial reason-giving as a 
"norm[ ] associated with legal craft."147 Reason-giving is a norm associ-
ated with legal (or, more to the point, judicial) craft the way the Hippo-
cratic Oath is a norm associated with medical craft; it is essential to the 
enterprise. Judicial reason-giving demonstrates whether, and to what de-
gree, a court's decision is responsive to the proofs and arguments 
presented by the litigants. And responsiveness to the proofs and argu-
ments presented by the litigants is the sine qua non ofadjudication.148 In 
this sense, judicial reason-giving is even more vital than reason-giving in 
the political branches, a norm that Sunstein ranks highly.149 Inade-
quately responsive legislators can be removed from office through the 
electoral process; inadequately responsive federal judges cannot be. 
Norms associated with legal craft are all there is to constrain them. 
145. And-an equally important point-Iower-courtjudges are subject to reversal on 
appeal when they ignore important facts or decisive arguments, so long as they have done 
so in an evident and material enough way. As such, the proclivities of a single non-
responsive judge tend to be rendered less harmful by the discipline of the appellate system. 
146. A related point is that judges are siguificantiy constrained by the type of 
arguments the parties usually make: arguments rooted in precedent. As David Strauss has 
written, "[aJ judge who conscientiously tries to follow precedent is significantly limited in 
what she can do .... Judges wbo might be tempted to overreach, but who are susceptible to 
criticism ... , can be evaluated by fairly well developed standards under the common law 
method." David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
877,926-27 (1996). As Strauss demonstrates, the constraint imposed upon judges by the 
common law method operates in constitutional adjudication as well. See id. 
147. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 16. Sunstein's rather dismissive 
nod toward legal norms in One Case at a Time is anomalous; his book Legal Reasoning and 
Political Conflict is entirely devoted to the thesis that norms of legal craft playa vital role in 
the political legitimacy of adjudication. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8. 
148. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 369 ("Adjudication is a process of decision that 
grants to the affected party a form of participation that consists in the opportunity to 
present proofs and reasoned arguments."). 
149. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 24-25,31 (arguing that 
"reason-giving" is a central part of legislative and administrative processes); Sunstein, 
Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 24-39 (claiming that "the antiauthoritarian impulse, 
understood as a requirement of reasons, lies at the heart of American constitutional law") . 
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Adjudication, then, is a fonn of government decisionmaking in 
which those bound by the decision have the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully-in which the affected parties "are bound by something 
they helped to make."150 This should sound familiar, because in this 
sense adjudication incorporates the democratic ideal of self-government. 
Litigants bound by a court decision have participated in that decision no 
less integrally-indeed, more integrally-than have most citizens bound 
by congressional legislation or administrative rulemaking. The synthesiz-
ing presence of a judge in adjudication is no more threatening to the 
fundamentally participatory nature of the process than is the synthesizing 
presence of representatives to the process of political legislation. Nor is 
the judge's presence any more threatening to participation than is the 
presence of majorities in the legislative chamber or the electorate, who 
must be convinced to vote a certain way in order for the participation of a 
particular citizen to be effectual. 
The result of a court decision-one produced according to the 
nonns of legal craft that require litigant participation and court respon-
siveness-thus can be said to carry a strong measure of democratic legiti-
macy with respect to the litigants involved in the case. This last bit is of 
course a key qualifier: with respect to the litigants involved in the case. A 
court's decision can have binding effects far beyond the litigants who are 
immediately bound by it. It can extend forward in time through stare 
decisis, binding (to a certain degree) the litigants in future cases for 
which the original decision serves as precedent. This is the primary sense 
in which judicial review typically impacts the legal landscape; its greatest 
strengths, and its biggest problems, usually lie not in the effects of a deci-
sion on the immediate litigants, but in the lasting effects of that decision 
through its application to other litigants (and to parties who change their 
behavior to avoid becoming litigants-what I have called "confonning 
nonlitigants"151) in future cases. 
Future litigants and confonning nonlitigants who are in this sense 
bound by a court decision have not themselves participated in the process 
of making that decision. But this does not mean that the decision is dem-
ocratically illegitimate with respect to them, any more than the fact that 
citizens typically do not directly participate in the making of laws means 
that those laws cannot legitimately bind them. In both cases, the key is 
accountability-or, perhaps more accurately, reliability of representation. 
Accountability in the political branches works through electoral control 
and interest representation; accountability in the judicial branch works 
through interest representation alone. But it works nonetheless, and re-
markably well in most cases. 152 
150. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 4 (1949). 
151. Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 372-74. 
152. Again, the description of adjudication as representation that follows derives from 
my more extensive treaIrnent in id. at 360-78. 
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Imagine a simple court case. We will start with a common law case 
rather than a constitutional one, although constitutional cases are at the 
center of minimalist arguments. Constitutional cases pose complexities 
that are best put to one side for the moment (to be examined in Part 
Il.C). Moreover, in order to understand how interest representation 
works in constitutional cases, it is first necessary to understand how it 
works in the common law. 
We can use a real-world example that I have used before. 153 In Dillon 
v. Legg, Margery Dillon brought a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress against the driver of a car, David Luther Legg, who had 
negligently struck and killed Dillon's young daughter while Dillon looked 
on. 154 Under existing California case law, Dillon could not recover for 
emotional distress unless she had been put in fear for her own safety by 
the defendant's conduct. 155 This rule did not help Dillon, since she ap-
parently had not been within the "zone of danger" created by Legg's neg-
ligence (or at least she did not allege that she had been). On this basis, 
the trial court dismissed Dillon's complaint. On appeal to the California 
Supreme Court, Dillon argued that the emotional distress rule should be 
extended to encompass emotional injury that, like Dillon's, arose not 
from fear for the plaintiff's own safety but from the trauma of witnessing 
the death of a close relative. 156 The state supreme court agreed and re-
versed the dismissal. 
The California Supreme Court's decision in Dillon produced a new 
tort rule in that state: Plaintiffs could now recover in tort for emotional 
distress suffered as a result of witnessing the death of a close relative 
through the negligence of the defendant. This rule had a profound im-
pact on many others in California who were not parties to that particular 
case. 157 Injured persons in the position of Margery Dillon could now 
bring lawsuits and potentially recover damages for their i~uries; 
tortfeasors in the position of David Legg (and their insurance carriers) 
could now be held liable and forced to pay these damages. The impact 
on the law was just as strong as if the new liability rule had been enacted 
by the California legislature. But none of the parties affected, with the 
exception of Dillon and Legg themselves (and probably Legg's insurance 
carrier), had participated in creating the rule. Was the rule democrati-
cally illegitimate as a result?158 
153. See id. at 379-91. 
154. 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968) (en banc). 
155. See id. at 914-15. 
156. See id. 
157. The impact extended to other states as well. See P.G. Guthrie, Annotation, Right 
to Recover Damages in Negligence for Fear of I~ury to Another, or Shock or Mental 
Anguish at Witnessing Such Injuries, 29 A.L.R.3d 1337, 1346, 1360-61 (1970). Dillon 
apparently was the first American decision recognizing emotional distress liability to 
plaintiffs outside the "zone of danger." 
158. I put aside the obvious point that the California legislature could have 
overridden the Dillon rule. 
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Not if we recognize the extent to which Dillon and Legg served as 
interest representatives of these similarly situated litigants and conforming 
nonlitigants. Imagine a subsequent plaintiff, Krouse, whose wife has been 
struck and killed by a negligent driver, Graham, while removing groceries 
from the back of the Krouses' parked car.159 Krouse sues Graham for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the trauma suffered 
by Krouse as a result of witnessing the accident. In defending the lawsuit, 
Graham will have the same interests that Legg had in defending the Dil-
lon case; he will want to present the same kinds of facts, make the same 
kinds of legal arguments, and avoid the same kinds of relief. But of 
course Legg has already presented those facts, made those arguments, 
and attempted to avoid that relief in the precedential case. The rule that 
now binds Graham-tortfeasors in his position must compensate plain-
tiffs in the position of Krouse-has been created by Legg acting in much 
the same way that Graham would have acted in producing the rule. 
Legg, that is, has acted as the interest representative of Graham and 
other similarly situated litigants now bound by the rule Legg participated 
in creating. There is of course no guarantee that Legg's efforts have pro-
duced the best possible outcome. (Certainly Graham does not think they 
have.) But there is no guarantee of that in statutory legislation, either; 
there is only the safegnard of a mechanism that ensures a representative's 
motive to act in the constituent's best interests. In the democratic legisla-
tive process, that safeguard rests primarily in the electoral system. In 
common law adjudication, the safeguard rests in the process of interest 
representation through the binding only of similarly situated future 
litigants. 
And note the crucial fact that Graham is free to argue that the court 
in his case should reach a different result-should not apply the rule 
created in Dillon v. Legg-either because that rule is a bad one and 
should be overturned or, more likely, because the circumstances of his 
case are materially dissimilar to those of Dillon. The latter is in fact pre-
cisely what Graham did in the real case upon which this hypothetical is 
based. In that case, unlike in Dillon, the plaintiff Krouse had not actually 
seen Graham's car strike his wife; instead, he "knew [his wife's] position 
an instant before the impact, observed defendant's vehicle approach her 
at a high speed on a collision course, and realized that defendant's car 
must have struck her."160 Graham argned that this fact was a material 
distinction from Dillon that required the court to reach (or at least justi-
fied the court in reaching) a different result: no liability. The California 
Supreme Court did not accept this distinction, holding that the Dillon 
rule governed Graham's case. But in Deboe v. Horn, the California Court 
of Appeal refused to apply Dillon to allow liability to a plaintiff who had 
been summoned to the emergency room immediately following an acci-
159. See Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Cal. 1977) (en bane). 
160. Id. at 103l. 
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dent that had paralyzed her husband.161 The defendant in Deboe success-
fully argued that the distinction between directly witnessing an accident 
(through some combination of senses) and hearing about it soon after-
ward was material enough to preclude liability in the latter circumstance. 
The point here is that future litigants, like Graham, themselves have 
the opportunity to argue about which precedents should be followed and 
what their implications should be. The decision of subsequent cases will, 
in this sense, be as much the product of litigant participation as the deci-
sion in the precedential case. Rarely does a precedential holding apply 
so squarely as to bind future litigants absolutely. 
To the extent, then, that court decisions bind people, they do so as 
the products of a decisionmaking procedure that respects and incorpo-
rates the democratic values of participation and representation. Court 
decisions are made not just by judges, hut by judges and litigants; and in 
many ways litigants are the primary authors of a decision. These litigant-
lawmakers serve as interest representatives of future litigant-subjects (and 
conforming nonlitigant-subjects). In this sense they are accountable to 
those bound by the laws they make. Adjudication may be differently dem-
ocratic, and possibly (more on this below) less democratic, than political 
decisionmaking. But it is inaccurate to say that adjudication is 
nondemocratic. 
C. Constitutional Cases 
Constitutional cases, the primary worry of the new minimalists, are 
different. They are unique, of course, in the familiar sense that their 
results often cannot be overridden by ordinary political processes. But 
they also are different in the sense that their impact-their binding ef-
fect-might be thought to extend beyond both the immediate litigants 
and those who are similarly situated to them. 
Take Romer v. Evans as an example.162 At issue in that case was the 
validity under the Equal Protection Clause of Amendment 2, a provision 
of the Colorado Constitution prohibiting state and local government 
from treating homosexuality as the basis of "any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination."163 The plain-
tiffs in that case were "homosexual persons, some of them government 
employees," who "alleged that enforcement of Amendment 2 would sub-
ject them to immediate and substantial risk of discrimination on the basis 
of their sexual orientation," and municipalities and other units of state 
and local government "which had acted earlier to protect homosexuals 
from discrimination but would be prevented by Amendment 2 from con-
161. 94 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79-80 (Ct. App. 1971). 
162. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
163. Colo. Const. art. II, § 30b. 
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tinuing to do SO."164 The defendants were the State of Colorado, Gover-
nor Roy Romer, and various other state officials. 
When the Supreme Court struck down Amendment 2 in Romer on 
the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, the immediate 
plaintiffs and, more to the point, the State of Colorado were of course 
bound by the decree. Colorado no longer could enforce the Amend-
ment against any of the plaintiffs. Nor could Colorado enforce the 
Amendment against anyone else; the doctrines of issue preclusion and 
stare decisis would see to that. And nonparties in the position of Colo-
rado were in a sense "bound" as well. Romer was a Supreme Court deci-
sion interpreting the Constitution of the United States. As such, other 
states and localities could no longer enforce legislation materially similar 
to Amendment 2 without facing the certain invalidation of that legisla-
tion pursuant to Romer in federal or state court. 
So far, none of this threatens the picture of adjudication as a par-
ticipatory and representative process. The State of Colorado was legiti-
mately bound by the decree in Romer because it participated fully in the 
making of the decision. Other states and localities seeking to enforce 
similar laws also were legitimately bound, because their interests were 
represented by the similarly situated State of Colorado. And note that to 
the extent other states and localities are able to demonstrate, through 
proofs and reasoned arguments, that the legislation they want to enforce 
is materially different from Amendment 2, they will be able to escape the 
binding effect of that decision. (This is in fact what occurred in Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, in which the City 
of Cincinnati succeeded in convincing the Sixth Circuit that a provision 
of its city charter that was similar to Amendment 2 nonetheless was suffi-
ciently distinct that it could survive equal protection scrutiny.165 The Su-
preme Court denied certiorari. 166) 
The potential problem, however, lies in the apparently broad "hori-
zontal" binding effect of Romer. We can think of a binding effect exerted 
by a precedential decision upon subsequent similarly situated litigants (or 
conforming nonlitigants) as vertical, and of a binding effect exerted rela-
tively contemporaneously upon nonlitigants by means other than stare 
164. 517 U.S. at 625. 
165. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 1997). 
According to the court, 
Id. 
[T]he language of the Cincinnati Charter Amendment, read in its full context, 
merely prevented homosexuals, as homosexuals, from obtaining special privileges 
and preferences ... from the City. In stark contrast, Colorado Amendment 2's 
far broader language could be construed to exclude homosexuals from the 
protection of every Colorado state law, including laws generally applicable to all 
other Coloradans, thus rendering gay people without recourse to any state 
authority at any level of government for any type of victimization or abuse which 
they might suffer by either private or public actors. 
166. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). 
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decisis as horizontal. The horizontal effects of Romer fall upon citizens of 
Colorado (or of other states) who benefited in some way from the exis-
tence and enforcement of Amendment 2 (or of similar legislation). For 
example, citizens who received some ideological or perhaps religious sat-
isfaction from the enforcement of a law against what they perceived to be 
"special treatment" for homosexuals are "bound" by the decision in Romer 
in the sense that they no longer can enjoy that satisfaction. Perhaps more 
concretely, Romer's result means that scarce state money will be spent to 
enforce laws against sexual-orientation discrimination; people who other-
wise would receive that money no longer will receive it and thus are 
"bound" by Romer. Such people did not participate in the decision; nor 
were they as similarly situated to the defendant in Romer (the State of 
Colorado) as were other states and municipalities. Did the decision 
therefore lack democratic legitimacy with respect to them? 
This is a tricky question, to which there are two mutually reinforcing 
answers. The first answer is that it is not entirely true that interested par-
ties other than the original plaintiffs and defendants in Romer were una-
ble to participate in the litigation. Romer was originally filed in Colorado 
state court; the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, tracking the Federal 
Rules, allow intervention of right by a third party who "claims an interest 
relating to ... the subject of the action and ... is so situated that the 
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant'S interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties."167 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a), upon which the Colorado rule is based, has been interpreted to 
allow intervention by third parties with an interest in upholding, or invali-
dating, a particular government policy or decision. 168 Thus third parties 
167. Colo. R. Civ. P. 24(a); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 
168. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 1978) (allowing intervention by mining 
companies in litigation challenging legality of issuance of uranium mill licenses without 
preparation of environmental impact statements); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 180-81 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (allowing intervention by parents whose children attended school district 
accused of unconstitutional policies); United States v. City of Niagara Falls, 103 F.R.D. 164, 
166 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (allowing intervention by association of businesses who sent waste to 
public facility being sued by United States for violating Clean Water Act); Baker v. Regional 
Higb School Dist. No.5, 432 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1977) (allowing intervention of 
residents of less populous towns in lawsuit brought by residents of more populous towns 
challenging constitutionality of scbool district apportionment). As the Smuck and Baker 
decisions illustrate, courts have not limited intervention to those whose potentially affected 
interests are pecuniary. In Smuck the intervening parents' interest was "concern for their 
children's welfare," 408 F.2d at 180, while in Balter it was citizens' interests "as voters, 
residents, and parents of school children." 432 F. Supp. at 537. More broadly, many 
decisions have allowed Rule 24 intervention of right based on the potential impact of stare 
decisis on the intervenors' interests. See generally 7C Charles Alan Wright et aI., Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1908 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 2000), and cases cited therein. 
Courts have divided on the question of wbether a potential intervenor under Rule 24 
must demonstrate Article III standing, and the Supreme Court has not resolved the issue. 
See Wright, supra, at § 1908; see also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 
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who were interested in the continued enforcement of Amendment 2, and 
who could demonstrate that the existing defendants were not adequately 
representing their interests, might have been allowed to intervene in the 
litigation had they sought to do so. 
Short of actual intervention as parties in the lawsuit, interested third 
parties could have filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court pur-
suant to Supreme Court Rule 37. 169 Two groups of amici actually did this 
in Romer, although neither of them supported upholding Amendment 
2.170 
Thus, there are a number of means by which interested third parties 
can and frequently do participate in the Court's decisionmaking process 
in important constitutional cases. 171 Even if these means were not availa-
576-77 (8th Cir. 1998) (requiring Article III standing for intervention); Building & Constr. 
Trades Dep't v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same); cf., e.g., Associated 
Builders & Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688,690 (6th Cir. 1994) (not requiring Article 111 
standing for intervention); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); 
United States Postal Servo v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978) (same). Recent 
Supreme Court decisions have limited standing in the federal courts. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 105 (1998) (denying standing to environmental 
group suing business for violating Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know 
Act); Raines V. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997) (denying standing to members of 
Congress seeking to challenge constitutionality of Line Item Veto Act); Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992) (denying standing to environmental groups suing 
Secretary of Interior for failure to interpret correctly Endangered Species Act); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-66 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black schoolchildren 
suing Internal Revenue Service for failure to deny tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory private schools). Despite these decisions, however, it is far from clear that 
the Court would require Article III standing for intervention, since the fact that 
intervention occurs only when some plaintiff with standing already has brought a lawsuit 
might change the relevant calculus. If the Court were to impose such a requirement, the 
opportunities for meaningful participation by third parties I outline here would be 
significantly reduced, and with them potentially the legitimacy of many federal court 
decisions. Thus there are strong reasons of legitimacy to allow broad standing to intervene 
in constitutional cases. As 1 have argned elsewhere, however, many of those same reasons 
favor justiciability doctrines that ensure that at least one plaintiff has an actual personal 
stake in the controversy. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 420-30. 
169. See Sup. Ct. Rule 37(1} (allowing filing of amicus curiae brief "that brings to the 
attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties"). 
170. See Brief of the Human Rights Campaign Fund et ai., as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 1-2, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039); Brief of 
Laurence H. Tribe et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1 (No. 94-1039). 
Notably, many groups on both sides of the issue-newly aware of the stakes after Romer-
filed amicus briefs in the Cincinnati case. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 
F.3d at 291 (listing amicus briefs filed by National Legal Foundation; American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Research; Equal Rights, Not Special Rights; American Family 
Association of Ohio; Cincinnati Federation of Teachers; NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc.; and others). 
171. It is true, of course, that these participatory options are expensive, certainly more 
so than voting, the baseline mode of political participation. A Colorado citizen thus is 
much more likely to vote in favor of Amendment 2 than to file an amicus brief or a motion 
to intervene in a constitutional lawsuit challenging Amendment 2's validity. But a citizen 
also is much more likely to vote in favor of a ballot issue than to undertake more costly 
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ble, however, those bound horizontally by most constitutional decisions 
striking down legislation, including Romer, would be represented in an-
other important sense. In Romer, the defendant was the State of Colo-
rado, represented in the litigation by its state solicitor. 172 The state solici-
tor is an official appointed by the state's Attorney General,173 who is in 
tum elected by the people of the State of Colorado. 1 74 Thus, the inter-
ests, such as they were, of the citizens of Colorado in upholding Amend-
ment 2 were represented by their state solicitor in the Romer litigation 
through traditional mechanisms of political accountability, quite apart 
from interest representation through stare decisis. This will be true in 
most constitutional cases, which typically involve the government as a 
party.175 
In constitutional cases, then, the interests of those nonparties who 
are bound horizontally typically are no less represented than the interests 
of nonparties who are bound vertically, through stare decisis. Constitu-
means of political participation-organizing a ballot drive, running for office, or using the 
mass media to speak to large numbers of people-despite the likelihood that these more 
costly types of participation are also more likely to be effective in achieving the citizen's 
ideological goals. In this respect, the option of (effective) participation in adjudication is 
not clearly more costly than the option of (effective) participation in politics. In both 
contexts, the typical citizen is likely to rely upon the efforts of organized groups with 
similar interests-groups that can intervene or file amicus briefs in litigation and can 
undertake expensive efforts like lobbying, advertising, and campaign funding in the 
political arena. Indeed, the participation of organizations representing the interests of 
groups of citizens-for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which intervened in the 
Cincinnati case, see supra note 170-seems at least as likely to be effective in litigation as in 
politics. This is because the field of competitors in a lawsuit is typically less crowded than 
the field of competitors in the political arena, and also because there is a smaller group of 
decisionmakers-a single judge or perhaps an appellate panel, rather than the majority of 
the electorate or the majority of the legislature-to win over. 
It is also true, and important, that litigation, like politics, is expensive for parties on all 
sides of an issue. Intervening in a lawsuit, or filing an amicus brief, is far more expensive 
than voting; but so is filing a lawsuit. The expense of intervening in Romer thus was hardly a 
relative disadvantage for would-be intervenors, any more than the expense of opposing 
Amendment 2 was a relative disadvantage for those who fought the referendum that 
enacted it. 
To generalize these points: The expense of participating in constitutional litigation 
does not make that method of decision making any less participatory, and thus any less 
democratically legitimate, than political decisionmaking. In both adjudication and 
politics, effective participation can be very expensive, and there is no reason to think that 
adjudication gives one side of an issue any cost advantage that is not present in politics. 
172. In its statutes, Colorado refers to its state solicitor general as the "state solicitor." 
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-31-201(4) (1999). 
173. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-31-203( 1) (1990). 
174. See Colo. Const. art. IV, §§ 1, 3. 
175. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 414-15. Even when the state or 
federal government is not an original party, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require 
the court to notifY the appropriate attorney general if "the constitutionality of [a statute) 
affecting the public interest is drawn in question," Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c), and permit the 
court to allow the government to intervene in such a case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 
2000] ASSESSING THE NEW JUDICIAL MINIMAllSM 1491 
tional cases, though special, are not significantly less democratic than gar-
den-variety litigation. 176 
D. Representation and Judicial Minimalism 
If judicial review is in this sense democratically legitimate-if it incor-
porates the same elements of participation and representation that char-
acterize decisionmaking by the political branches-then calls for judicial 
minimalism appear to lose much of their force. Judicial review becomes 
just another kind of democratic institution, different from, but not neces-
sarily less legitimate than, congressional lawmaking or executive rulemak-
ing. If judicial review is itself essentially democratic, why should courts 
defer to the political branches whenever possible, as the new minimalists 
suggest? 
One conceivable answer to this question is that judicial review, while 
not so nondemocratic as is usually supposed, nevertheless may be less 
democratic, in ways we care about, than political lawmaking. We may not 
think that the kind of interest representation that operates through the 
common law method is a completely satisfactory substitute for the combi-
nation of interest representation and electoral control that characterizes 
the political system. There may be something unique and important 
about the ability to elect our representatives periodically, and to elect 
others to replace them, that is not present in even the most participatory 
and representative example of constitutional adjudication. If so, then we 
may still prefer courts to act in a minimalist fashion when exercising the 
power of judicial review. 
Someone giving this answer, it seems to me, might reasonably be 
asked to identify that "something unique and important" about electoral 
accountability that is lacking in a properly functioning system of adjudica-
tion. A possible response to this challenge is suggested by the work of 
Robert Burt. For Burt, the core ideal of democracy is the absence of 
176. The functioning of what I have called "adjudication as representation" in 
constitutional cases thus illustrates the important distinction between majaritarian 
decision making and democratic decisionmaking; a process may be the latter without being 
the former. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 419-20. Indeed, the decision of 
Romer was even more saliently countermajoritarian than the typical exercise of judicial 
review, because the Colorado Amendment invalidated by the Coun had been enacted by 
popular referendum. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). And, just as the 
decision in Romer can be seen as democratic though countermajoritarian, it also can be 
seen as the product of a more deliberative decisionmaking process than the enactment of 
Amendment 2 is likely to have been. In Pan Ill, infra, I explain why judicial 
decision making about issues of individual rights is likely to be more deliberative, and 
generally of better quality, than political decision making about such issues. In the 
particular context of popular referenda, this comparison seems even more one-sided in 
favor of adjudication. (Sunstein apparently agrees, tentatively suggesting that "[I' Jeferenda 
may well be based on inadequate information and on popular passions that are 
insufficiently influenced by reason-giving and understanding of context," and that 
"[pJerhaps the Coun should review the outcomes of referenda with an unusually high 
degree of skepticism." Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 133-34.) 
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coercion; true democratic legitimacy arises only when all parties who will 
be bound by the resolution of an issue have agreed to that resolution. It 
is not mere participation in decisionmaking that produces legitimacy, but 
agreement among the participants.177 From this view of democracy, one 
might construct a critique of adjudication on the grounds that adjudica-
tion is not about resolving disputes by agreement, but rather about the 
"authoritative resolution of disputes [by the court] that overrides the sub-
jective evaluation of [one] of the contesting parties."178 Because the im-
position of judicial authority involves coercion of the losing party, adjudi-
cation cannot claim the same degree, or perhaps the same type, of 
legitimacy that political decisionmaking can claim. 
The difficulty with this argument as a brief for minimal ism is that the 
alternative to resolving issues by adjudication-resolving them by 
majoritarian politics-itself inevitably involves coercion. The winning po-
litical majority authoritatively imposes its decision upon the losing politi-
cal minority no less than the court authoritatively imposes its decision 
upon the losing litigant. Only in nearly nonexistent cases of unanimity is 
political decisionmaking truly a matter of agreement rather than coer-
cion. Burt acknowledges this difficulty, ultimately suggesting only that 
unanimous consent, though "almost impossible to obtain in practice," 
should be "our guiding ideal in all social relations and in all institu-
tions. "179 Acknowledging the virtual impossibility of unanimous consent 
in the real world, however, negates the legitimacy gap between (authori-
tarian) adjudicative decisionmaking and (equally authoritarian) 
m;:goritarian politics. 
For the sake of argument, though, I am willing to assume that there 
is something special about electoral accountability that, all else being 
equal, provides a reason for preferring political to adjudicative decision-
making. The problem is that all else is not equal. As I argue in the next 
Part, although arguably adjudication is somewhat less democratic in gen-
eral than political decisionmaking, it is more deliberative and thus more 
effective on issues of rights. 
Ill. COURTS AND RrGHTS 
The case for the new minimalism depends not only on the idea that 
adjudication (at least, judicial review) is less democratically legitimate 
than political decisionmaking; it also depends partly on the notion that 
courts have no special institutional competence to decide issues of indi-
vidual or minority rights. 180 The new minimalists prefer that, at least in 
177. See Burt, supra note 85, at 368; see also supra Part I.B.3.a. 
178. Burt, supra note 85, at 98. 
179. Id. at 374. 
180. This premise is shared by many proponents of "deliberative democracy." Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, for instance, decry "the view that courts are the forum of 
principle in our democratic system, and that legislatures are incapable, or demonstrably 
less capable, of considering moral principles in the making of policy." Amy Gutmann & 
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the first instance, matters of individual rights18l be left to the political 
process,182 and that courts primarily limit themselves to promoting delib-
eration and accountability in that process.183 
Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement 48 (1996). But they acknowledge that 
"[i]f the judiciary turns out to be better able to protect some or all basic liberties and 
opportunities, then a deliberative perspective will grant the judiciary special authority to 
review those rights." Id. Whether this is so, they assert, "is a question of institutional 
design, not fundamental principle, and it remains more open to empirical investigation 
than constitutional democrats typically suggest." Id. Gutmann and Thompson are surely 
correct that the branches' comparative capacity for protecting individual rights "is a 
question of institutional design," but their suggestion that it is "open to empirical 
investigation" seems a bit naive: Whether the Court or Congress has been more successful 
at protecting rights depends upon entirely subjective, and not at all empirical, conclusions 
about which rights are worth protecting. A satisfying assessment of comparative 
institutional advantages in the protection of rights must, it seems to me, be divorced from 
particular subjective evaluations of rights, and thus from subjective evaluations of "success" 
or "failure" in particular cases. I try to accomplish such an assessment in this Part. 
181. Because I am not sure there is a meaningful difference between "individual" and 
"minority" rights, I will refer to both categories of rights as "individual rights." In my view, 
rights one might have as a member of a minority group-for instance, the right of a 
member of a racial minority against discrimination on the basis of that membership-
really devolve into rights one has as an individual, regardless of one's membership in a 
minority. Such rights may take on special significance, however, because one's 
membership in a minority puts them at risk. 
182. For example, each of the specific contexts in which Sunstein endorses 
minimalism in One Case at a Time involves individual rights. See Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time, supra note 8, at 75-116 (assisted suicide); id. at 117-36 (affirmative action); id. at 
137-71 (discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation); id. at 172-210 (free speech). 
Dorf and Fallon both similarly endorse minimalism in assisted-suicide cases. See Dorf, 
supra note 11, at 62-63,73; Fallon, supra note 11, at 137-41,145-48. Dorfalso advocates 
minimalism in cases involving the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. See 
Dorf, supra note 11, at 70-73. Burt criticizes the Court for its lack of minimalism in the 
contexts of abortion, see Burt, supra note 85, at 344-52, 357-62, and the death penalty. 
See id. at 327-44, 373-74. 
183. This is primarily Sunstein's theme. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 
8, at 32-33 (defending "democracy-promoting" use of clear-statement principle in case 
involving denial of passport to known communist); id. at 33 (defending, as means of 
promoting deliberation,Justice White's concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 502-07 (1965), which rejected an anti-contraception statute on rational-basis 
grounds); id. at 34-35 (defending, as means of promoting democratic accountability, 
Court's rejection of Civil Service Commission policy barring employment of aliens on ultra 
vires grounds); id. at 33-34,117-36 (defending Court's casuistry in affirmative-action cases 
as means of promoting public deliberation). Fallon has picked up on this theme as well, 
touting "suspect-content," "nonsuspect-content," and "purpose" tests as means of 
promoting rational and unbiased deliberation in government decisionmaking. See Fallon, 
supra note 11, at 88-105. Of course, Alexander Bickel was the first to draw out this theme. 
See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 3, at 148-56 (extolling the doctrine of desuetude as a way to 
encourage political deliberation); id. at 156-64 (connecting the nondelegation doctrine to 
political accountability); id. at 164-69 (doing the same with the clear-statement doctrine). 
Burt advocates the use of many of Bickel's "passive virtues" as means of "pursuing 
conversation" between the Court and the political branches, and among the political 
branches, "rather than imposing silence." Burt, supra note 85, at 362; see also id. at 
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But there are at least three good reasons to believe that courts do in 
fact tend to be bett~r decisionmakers than political institutions when it 
comes to individual rights. The first reason (a familiar one) is the classic 
defense of judicial review: Because courts are less subject than the politi-
cal branches to majoritarian pressures, they are better able to protect in-
dividual rights against the m,yority. Volumes have been written about 
this justification for judicial review, and I discuss it and its implications for 
minimalist arguments only briefly below. 
The other two reasons are less familiar, and I devote more time to 
discussing them. The second reason is that the courts' mode of opera-
tion-relatively isolated from public scrutiny and mass-media attention-
lends itself more to true deliberation than do the high-profile decision-
making processes of the political branches. The third reason is that the 
common law decisionmaking method employed by courts, characterized 
by gradualism and analogical reasoning, is better suited to making deci-
sions about individual rights than are the more instantaneous and holistic 
decisionmaking processes of the political branches. 
A. The Countermajoritarian Advantage 
The courts' role as protector of individual rights has been champi-
oned since the Founding on the ground that courts, relatively insulated 
from majoritarian pressures, are better suited to that role than the politi-
cal branches. Hamilton famously wrote in The Federalist No. 78 that the 
independence of the judges is ... requisite to guard the Consti-
tution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill 
humors which . . . sometimes disseminate among the people 
themselves, and which ... have a tendency ... to occasion dan-
gerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions 
of the minor party in the community.184 
In my view, Sunstein and the other new minimalists undervalue this clas-
sic argument. Like John Hart Ely, from whose representation-reinforce-
ment model of judicial review Sunstein and Fallon borrow liberally, the 
new minimalists do not explain how even a truly deliberative, genuinely 
accountable, broadly and fairly participatory system of majoritarian gov-
ernment can avoid occasionally trampling on individual rights in the 
name of the greater good. If one believes that individual rights have 
some meaning apart from the greater good, then one must acknowledge 
the need to protect them even in a well-functioning m,yoritarian system. 
And Sunstein does seem to endorse, if somewhat vaguely, the notion that 
(at least some) individual rights are not reducible to utilitarian or democ-
racy-reinforcing goals. 18S 
359-62 (embracing clear-statement principles and void-for-vagueness and ripeness 
doctrines). 
184. The Federalist No. 78, supra note 2, at 440. 
185. For example, Sunstein defends Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954), as a "compelling case[]" in which "the underlying judgment of (constitutionally 
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Given this belief, the readiness of Sunstein and the other new mini-
malists to assign to the judiciary a secondary or back-up role in protecting 
individual rights, a role that fully vests only in the presence of clear politi-
cal failure or substantial judicial certainty, is somewhat incongruous. 
Why should individual rights ever be put at the mercy of a self-interested 
majority? The judiciary's insulation from majoritarian pressures would 
seem to give it a powerful and ubiquitous advantage in recognizing indi-
vidual rights. On what grounds, then, should the judiciary defer to a po-
litical system that is subject to those pressures?186 
One ground might be the superior democratic legitimacy of the po-
litical process. But that ground is made much less appealing by the rec-
ognition that, as explained in the previous section, adjudication is itself 
democratically legitimate in an important sense. If adjudication is seen 
to be democratically legitimate-participatory and representative, like 
the political system-then the countermajoritarian difficulty becomes a 
countermajoritarian advantage: Adjudication is capable of protecting in-
relevant) political morality is insistent." Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 38. 
This defense hints at a deeper substance than anything recognized by Ely, who justifies 
Brown solely in representation-reinforcement terms. See Ely, supra note 52, at 150-5l. 
Sunstein also ultimately defends the Court's decision in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 
(1996), on substantive, not procedural, grounds: 
I will assert, without defending the point here, that [a] notion of equality [that 
would protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation] 
does indeed connect very well with the best understanding of the equality 
principle that underlies the Civil War amendments. Simply as a matter of abstract 
constitutional theory, the anticaste principle ... draws discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation into considerable doubt. 
Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 160. 
186. Mark Tushnet offers two connected answers: (1) that maJontarian politics 
ultimately is capable of policing itself with respect to individual rights, see Tushnet, Taking 
the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 128, and (2) that the Court in any case tends over 
time either to track majority values in such matters or to be ineffective in resisting them. 
See id. at 152-53. Tushnet acknowledges that his argument with respect to (I) is largely 
aspirational, see id. at 128, and he ultimately defends it with a twist on Learned Hand's 
famous dictum that " [l]iberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no 
constitution, no law, no court can save it," Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 190 (1960). 
See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 71 ("I doubt that the people 
of the United States have become so degenerate that the principles of the Declaration of 
Independence no longer mean anything to us. If the substantive skeptic is right [that they 
have], however, it seems wildly unlikely that the courts can save us from ourselves."). 
Tushnet also admits with respect to (2) that much relies on the idea of long-term 
convergence between judicial decisionmaking and majority values, and indeed on how one 
defines the relevant "majority." See id. at 134. 
Although I concede the force of Hand's aphorism, I am skeptical that political 
majorities, acting through their representatives in the political branches, are likely to do a 
better job than courts of making particular decisions about antimajoritarian rights. I try to 
justify this skepticism in Part III and, using Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), as an 
example, in Part V.B. I do tend to agree with Tushnet that constitutional doctrine, 
perhaps especially in the area of individual rights, tends over the long haul to track 
majority values, but I think the temporal qualifier carries more weight than Tushnet 
assigns to it. See infra Part V.B. 
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dividual rights from majoritarian excess while remaining democratically 
accountable to those most affected by judicial decisions. Judicial review 
may be counterm,yoritarian, but it is not antidemocratic. And the argu-
( ment for a general rule of judicial deference to the political process in 
the area of individual rights becomes less convincing. 
B. opacity, Transparency, and Deliberation 
Deliberation is not necessarily promoted by transparency; indeed, it 
is frequently hindered by it. This is a point that Sunstein himself has 
made quite powerfully in the past. In The Partial Constitution, Sunstein 
sides with Madison against Jefferson in favor of the closing of the Consti-
tutional Convention in 1787: 
On Madison's view, it was best "to sit with closed doors, because 
opinions were so various and at first so crude that it was neces-
sary they should be long debated before any uniform system of 
opinion could be formed. Meantime the minds of the members 
were changing, and much was to be gained by a yielding and 
accommodating spirit .... [B]y secret discussion no man felt 
himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was 
satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force 
of argument."187 
Indeed, the Federalists thought that opacity was necessary for true demo-
cratic deliberation. They distrusted open public discussion and, as James 
Martin has written, "believed that the public interactions and debates that 
are a part of any democracy should take place via the representative 
mechanisms that operate through the legal institutions of the state."188 
The relationship between the opacity and the quality of deliberation 
recently surfaced in the debate over whether the Senate, sitting as a court 
of impeachment in the trial of President Clinton, should deliberate pub-
licly or behind closed doors. Some, like Iowa Senator Tom Harkin, op-
posed deliberations in "secret session" and argued that opening the de-
bate "would send an important message. The public has a right to know 
how the Senate reaches its final decision on the removal or acquittal of 
the President."189 Others, like Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, held a 
different view: "I think we explain [ ] to our constituents how we're going 
to vote as we vote and afterwards .... But I believe that the deliberations 
ought to be like every jury in America, they ought to be behind closed 
187. Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 22 (quoting 3 Max Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 479 (1911)). 
188. James P. Martin, When Repression Is Democratic and Constitutional: The 
Federalist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 117, 
118 (1999). 
189. Office of Senator Tom Harkin, Press Release, Harkin/Wellstone Make Final 
Push to Open Final Deliberations, Federal Document Clearing House, Feb. 8, 1999, 
available in 1999 WI.. 2222309. 
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doors where we can be candid .... "190 In the end, those advocating 
open-door deliberations failed to achieve the two-thirds mcyority neces-
sary to waive the Senate rule requiring secret debate. 191 
Madison, Senator Shelby, and Sunstein himself have recognized that 
the glare of the public spotlight is not conducive to the candidness and 
open-mindedness necessary to true deliberation. This is so for the same 
reasons that support representative rather than direct democracy: Public 
opinion may be raw, "based on inadequate information and on popular 
passions that are insufficiently influenced by reason-giving and under-
standing of context." 192 Exposing important decisions, and the processes 
of making them, to instantaneous and continuous public scrutiny threat-
ens to infect representative democracy with the sorts of emotional, knee-
jerk tendencies it was designed to avoid. 193 
This is especially so when the decisions to be made involve not sim-
ply policy issues, but questions of individual rights against the majority. 
Writing of the dangers of referenda in the affirmative action context, 
Sunstein notes the risk that "outcomes will not be based on a careful as-
sessment of facts and values, but instead on crude 'we-they' thinking."194 
This point can be generalized across all decisions involving individual 
rights. Questions of individual rights are inherently "we-they" affairs: 
The majoritarian "we" is pitted against the individual or minority "they." 
True deliberation about such questions-decision making characterized by 
reason-giving, openness to opposing argnments, consideration of various 
relevant perspectives, and willingness to compromise-is made difficult 
from the start in the political system, where the ultimate decisionmakers, 
the citizens, by definition have something to gain or to lose. Deliberation 
is made all the more difficult when representatives are constantly bom-
barded, through public opinion polls and the ever-more-massive media, 
by the self-interests they are supposed to be filtering. 195 
190. This Week (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 7, 1999), available in 1999 WL 
5920454. 
191. See Jim Abrams, Senators Fail in Bid to Open Debate, AP, Feb. 9,1999, available 
in 1999 WL 11926331. 
192. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 133. 
193. See Bessette, supra note 139, at 207-10 (describing efficacy of behind-closed-
doors deliberation); cf. Martin, supra note 188, at 153 (explaining Federalist view that 
"discussing issues through the medium of the mass media and private political 
organizations ... introduced enormous inequalities of access [to the political process), 
inequalities that could be avoided by deliberating through the representative process"). 
194. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 133. 
195. Sunstein himself has fretted about the baleful influence of the modern mass 
media upon political deliberation. In two recent articles, he has decried the interaction 
among the media, the Independent Counsel statute, and the impeachment provisions of 
the Constitution as creating incentives for partisan political attacks and as distracting 
public attention from important policy issues. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and 
Bad Institutions, 86 Ceo. LJ. 2267, 2276-79 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the 
President, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 279, 314 (1998). 
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The increasing transparency of politics stands in stark contrast to the 
opaque process of adjudicative decisionmaking. Only very rarely, as in 
the OJ. Simpson case, does the actual process of adjudication attract sig-
nificant public attention. What publicity adjudication does draw invaria-
bly goes to the trial process, not to the appellate process, where law is 
made. Appellate court and Supreme Court proceedings are not tele-
vised, and only the results of those proceedings tend to receive publicity 
(and then only wben they decide high-profile issues). And of course the 
actual deliberations of appellate courts invariably take place behind closed 
doors. 
It is true, and important, that the tools of Supreme Court delibera-
tion-briefs filed by the parties, and transcripts or recordings of oral ar-
guments-and the results of that deliberation-written opinions-usu-
ally are made public, more frequently and quickly than ever these days. 
But these sources only confirm the extent to whicb adjudication is metic-
ulously deliberative. Legal briefs, oral arguments, and court opinions, 
unlike arguments made in the political realm, typically eschew entreaties 
to "public opinion" or "the public interest," instead replacing them with 
arguments based on the interpretation of legal authorities. Briefs, argu-
ments, and opinions also typically address the reasoning both for and 
against the results they espouse. They are not allowed to be "supported 
by self-interest or force"196 or to rely on "'[n]aked preferences."'197 
They are models of "reason-giving in the public domain."198 
The quoted phrases in the previous paragraph are taken from Sun-
stein's description of "deliberative democracy" in One Case at a Time. Re-
markably, though, they describe the everyday adjudicative process mucb 
more accurately than they describe the everyday political process.l99 This 
is because the adjudicative process is, in these important ways, far more 
"deliberative" than politics typically can be. Part of the reason for this is 
the much-maligned isolationism of the law-its insulation from worldly 
affairs, its persistent formalism, its self-referential reliance only on appro-
priately pedigreed authorities.200 Law in our system takes place behind 
Sunstein is not the only proponent of "deliberative democracy" to despair at the state 
of contemporary political deliberation. See, e.g., Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 180, 
at 12 ("In the practice of our democratic politics, communicating by sound bite, 
competing by character assassination, and resolving political conflicts through self-seeking 
bargaining too often substitute for deliberation on the merits of controversial issues."). 
196. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 25. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6 (1991) (distinguishing 
belween "normal politics" and "higher [i.e., constitutional] lawmaking"); id. at 24-32 
(applying this "dualist" approach to theories of "liberalism" and "republicanism," and 
articulating a conception of "liberal republicanism" in which "normal politics" embodies 
the liberal tendencies of the American polity and "higher lawmaking" embodies its 
republican tendencies). 
200. Cf. Dorf, supra note 11, at 8 ("The Justices live and work in relative isolation 
from major currents of American political, technological, and social life."); Erwin N. 
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closed doors, away from·the public spotlight and with little regard for it. 
And this opacity may work to the judiciary's advantage in attracting pub-
lic trust; a recent survey indicates that the public has more "respect" for 
the Supreme Court than for the political branches.201 
It is strange, then, that Sunstein sees judicial review primarily as a 
tool for increasing the deliberativeness of the political branches. Much 
of the point of judicial review is that it is more deliberative than the politi-
cal process, and thus better constituted to produce decisions that require 
deliberation above all else. As I explain in the next section, the adjudica-
tive brand of deliberation does not lend itself to many kinds of decision-
making that the political branches are good at. But it does lend itself to 
decisionmaking about individual rights-when they exist, what they look 
like, how far they ultimately extend. Decisions about individual rights are 
particularly poorly made in the spotlight, where they can be distorted by 
the very pressures that rights are meant to stand against. They are better 
made by courts, which can, in the current phrase, "fly under the radar" of 
public scrutiny. 
C. The Common Law Method and Individual Rights 
Lon Fuller, in his famous essay "The Forms and Limits of Adjudica-
tion," characterized adjudication as "a form of decision that defines the 
affected party's participation as that of offering proofs and reasoned ar-
guments."202 From this description, Fuller deduced that adjudication, 
virtually by definition, is concerned with-and limited to-deciding 
"claims of right or accusations of fault.''203 Adjudication, for Fuller, was 
entirely about deciding questions of rights. More recently, Ronald Dwor-
kin has taken up the inherent connection between adjudication and 
rights. 204 
Fuller's insight suggests a weakness in the new judicial minimalism: 
It suggests that adjudicative procedures are especially good at producing 
decisions about individual rights, and thus it undermines the case for def-
erence to the political process with respect to rights issues. In fact, there 
are three closely related ways in which the common law method of adjudi-
cation makes courts better suited than the political process to decide is-
sues of individual rights. First, deciding questions of rights is what courts 
always have done and are used to doing. Second, the common law brings 
Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Tenn-Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor 
Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 HalV. L. Rev. 81,81 (1960) ("In our situation and tradition, the 
Supreme Court is inevitably an isolated and remote body."). 
201. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowennent of 
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 
Duke LJ. 703, 754 (1994). 
202. Fuller, supra note 13, at 369. 
203. Id. 
204. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81-130 (1978) [hereinafter 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously]. 
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the element of continuity to decisions about rights, continuity that is gen-
erally absent from the political process but is bound up with the very 
definition of rights. And third, reasoning by analogy allows courts to de-
fine rights by reference to particular circumstances, an advantage not typ-
ically shared by political decisionmaking. I discuss each advantage in 
turn. 
1. The Connection Between Adjudication and Rights. - Acljudication, at 
least in the Anglo-American tradition, has always been about rights. This 
is a virtually definitional fact, springing from the very nature of adjudica-
tion. At its core, adjudication is a means of resolving disputes between 
people, and dispute resolution implies standards by which disputes can 
be resolved. Unless those standards are to be based on force or happen-
stance, they must be based upon arguments about rights-that is, upon 
arguments about why a disputant is entitled to a particular resolution of 
the dispute. 
Consider the classic liberal justification of government as a means of 
resolving disputes. For Hobbes, the state of nature was characterized by 
constant, often violent disputes; the solution was the establishment of 
government, including, crucially, courts of law that could resolve disputes 
peacefully. 205 Locke too saw government, and particularly courts, as a 
solution to the problem of "every Man's being Judge in his own Case," 
which was one of the "inconveniencies of the State of Nature."206 
In nascent liberal theory, the primary function of government thus 
was adjudicative-the peaceful and authoritative resolution of existing 
disputes. Of course, we expect modem government to do much more 
than this. But we still assign to courts the primary task of resolving 
disputes. 
How do courts go about this task? Note that disputes virtually always 
concern things that have already happened. A farmer has bought a cow 
that does not produce milk as promised; is he entitled to a refund of the 
purchase price? A driver has struck a pedestrian in a crosswalk; must she 
compensate the pedestrian for his injuries? Answering these typical kinds 
of adjudicative questions requires assessing the consequences of some-
thing that occurred in the past. Dispute resolution is an inherently retro-
spective enterprise. 
Faced with an existing dispute, a court has several choices of how to 
resolve it. The court could tell the parties to fight it out amongst them-
selves; but this would defeat the purpose of adjudication, which is the 
peaceful and authoritative resolution of controversies. The court could 
decide by happenstance, as by tossing a coin; but this hardly justifies the 
trouble of having courts (anyone could do it), and in any event we are too 
205. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 223-34 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Classics 
1986) (1651). 
206. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 326 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
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much the children of rationalism in today's society to accept such a reso-
lution as authoritative. Or the court could decide by reason-by hearing 
what Lon Fuller called "reasoned arguments"207 from each of the dispu-
tants about why he or she or it should win the case. This last option, of 
course, is the one courts actually choose in our system. 
What is meant by a "reasoned argument"? Appeals to force or 
chance are out, on the grounds just discussed. Appeals to what Sunstein 
would call a "naked preference" are out as well; merely saying "rule in my 
favor because it would be in my interest for you to do so" does not carry 
any weight in our system of adjudication. (And rightly so, because acting 
on such an appeal would render adjudication superfluous-it would be 
no different than resolving the dispute by force. In any case, if both dis-
putants make this argument, the court has no basis to choose between 
them.) The "reasons" backing up an argument to a court must really be 
reasons; they must be grounded in an appeal to what is right (that is, re-
quired by some relevant normative code) 208 or good (that is, conducive to 
the furtherance of some good result or to the avoidance of some bad 
one).209 
As Fuller noted, reasoned argument in adjudication tends to invoke 
ideas of what is right rather than ideas about what would produce good 
results.210 Why is this? I suspect it is because arguments about good re-
sults are not necessarily connected with the core function of adjudication, 
which is dispute resolution. Again, adjudication for the most part is ret-
rospective; it assesses events that already have occurred. Arguments 
about good results have no relevance to the assessment of events that 
already have occurred-because those events already have occurred. An argu-
ment that it would be best for society, all things considered, if sellers of 
livestock bore the risk of latent defects, or if drivers compensated pedest-
rians injured by their negligence, does not tell a court what to do about a 
dispute over the sale of a cow that occurred last month, or over a traffic 
accident that happened last year. The parties to such past disputes will 
not be affected one way or another by the establishment of a prospective 
207. Fuller, supra note 13, at 365. 
208. The relevant normative code need not involve appeals to "morality," "natural 
law," or indeed any extrajudicial authorities; it may simply consist of the requirement that 
judicial precedent be followed. Fuller seems to invoke this latter sense when he defines 
adjudication as involving "claims of right." See Fuller, supra note 13, at 365-72. 
209. I mean "good" here not to refer to conceptions of "the good life" for individuals, 
but rather to refer to conceptions of "the common good" -i.e., the best state of affairs 
generally, by whatever criteria one might use to assess it. My distinction between decisions 
about the "right" and decisions about the "common good" parallels Ronald Dworkin's 
distinction between decisions of "principle" and decisions of "policy." See, e.g., Ronald 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 2-3 (1985) [hereinafter Dworkin, A Matter of Principle] 
(summarizing his principle-policy distinction). 
210. See Fuller, supra note 13, at 365-72. Again, Fuller apparently uses the idea of 
"right" in a relatively narrow sense, to signifY "rights" arising from specific positive legal 
authorities rather than "right results" in a broader moral sense. But Fuller is vague about 
this in his article. See id. 
1502 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1454 
rule (at least not so far as the disputes in question are concerned). The 
seller of the cow cannot go back in time and test the cow's milk-produc-
tion capability before taking the buyer's money; the driver of the car can-
not go back and drive more carefully, thus avoiding the pedestrian. It is 
too late for that. 
Arguments about good results-that is, about the best rule to cre-
ate-thus cannot help resolve existing disputes. Of course, they can help 
resolve, or avoid, future disputes, insofar as they are arguments about 
prospective rules. But the creation of prospective rules-through the 
mechanism of stare decisis-is a function separate from the resolution of 
existing disputes. The former function is not implied by the latter. 
Courts can, and sometimes do, resolve disputes without creating or modi-
fying prospective conduct rules. 211 
Because arguments about good results cannot resolve existing dis-
putes, they do not hold a core place in adjudication. But arguments 
about the right do. Indeed, when arguments about good results are put 
to one side, arguments about the right are the only kind of reasoned 
arguments left. If adjudication is characterized by reasoned arguments-
as it must be, since force, chance, and naked preference are out-and if 
reasoned arguments about dispute resolution tend to be arguments 
about the right, then adjudication is characterized by arguments about 
the right. Lon Fuller put the syllogism this way: 
(1) ... Adjudication is a process of decision that grants to the 
affected party a form of participation that consists in the oppor-
tunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments. (2) The liti-
gant must therefore, if his participation is to be meaningful, as-
sert some principle or principles by which his arguments are 
sound and his proofs relevant. (3) A naked demand is distin-
guished from a claim of right by the fact that the latter is a de-
mand supported by a principle; likewise, a mere expression of 
displeasure or resentment is distinguished from an accusation 
by the fact that the latter rests upon some principle. Hence, (4) 
issues tried before an adjudicator tend to become claims of right 
or accusations of fault. 212 
Adjudication, then, almost inherently involves arguments about the 
right. As this passage from Fuller (echoed by Dworkin213) suggests, argu-
ments about what is "right"-about what resolution of a dispute is mor-
ally required-are equivalent to arguments about what the disputants 
211. The increasing trend toward unpublished opinions in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals is an important example. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not 
Making Law, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1998 at 157,159 (1998) (describing and 
assessing data on use of unpublisbed opinions and "without comment" dispositions in 
Courts of Appeals). 
212. Fuller, supra note 13, at 369. 
213. See, e.g., Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 204, at 82-90 (developing 
his "rights thesis," according to which every case has a morally "right" answer which the 
litigants in turn have a "right" to see applied). 
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have a "right" to. If a decision refunding the cow's purchase price is 
"right," in the sense of being morally obligatory, then the plaintiff in the 
case has a "right," or a moral entitlement, to have that decision ren-
dered.214 Adjudication, which is fundamentally about determining the 
right resolution of existing disputes, thus also is fundamentally about de-
termining the rights of the parties to those disputes. Determining par-
ties' rights is simply what courts do. 
Contrast this with what the political branches of government typically 
"do." Political decisionmaking (at least as conceived by Sunstein and 
other neo-Madisonians, who discount the roles of rent-seeking and inter-
est group "deals" in politics215) is primarily decision making about good 
results, indeed about results that inure to the common good. The politi-
cal branches are not typically concerned with resolving existing dis-
putes-this is the courts' job. They are concerned instead with creating 
prospective rules that can guide the resolution of future disputes and, if 
possible, prevent future disputes from occurring. Thus, political deci-
sionmaking is not primarily concerned with rights (that is, entitlements 
to a particular outcome), but rather with the common good (that is, 
whether a particular outcome is or is not good social policy).216 
It is inherent in the dispute-resolution role of courts, then, that they 
entertain and assess arguments about rights. It is not inherent, or at least 
is much less so, in the policymaking role of the political branches that 
they entertain and assess such arguments. The fact that courts unavoid-
ably make decisions about rights, and thus make them with much greater 
regularity than do the political branches, casts substantial doubt upon any 
approach that, like the new judicial minimalism, commands courts fre-
quently to defer to the political branches with respect to such decisions. 
214. And the defendant has the same "right," although with respect to the defendant 
the "right" looks more like a "duty." 
215. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 24-25 (arguing that 
legislation achieved through "power" rather than deliberation is illegitimate); Sunstein, 
Free Speech, supra note 8, at 241-52 (arguing that legitimate lawmaking stems from public 
deliberation); Sunstein, Partial Constitution, supra note 8, at 17-39 (arguing that reason is 
the only legitimate basis for political activity); see also, e.g., Deliberative Democracy Gon 
Elster ed., 1998) (collecting essays defending deliberative democracy); Deliberative 
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics Games Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) 
(same); Gutmann & Thompson, supra note 180, at 45-46 (suggesting that interest group 
pressures cancel each other out). 
216. This is not to say that the political branches never concern themselves with 
rights, or that they never should do so. A party who will be affected by a proposed rule can 
invoke arguments of entitlements, or rights, for or against that rule. For instance, a party 
who will be forced to pay a proposed tax can argue that her "right" to (a certain kind of) 
autonomy will be impaired by the tax. Such arguments may have weight, even decisive 
weight, in political decision making. But they will exist alongside arguments about the 
common good-for example, an argument that the proposed tax will improve society by 
increasing the money available for necessary social services. The coexistence of, and 
interplay between, arguments of right and arguments about the common good is 
characteristic of politics. It is not, however, characteristic of adjudication. 
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This command belies the fact that courts are more practiced in deciding 
about rights than the political branches are. 
2. Rights, Continuity, and the Common Law. - Decisionmaking about 
rights thus is inherent in the adjudicative function of reasoned dispute 
resolution. To recognize this, however, is to leave open the question of 
where the rights assessed by courts come from. The answer in the Anglo-
American common law tradition is that they come primarily from previ-
ous court decisions. A court's assessment of the rights of the parties to a 
dispute before it is based upon-and, on a Dworkinian view, may even be 
seen to arise from 217-courts' resolutions of prior disputes involving simi-
lar facts. In the common law tradition, moreover, each successive court 
decision progresses only incrementally from the prior decision or deci-
sions upon which it is based. Indeed, sudden large leaps in doctrine 
would undermine the notion that the resolutions of particular cases pro-
ceed unavoidably and inevitably from the resolutions of previous ones. It 
would threaten the very notion of "rights." 
The entirety of Sunstein's One Case at a Time, as its title suggests, is a 
celebration of this common law method of case-by-case, gradualist deci-
sionmaking.218 But even Sunstein underappreciates the essential connec-
tion between common law gradualism and rights, an oversight that is am-
plified in the work of Michael Dorf, for whom the common law is too 
gradualistic.219 In our common law system, legal rights are products of 
gradualist decisionmaking. What is more, their character as rights is pre-
served by gradualism. 
Our tradition generally denies the existence of legal rights that are 
not traceable in some way to a suitably pedigreed source.220 In pure com-
mon law cases, that source is prior case law; in cases involving statutes, it is 
the statute (however conceived)221 and prior case law; in cases involving 
217. I am thinking particularly here of Dworkin's well-known "rights thesis," which 
holds that the "gravitational force" of precedents produces a "correct" result (and thus a 
"right" of one party to win) in subsequent cases. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 
supra note 204, at 82-90. Dworkin later refined this idea into the notion of decisional law 
as a "chain novel," in which each court is constrained to decide cases in the way that best 
interprets and applies the import of past decisions. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 
228-38 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, Law's Empirel. 
218. Cf. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8, at 62-100, 121-35. 
219. See Dorf, supra note 11, at 45. 
220. This is not to deny the viability of natural law or "incorporationist" theories of 
law, which give legal status to (some) norms thought to exist wholly or partially without 
dependence upon an existing authoritative source. 1 assume here only that our tradition 
requires, at least, that law be tied or accommodated to agreed-upon authoritative sources 
in some way-for example. in the holistic way that Dworkin posits, see, Dworkin, Law's 
Empire, supra note 217, at 226-28, or perhaps by "incorporation" as suggested by Jules 
Coleman. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139, 
160 (1982). 
221. Different theories of statutory interpretation might rely on different types of 
sources, and might rely on them in different ways. One theory, for example, might make 
use of legislative history while another might not. 
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constitutions, it is the constitution (again, however conceived) and prior 
case law. It is mostly impermissible in our tradition for a court to "de-
clare" the existence of a "right" without at least some authoritative refer-
ence to these kinds of sources. Even in decisions often described (and 
frequently criticized) as having declared "new" rights-for example, Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co. in the common law realm222 and Griswold v. 
Connecticut in the constitutional realm223-courts have taken pains to tie 
their decisions to prior cases, albeit sometimes unconvincingly. 
This virtual prohibition against the ex nihilo "creation" by courts of 
"new" rights reflects, or perhaps is reflected by, the fact that case-by-case 
gradualism defines rights in the common law. A litigant does not have a 
right to a particular resolution of a dispute unless that right is supported 
by decisions in prior cases. Court decisions that depart radically from 
prior decisions thus cannot convincingly articulate common law rights; 
there is nowhere for such "new" rights to come from. Only gradualism 
maintains a close enough connection between rights articulated on new 
facts and rights recognized in prior cases. In the common law, continuity 
and rights are inseparable. 
The continuity of the common law not only creates rights; it also 
maintains their status as rights. The distinctive character of rights is com-
promised if their existence depends too much on precise shadings of fact. 
Imagine, for instance, if Griswold v. Connecticut had been strictly limited to 
its facts in future decisions. The "right" first articulated in that case then 
would not have been anything approaching the breadth of "the right of 
privacy"; it would have been something much more narrow, perhaps "the 
right of married couples to use in their own homes contraceptive drugs 
or devices if prescribed by a licensed physician." Such a "right" hardly 
deserves the title; it is more like a curiosity or an anomaly. 
A related point is that rights can scarcely be called "rights" if their 
recognition is relatively ephemeral. If the "right of privacy" first articu-
lated in Griswold had been wholly repudiated, rather than reaffirmed and 
arguably expanded, eight years later in Roe v. Wade,224 it would be stretch-
ing things to call it a "right" at all. 
The gradualism inherent in the common law insulates rights from 
arbitrary constriction and capricious disavowal. True, a right hastily de-
clared and ill-supported by prior decisions may readily be limited or re-
jected by subsequent ones.225 But the same norms that deter courts from 
abruptly creating rights also deter courts from abruptly limiting or aban-
doning them. Just as common law rights emerge slowly, they change 
slowly and disappear slowly, too. 
222. 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (recognizing right of injured third party to sue in tort 
manufacturer of defective, but not inherently dangerous, product). 
223. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing constitutional "right of privacy" that protects 
married couples' choice to use contraception). 
224. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
225. On this point, see infra Part V.A 
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Contrast this gradualistic quality of court-created rights with the ab-
ruptness and transience of many rights created in the political branches. 
The political branches are not bound to follow or even to respect prece-
dent; they can create entirely new statutory or regulatory rights today and 
repeal them tomorrow. Politically created rights need not be grounded 
in the past, and, for that reason, they need not extend very far into the 
future. 
The ephemeral nature of politically created rights is perfectly appro-
priate to the usual mission of the political branches, which is making pol-
icy, that is, pursuing the common good. The common good-and, per-
haps more to the point, ideas about the common good-can change from 
year to year or even from day to day. Perhaps even more to the point, the 
majority coalition responsible for determining and acting to further the 
common good can change from election cycle to election cycle. From 
the standpoints of both efficacy and democratic legitimacy, it generally 
would be foolish to lock in the political branches to any sort of long-term 
commitments about legal rights. 
But where the rights in question are rights against the majority, it 
would be foolish to subject them to fluctuations in majority interest or 
majority opinion. This point is slightly but crucially different from the 
usual one about foxes guarding henhouses. Even if the majority (or its 
representatives in the political branches of government) could be trusted 
to act in good faith in deciding issues of individual or minority rights, it 
still would be prisoner to the political way of doing things: unconstrained 
by the past and with little ability to constrain the future. 
Their lack of constraint by the past means the political branches 
have difficulty articulating anything that sounds like a right against the 
majority. Such rights ultimately must come from somewhere other than 
the majority they stand against, and it is unclear what that source might 
be for the political branches, which have no system of precedent to draw 
from. 
Their inability to constrain the future means not only that the politi-
cal branches cannot guarantee that the "rights" they articulate will be 
truly durable (which is really just a restatement of the problem of lack of 
constraint by the past), but also that their decisions about rights will be 
skewed by the knowledge that those rights need not be durable. The 
political branches do not need to worry about the lasting implications of 
the rights they articulate, because they know that they (or their succes-
sors) can-without the necessity of justification-renege on those 
"rights" in the future if they turn out to be too troublesome. It is easy for 
Congress to refrain from enacting legislation that threatens free speech 
this year if Congress knows it can enact the same legislation next year. 
Worse, it is easy for Congress to bow to political pressures and enact that 
legislation this year if Congress knows that it (or its successor) can repeal 
the legislation next year. This is an underappreciated response to the 
Thayerian argument, which is echoed by Tushnet, that judicial review en-
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courages the political branches to shirk their duty of constitutional judg-
ment by making the courts available to pass that judgment for them.226 
The availability of a subsequent repeal of constitutionally questionable 
legislation-perhaps by a successor legislature made up of different mem-
bers-is no less an "out" for irresponsible legislators than is the availabil-
ity of judicial review. 
The point is that there is a necessary and close relationship between 
continuity and rights, at least when "rights" means rights against the ma-
jority. Court decisionmaking is characterized by continuity; political deci-
sionmaking is not. It stands to reason, then, that courts will be better 
decisionmakers about rights than the political branches will be. 
3. Rights and Analogical Reasoning. - In the extensive treatment of 
analogical reasoning in his 1996 book Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 
Sunstein celebrates the fact that "analogical reasoning is focused on par-
ticulars, and it develops from concrete controversies."227 In One Case at a 
Time, Sunstein defends judicial minimalism as "a sensible reaction to the 
limitations that judges know they face, not least in predicting the conse-
quences of their decisions."228 These two positions, however, are at odds 
with each other in an important sense. 
As Sunstein has noted, a strength of analogical reasoning as a deci-
sionmaking method is its grounding in factual context.229 Ajudge rea-
soning analogically compares the specific facts of a case to the specific 
facts of a prior case and asks whether they are similar in relevant respects. 
Of course, the judge must utilize some principle by which the relevant 
factual similarities can be determined, and by definition such a principle 
will transcend specific facts. But this principle itself comes from the facts 
of prior cases; it is a reason or justification connecting those facts with the 
prior cases' results. Put another way, a principle is the reason a particular 
result is justified by a particular set of facts. It is emphatically not an ab-
stract, acontextual concept.230 
Having extracted a principle from prior cases, the judge reasoning 
analogically then applies that principle only to her own case. She leaves it 
up to judges in future cases to decide whether that principle is wisely 
applied to different facts. 
226. See Thayer, supra note 121, at 155-56; Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, 
supra note 7, at 57-58 (adopting Thayer's argument). 
227. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8, at 67. 
228. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 53. 
229. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 8, at 62-100. 
230. For an analogous proposition, see Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, supra note 
209, at 2: 
When political issues come to court ... they plead for decision that is at once 
discrete and principled. They must be decided at retail, in their full social 
complexity; but the decision must be defended as flowing from a coherent and 
un compromised vision of fairness and justice .... Legal analysis, in this broad 
sense, is more concrete than classical political philosophy, more principled than 
political craft. 
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Contrast, in these respects, the decisions produced by analogical rea-
soning with the decisions made by legislatures.231 First, although a legis-
lature may be motivated to take action by specific problems or disputes, it 
is not required to make its decisions consistent with decisions it or its 
predecessors have made in the past. Thus the legislature has no need to 
identify something-a "principle" -by which consistency across decisions 
can be assessed. It has no need, that is, to examine prior decisions and 
identify the norms that justified those decisions in light of their facts. 
Freed from this necessity, the legislature can base its decisions on norms 
that are entirely acontextual and that, because of this acontextuality, may 
not work very well when applied to actual facts. In contrast, principles 
identified through analogical reasoning work well, by definition, when 
applied to at least some sets of actual facts: those of the precedents that 
produced the principle. "An[] advantage that courts have," Bickel wrote, 
is that questions of principle never carry the same aspect for 
them as they did for the legislature or the executive. Statutes, 
after all, deal typically with abstract or dimly foreseen problems. 
The courts are concerned with the flesh and blood of an actual 
case. This tends to modify, perhaps to lengthen, everyone's 
view. It also provides an extremely salutary proving ground for 
all abstractions; it is conducive, in a phrase of Holmes, to think-
ing things, not words, and thus to the evolution of principle by a 
process that tests as it creates.232 
Second, the operative concepts embodied in legislation, because 
they are acontextual, almost inevitably apply in cases beyond those envi-
sioned by the enacting legislature. A court reasoning analogically decides 
that, on a particular set of facts F], F2, and F3 , result R obtains. The court 
does not decide whether result R would obtain in the presence of addi-
tional fact F4; nor does the court decide whether result R would obtain in 
the absence of fact Fl' A legislature enacting a statute, however, typically 
decides that result R obtains in the presence of facts FI , F2 , and F3 , quite 
regardless of whether additional fact F4 is present; it also decides that re-
sult R does not obtain in the absence of fact Fl. A legislature, that is, 
decides many cases that are not "before it," and thus almost inevitably 
decides cases it has not carefully considered.233 But a court decides only 
the particular case before it and thus determines the consequences of 
only a single, finite set of facts. 
231. I use the legislature here as the paradigm of a "political" branch. Much of what 
follows applies to the executive branch as well, but probably not all of it. Like the 
legislature (but unlike the courts), the executive is not typically constrained by "principle." 
But the executive often makes more particularistic decisions-that is, decisions affecting a 
smaller number of cases-than the legislature does. 
232. Bickel, supra note 3, at 26. 
233. For a more nuanced discussion of the difference between the decision embodied 
in a typical common law ruling and that embodied in a typical statute, see generally Peters, 
Adjudication, supra note 15, at 361-66. 
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Thus it is strange for Sunstein (and Michael Dorf, who takes a similar 
approach) to celebrate the particularism and contextuality of analogical 
reasoning while at the same time worrying about "the limitations that 
judges know they face, not least in predicting the consequences of their 
decisions."234 The limitations judges face in this respect seem considera-
bly less significant than those faced by legislators, both because judges' 
decisions tend to be better grounded in actual facts and because the con-
sequences of their decisions tend to be more closely tethered to the ac-
tual facts upon which those decisions are based. A court usually does not 
decide what would be best in the abstract; it decides what is the right 
result on the facts of a particular case. And a court usually limits the 
scope of its decision to those facts, refusing to decide cases whose facts 
are not before it. Legislative decisionmaking typically shares neither of 
these characteristics. 
All of which suggests that courts generally will be better than legisla-
tures at making decisions that benefit from close attention to factual con-
text. Tushnet disagrees, asserting that "[ t] his contrast between courts 
and legislatures is so overstated as to be worthless."235 First, Tushnet 
points out, "[l]egislatures respond to real"-that is, factually specific-
"human problems toO."236 Tushnet offers the example of "Megan's 
Laws," statutes requiring disclosure of a convicted sex offender's resi-
dence in a community, enacted as legislative "respon[ses] to the abduc-
tion and murder of a [particular] child by a [particular] convicted sex 
offender. "237 
But this example merely supports my point. Megan's Law, inspired 
by an especially compelling case, is likely to have many consequences in 
other cases that were not foreseen by the legislature that enacted it. A law 
that seems like good policy when applied to a murderer or a serial 
pedophile may not seem like good policy when applied, say, to an eigh-
teen-year-old woman convicted of the statutory rape of her sixteen-year-
old boyfriend. When such unforeseen consequences potentially affect 
not just policy but rights-in the case of Megan's Law, perhaps the consti-
tutional rights to privacy or'due process of law, or the constitutional pro-
tection against ex post facto laws-then it makes little sense for a court 
faced with such consequences to defer to the 'Judgment" of a legislature 
that did not anticipate them. 
On the other side of the coin, Tushnet asserts somewhat ambigu-
ously that "courts can respond to general, abstract concerns just as legisla-
tures do. "238 I can think of three more-specific points Tushnet may have 
234. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 53. Dorl's proposal of 
"provisional adjudication" seeks to address similar concerns about the predictive fallibility 
of the Court. See Dorf, supra note 11, at 60-69. 
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in mind here. First is simply the fact that courts must speak and think in 
terms of principles-a fact that, as I argue above, actually supports a pref-
erence for judicial decisionmaking on matters of rights. Second, Tushnet 
may have in mind the fact that courts sometimes lay down broad rules-
as with asbestos lawsuits, where, as Tushnet notes, "the courts [have] de-
vised quite elaborate procedures to sort out the claims."239 I explain in 
Part IV why this kind of procedurally nonminimalist behavior by courts 
can threaten both the democratic legitimacy and the quality of their deci-
sionmaking (although of course there may be countervailing factors of 
efficiency, predictability, and the like weighing in favor of such broad 
rules). In any event, the kinds of broad general rules set by courts in 
asbestos litigation certainly are exceptional rather than typical. 
Third, Tushnet may have in mind the fact that courts sometimes act 
procedurally somewhat like legislatures, with the participation of a broad 
spectrum of potentially affected parties. As he explains, "[m]odern pro-
cedural devices ... sometimes convert court hearings into versions of a 
modern town meeting."240 This is true, and to a large extent it is a trend 
to be encouraged, as I have argued elsewhere.241 But it is entirely beside 
the point here, which is that courts typically decide issues in particular 
contexts rather than in the abstract-a point that holds regardless of 
who, or how many, are participating as litigants or amici in the decision 
of that particular issue. 
Tushnet's objections aside, then, there remains strong reason to be-
lieve that courts typically are better than the political branches at making 
fact-sensitive decisions. It may be that most government decisions, not 
just those involving individual rights, are fact-sensitive in this way. If so, 
then the new minimalists' functional hierarchy of legislature over court 
may be backwards with respect to many kinds of decisions. 1 doubt, how-
ever, that even a juricentric approach can take us this far; as I explain 
below, there are other functional considerations besides the importance 
of factual context that come into play in government decision making, 
and many of those considerations weigh in favor of political rather than 
judicial hegemony. In any case, my suggestion for present purposes is 
only that decisions about rights tend to benefit from close attention to 
factual context and thus generally are better suited to resolution byadju-
dication than by political decisionmaking. 
Let me support this suggestion with a simple but revealing anecdote. 
I often poll the students in my Constitutional Law course to see how 
many of them believe in the existence of a constitutional "right of pri-
vacy." Most of them say they do. Then I ask the students to explain the 
result demanded by a "right of privacy" in a short series of cases: Griswold 
239. Id. 
240. Id. (citing Stephen C. YeazeIl, Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A 
Commenlary on the Los Angeles School Case, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 244, 244 (1977)). 
241. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 417-19. 
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v. Connecticut,242 Roe v. Wade,243 and Bowers v. Hardwick. 244 Many of them 
are not sure what some or all of the results should be. Of course, many of 
them disagree sharply with others over the implications of a "right of pri-
vacy" for each particular case. 
The point of this academic parlor game is to demonstrate what ex-
perienced lawyers and constitutional scholars already know: The content 
of rights is inherently contextual.245 Simply declaring the existence of a 
"right of privacy" does not say very much. (It does say something; there is 
an amorphous core of meaning to a "right of privacy" that allows most 
lawyers at least to identity cases in which it might be relevant. This fact is 
revealed by the phenomenon that none of my students ever protests that 
the right of privacy simply is not relevant to Griswold, Roe, or Bowers.) But 
one has to point to particular sets of facts to begin to understand what a 
"right of privacy" might actually entail. 
To bring things closer to the subject of this Article, imagine that, pre-
Bowers but post-Griswold and Roe, a bill is introduced in a state legislature 
that would criminalize homosexual sodomy. Legislator Smith rises and 
declares that the legislature should not pass the bill without first deter-
mining that it does not infringe the constitutional "right of privacy." How 
will he and his colleagues go about conducting this inquiry? Probably 
they will offer a series of hypothetical situations in which the statute 
might apply, asking with respect to each situation whether the "right of 
privacy" has been infringed. But there will always be a hypothetical case 
they miss. Perhaps they will not envision arrests in the bedroom of a 
defendant's home, triggered by a tip from a nosy neighbor and carried 
out by a cadre of armed police officers. The "right of privacy" that the 
legislature is confident is not infringed by prohibiting, say, sexual contact 
in an adult movie theater or in a bathhouse may in fact be infringed by 
the statute as applied to other, unenvisioned circumstances. 
Of course, maybe that hypothetical case never arises in the real 
world. But if it does, it seems silly for the court deciding it to defer to the 
legislature out of respect for "the limitations that judges know they face, 
not least in predicting the consequences of their decisions."246 The con-
sequences of the decision faced by the court are quite clear-clearer, at 
least, than they may have been to the legislature, which might not even 
have envisioned the case the court must now decide. 
It seems, then, that decisions about rights benefit significantly from 
being made with reference to particular facts. True, one might object 
that this argument proves too much. Virtually every legislative act carries 
potential consequences that the legislature did not envision and may not 
242. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
243. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
244. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
245. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 11, at 53 ("[T]he specification of rights can only 
proceed in concrete contexts within which particulars matter."). 
246. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 53. 
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have endorsed, whether the statute implicates individual rights or not. 
Should a court always refuse to implement these unforeseen conse-
quences?247 Conversely, should a court always defer to fareseen applica-
tions of a statute, even if those applications seem to infringe individual 
rights? 
These rhetorical questions miss the point of the instant comparison 
between analogical reasoning and legislative decisionmaking. The point 
is not to demonstrate that courts are functionally superior deci-
sionmakers to legislatures in most or every context in which decisions can 
be made. The point, rather, is to demonstrate that courts are function-
ally superior decisionmakers in one context in which they are charged 
with making decisions in our political system: the context of individual 
rights. The new minimalists do not dispute that courts ultimately must 
make decisions about individual rights in our system, particularly about 
constitutional rights.248 Their thesis is that, in making those decisions, 
courts should defer (to some degree, in some cases) to the judgment of 
the legislature out of concern for their own cognitive limitations. My 
analysis thus far has suggested only that the cognitive limitations faced by 
courts in such cases are no greater, and probably are less significant, than 
the cognitive limitations faced by legislatures when enacting the statutes 
at issue in them. 
In any event, the decisionmaking advantage enjoyed by courts over 
legislatures does not extend to all (or even to most) decisions that are 
highly contextual. Courts, after all, must operate according to principles, 
and this requirement can impose significant limitations. Some decisions 
are in effect so fact-dependent that it is difficult or impossible to extract a 
principle from them, or to apply a principle to them. An example is the 
decision, made every year by Congress and the Administration by means 
of appropriations bills, of how to budget the federal government. A court 
could never effectively decide this issue, because it involves no principle 
that can be extracted from prior similar decisions and applied meaning-
fully in the case at hand. The task of reasoning by analogy from one 
year's budget to the next would be, in one of my wife's favorite phrases, 
247. The answer to this seemingly rhetorical question may be more complex than at 
first it appears. See Christopher J. Peters, Statutory Interpretation and the Default Position 
1-6 (Aug. 9, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
Suffice it to say that there may be cases in which a court should indeed refuse to 
implement consequences of a legislative enactment that apparently were not foreseen by 
the enacting legislature. 
248. For example, Sunstein endorses "ambitious[ ]" recognition of rights by the Court 
on tbose "relatively rare occasion[s]" where the Court has "encounter[ed] the basic 
problem for a period of years." Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 170. 
Similarly, Dorf sees a role for the Court in "the articulation of fundamental ... values." 
Dorf, supra note 11, at 79. On the other hand, abolitionists like Tushnet do indeed 
dispute this proposition. And opponents of judicial supremacy like Tushnet and Burt, and 
perhaps discursivists like Devins and Katyal, dispute that courts must finaUy decide issues of 
constitutional rights. See supra Part I.B.3.c (discussing Tushnet); supra Part l.B.3.a 
(discussing Burt); supra Part l.B.3.b (discussing Devins and Katyal). 
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"like herding cats." It is an example of what Lon Fuller called a "polycen-
tric" problem,249 and of what Hart and Sacks called a "dispute [that] is 
not susceptible of a reasoned solution. "250 Only the political branches, 
with their freedom from principle and their amenability to bargaining, 
can effectively tackle such problems. 
Decisions about rights, however, will rarely or never be polycentric in 
this way, probably because rights depend for their very existence on some 
principle that can be applied consistently across cases. Decisions about 
rights will usually or always be matters both of principle and of context. 
As such, they will be amenable to the process of analogical reasoning, a 
process typically employed by courts but not legislatures.251 At least in 
the realm of individual rights, there is no convincing reason for a court to 
defer to a legislature on the ground of cognitive disadvantage. 
IV. THE JURICENTRIC CAsE FOR PROCEDURAL MINIMALlSM 
The case for the new judicial minimalism appears to be based on two 
premises: first, that political decisionmaking is significantly more legiti-
mate in a democratic sense than judicial decisionmaking, and second, 
that judicial decisionmaking is not significantly more efficacious than po-
litical decisionmaking in matters of individual rights. The previous two 
Parts have called both premises into question. Like political decision-
making, adjudication is both a participatory and a representative process .. 
Indeed, it is often more participatory than political decisionmaking, and 
while it is not representative in the majoritarian sense, it is representative 
in the way that might matter most: in the incentives it creates for repre-
sentatives (precedent-setting litigants) to act in the best interests of their 
constituents (future bound litigants and conforming nonlitigants). 
Moreover, adjudication is a particularly apt process for making deci-
sions about individual rights. The counterm~oritarian advantage held by 
courts is no less advantageous for being a cliche. The relative opacity of 
judicial decisionmaking promotes true deliberation, especially in compar-
ison to the increasing tumult of politics in the age of mass media. And 
the common law method, with its gradualism, contextualism, and respect 
for principle, is better suited to making decisions about rights than the 
spontaneity, abstractness, and pragmatism that characterizes political 
decisionmaking. 
249. Fuller, supra note 13, at 394-404. Note again the distinction between 
"polycentric" problems and what I have called here "policentric" approaches to judicial 
review. 
250. Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 645 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
251. Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point. See Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 
supra note 209, at 24 ("[N]o claim of right is sound if it cannot stand the test of 
hypothetical counter-example. But the technique of examining a claim of right for 
speculative consistency is a technique far more developed in judges than in legislators or in 
the bulk of the citizens who elect legislators."). 
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When the twin premises of the new minimalism are undermined, we 
are left with a picture of the American judiciary-with the Supreme 
Court at its apex-as more than just the handmaiden of deliberative de-
mocracy. The Court is an active and crucial participant in the process of 
deliberative democracy. It is just as deliberative in its own way as the po-
litical branches, and often it is more deliberative, especially with respect 
to individual rights. And it is significantly democratic, too, although not 
majoritarian. The Court thus can be understood as a coequal institution 
of deliberative democracy, with the emphasis on the deliberative 
component. 
Taking this juricentric view of the Court, however, still leaves an im-
portant place for some form of judicial minimalism. As 1 contend below 
in Part V, my critique undermines the case for substantive minimalism-
that is, for deference by the Court to the political branches in matters of 
individual rights, in the form of a reluctance to overturn the results of 
democratic politics. But the critique preserves, and even strengthens, the 
case for procedural minimalism-for narrowness and shallowness in deci-
sionmaking, whether the decisions validate or invalidate the results of 
democratic politics. Procedural minimalism is an important component 
of both the accountability and the functionality of the Court's 
decision making. 
A. Procedural Minimalism and Judicial Legitimacy 
Procedural minimalism-narrowness and shallowness in judicial 
decision making-is defensible less as a means of preserving and bolster-
ing the accountability of political decisionmaking than as a means of pre-
serving the accountability of judicial decisionmaking. This conclusion fol-
lows from the description of adjudication as a representative process 
outlined in Part 11.252 
In Part 11, I noted that court decisions routinely bind subsequent 
litigants and conforming nonlitigants, whose interests can be seen to be 
represented by the litigants participating in a precedential decision. The 
more similar the facts of the precedential case and the subsequent case, 
the more similar the interests of the representative and subsequently 
bound litigants are likely to be-and thus the greater the likelihood that 
the representative litigants will adequately represent the subsequent liti-
gants' interests. The broader the rule announced by a court in deciding 
a case, however, the broader the spectrum of subsequent litigants and 
conforming nonlitigants who will be bound by that rule-and thus the 
looser the ties of interest between the representative and bound parties. 
For instance, the Supreme Court's declaration in Brown v. Board oj 
Education that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently une-
252. For a more complete version of this argument, see Peters, Adjudication, supra 
note 15, at 401-11. 
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qual"253 necessarily bound school systems that may have been dissimilarly 
situated in material ways to that of Topeka, Kansas, the defendant in the 
case. (One could argue that northern school districts afflicted primarily 
by de facto, not de jure, segregation were materially dissimilar in this 
sense-an argument the Court ultimately accepted, but not without some 
consternation.254) But the interests of these dissimilar school districts, by 
virtue of their dissimilarity, were not adequately represented by the To-
peka Board of Education in Brown. Because the Topeka Board had en-
gaged in de jure discrimination, its interest in that case was to maintain 
the Plessy rule that segregated facilities, whether or not segregated inten-
tionally, do not automatically violate the Equal Protection Clause. The 
Topeka Board had no interest in preserving a distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation. The broad "separate-is-unequal" rule an-
nounced by the Court, however, arguably bound other school districts 
that did have an interest in preserving that distinction. These other 
school districts were potentially bound by a rule that neither they nor any 
reliable representative of their interests had helped to create. 
In this way, a lack of procedural minimalism, in the form of the artic-
ulation of broad judicial rules, threatens the legitimacy of interest repre-
sentation in adjudication. Interest representation only works when the 
interests of subsequent litigants and conforming nonlitigants are coexten-
sive with those of the participating litigants in material ways. But this is 
unlikely to be the case when a court announces a broad rule, because in 
doing so the court necessarily binds subsequent litigants and conforming 
nonlitigants with interests distinct from those of the participants. 
This challenge to the accountability of adjudicative decisionmaking 
is a function ofa lack of narrowness (that is, of width) injudicial decision-
making. But it is worth noting that a lack of shallowness (depth) can 
compromise accountability in precisely the same way. Indeed, depth pro-
253. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
254. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court upheld the district 
court's plan of busing and gerrymandering of school districts to remediate the continuing 
de facto effects of historical de jure segregation. 402 U.S. I, 31-32 (197I). In Keyes v. 
School District No.1, Denver, Colorado, the Court held that a system-wide remedy might be 
appropriate in a school district that had never mandated segregation by statute, even 
though de jure segregation had been established with respect to only a small portion of the 
district. 413 U.S. 189,208 (1973). The concurrences of Justices Powell and Douglas in 
Keyes advocated abandoning altogether the distinction between de facto and de jure 
segregation. See 413 U.S. at 214-15 (Douglas,J., concurring); 413 U.S. at 219-36 (Powell, 
J., concurring). In subsequent cases, however, the Court restricted judicial authority to the 
remediation of the demonstrable effects of de jure segregation. See Milliken v. Bradley, 
418 U.S. 717, 752-53 (1974) (holding that district court lacked power to order interdistrict 
remedy absent proof of interdistrict de jure violation or interdistrict effects of de jure 
violation); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976) (holding 
that district court's remedial authority was exhausted once school district implemented 
racially neutral student assignment plan, despite continuing de facto segregation); 
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 101-02 (1995) (rejecting district court remedial plan 
designed to attract nonminority students from other districts). 
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duces width. It is difficult to imagine a court opinion that is deeply rea-
soned without, by virtue of the very depth of its reasoning, also setting out 
some sort of broad rule that will impact future cases. 
Suppose, for example, that a court strikes down as unconstitutional a 
particular government activity-say, the maintenance of a males-only 
public military college-but gives no reason for doing so other than sim-
ply saying, "This particular policy on these particular facts violates the 
Equal Protection Clause." Such a decision would be both very shallow 
and very narrow; it would have no necessary implications for any other 
case, unless another case arises bearing virtually identical facts to those at 
issue in the precedential case. 
But suppose, on the contrary, that the court invalidates the males-
only policy in a deeply reasoned opinion elucidating first principles of 
gender equality under the Equal Protection Clause. (This is what the 
Supreme Court actually did in its VMl decision.255) Even if the court 
purports to act narrowly in doing so-by expressly limiting the preceden-
tial force of its decision to the particular facts of the case, as the VMl 
Court did-the actual impact of the decision will be inescapably broader 
than those particular facts. This will hold true especially among lower 
federal and state courts, which will properly be reluctant to ignore the 
grounds upon which a Supreme Court decision has been rendered. The 
deep reasoning underlying the decision, precisely because it is deep rea-
soning, will have applications in other gender equality cases. In effect, 
the reasoning will operate as a sort of rule, influencing the decisions of 
future cases to which that reasoning is relevant. And that reasoning will 
be relevant in a broad spectrum of cases involving government-imposed 
distinctions between men and women, not just in cases with facts very 
similar to those of VMI. 
In other words, depth and width in judicial decisionmaking are qual-
itatively, if not necessarily quantitatively, the same thing. There really is 
no category consisting of decisions that are both very "deep" and very 
"narrow";256 at best there are some deep decisions that are less wide than 
others. A decision like that in VMI, which is deeply reasoned but ex-
pressly limited to its facts, is somewhat narrower than a decision like 
Brown v. Board of Education, which is both deeply reasoned and explicitly 
wide in scope ("[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual"257). Both types of deep decision, however, are necessarily wider 
than a decision that is both very narrow and very shallow, such as that in 
United States v. Lopez, in which the Supreme Court narrowly invalidated a 
255. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556-58 (1996); see also Sunstein, 
One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 163-71 (discussing VMJ). 
256. Sunstein, however, thinks that such a category exists. See Sunstein, One Case at 
a Time, supra note 8, at 17 (describing Court decisions that he categorizes as both deep 
and narrow). 
257. BrlJUln, 347 U.S. at 495; see also Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 
17. 
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particular statute under the Commerce Clause without providing a 
deeply theorized reason for doing SO.258 
To return to the primary point: Procedural minimalism-that is, 
narrowness and shallowness in decisionmaking, without regard to the 
substance of the decision itself-is a necessary prerequisite of the demo-
cratic legitimacy produced when litigants in a precedential case serve as 
interest representatives of future litigant-subjects or of conforming nonli-
tigant-subjects. Importantly, this justification of minimalism is juricentric, 
not policentric; it rests not on concerns for the legitimacy of the political 
branches, but on concerns for the legitimacy of the Court itself. 
B. Procedural Minimalism and Judicial Competence 
Procedural minimalism is a necessary component of the Court's ac-
countability; it is also a necessary component of the Court's unique com-
petence in matters of individual rights. As I explained in Part III, the very 
concept of legal rights supposes both a gradualistic progression of deci-
sions from which rights can arise and a concrete platform of facts upon 
which rights can be fixed. 
When the Court renders a broad decision-one with substantial 
binding effect in a variety of factual contexts that otherwise might seem 
materially distinguishable-it acts in that respect like a legislature passing 
a statute. The impact of its decision inevitably will be felt in factual situa-
tions the Court (and the litigants) did not envision, or in any event did 
not carefully consider. If, as I suggested above, rights are best articulated 
in concrete factual circumstances, broad decisions by the Court forfeit 
258. See 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 
17. Lopez illustrates that in a sense the question of a decision's minimalism-particularIy its 
narrowness-is always open, because subsequent courts may interpret and apply an 
apparently narrow precedent broadly, or an apparently broad precedent narrowly. The 
former may have occurred recently in United States v. Marrison, in which the Supreme Court 
treated Lopez as "the proper framework for conducting the required analysis" and 
invalidated the Violence Against Women Act as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause 
power. 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2000). It is possible that Marrison signals a willingness, on 
the part of a current majority on the Court, to read Lopez broadly, transforming its 
seemingly fact-specific reasoning into a set of tests or rules to be applied in dissimilar cases. 
I for one would be hesitant to draw this conclusion, since the statute invalidated in 
Marrison was in many respects quite similar to the statute invalidated in Lopez. Both, for 
instance, were criminal statutes touching on areas (education in Lopez, domestic relations 
in Marrison) traditionally regnlated by the states and in which there was no clear indication 
of state regulatory incompetence. But even if Marrison foreshadows a broad reading of 
Lopez, the relative narrowness (and shallowness) of Lopez is preferable from a legitimacy 
standpoint to a broader and deeper opinion, because it allows the parties in future cases 
like Marrison more freedom to urge factual distinctions, and it allows the court more 
freedom to adopt them-even if it chooses not to do so. Put more generally, the fact that 
courts in subsequent decisions may "expand" a seemingly minimalist decision does not 
mean they inevitably will do so, and the more minimalist the original decision, the more 
freedom the parties and the court will have in subsequent cases to resist expansion. 
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much of its natural advantage over the political branches in matters of 
rights. 259 
Thus Sunstein is correct after all that "minimalism is a sensible reac-
tion to the limitations that judges know they face, not least in predicting 
the consequences of their decisions."26o There may be little or no reason 
to think that the Court is better than the political branches at making 
predictive decisions about rights (as opposed to decisions grounded in im-
mediate, obvious facts). Thus there may be little or no reason for the 
Court, in rendering a broadly binding decision, to preempt the ability of 
the political process to take the first stab at applying rights to new 
circumstances. 
This may be especially true in areas where "the relevant facts are in 
flux and changing very rapidly, and the consequences of current develop-
ments are hard to foresee," and in areas where "the legally relevant 
[moral] values are ... in flux and not at all simple to sort OUt."261 Areas 
of factual or moral "flux" are areas in which seemingly small distinctions 
between one case and another can demand entirely different types of 
resolutions. In areas of flux, a seemingly broad right might entail very 
different results in slightly different cases, or it might apply in one case 
but not in another.262 
To express skepticism about whether the Court is better than the 
political branches at making predictive judgments about rights, however, 
is not to concede that the Court is worse at making such judgments. The 
Court's insulation from majoritarian pressures263 and its characteristically 
259. But perhaps not all of that advantage. The Court's relative insulation from 
majoritarian politics and its relatively deliberative decisionmaking procedures might 
preserve some advantage over the political branches in decisions about rights, even absent 
the gradualism and fact-specificity of the common law method. See supra Parts lILA and 
III.B. 
260. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 53. 
261. Id. at 174. 
262. Sunstein illustrates factual flux with, inter alia, Reno v. ACLU, in which the Court 
relied on narrow vagueness grounds to strike down provisions of the Communications 
Decency Act that prohibited the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" material 
to minors. 521 U.S. 844, 859, 874 (1997). As Sunstein contends, this procedural 
minimalism was appropriate because the area in question is in factual flux: Broad 
recognition of something like a "right to speech on the Internet" might foreclose future 
legislative intervention in response to new technological advances or to unanticipated 
dynamics in the nascent, constantly changing technology market. See Sunstein, One Case 
at a Time, supra note 8, at 172-205. 
Sunstein illustrates moral flux with the Court's recent assisted suicide decisions. See 
id. at 75-116. As he notes, "[tJhe 'right to die' might be asserted in many diverse 
circumstances," and the applicable moral considerations might differ subtly but 
significantly with respect to each. Id. at 79. Given the subtle and complex moral 
differences across the many possible factual scenarios, it would be unwise for the Court to 
render a blanket rule allowing states to prohibit assisted suicide; indeed, the Court has 
declined to do so. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-09 (1997); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735-36 (1997). 
263. See supra Part lILA. 
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deliberative decisionmaking methods264 give it an advantage over the po-
litical branches, whether or not the decisions it makes involve prediction. 
Given the admittedly lingering doubts about the Court's legitimacy rela-
tive to that of the political branches,265 however, and especially given the 
costs attendant to changes in the status quo, it probably makes sense for 
the (predictively fallible) Court to defer, by means of procedural 
minimalism, to the (predictively fallible) political process. 
For these reasons, Sunstein's brand of procedural minimalism is 
more appealing than some more modest versions, including Fallon's, 
Dorfs, and the discursivist variety advocated by Katyal. Fallon is wary of 
deep reasoning but sanguine about doctrinal "tests" that apply across con-
stitutional cases.266 Fallon's doctrinal tests, bowever, amount to broad 
rules meant to apply in a variety of cases that otherwise might seem factu-
ally distinct. As such, they demand the kind of prediction about the ap-
plication of rights that the Court might not be especially good at. Dorf 
eschews fact-specific judicial application of rights altogether in favor of a 
regime in wbich the Court articulates fundamental constitutional values 
in a general way, leaving the details to be filled in by the political 
branches at the national or state leveI.267 Like Fallon's doctrinal tests, 
however, Dorfs fundamental values risk the fallibility inherent in applica-
tion to many unforeseen cases (although it is probably true that decisions 
about rights cannot be made without drawing upon some principle that 
applies across cases268). More troublingly, they imply the uprooting of 
the judicial articulation of rights from the firm soil of particular facts, and 
thus the dilution of a chief advantage enjoyed by the Court over the polit-
ical branches in making decisions about rights.269 The same objection 
applies to Katyal's suggestion that judges freely indulge in "advicegiving" 
about policies and facts not before the Court,270 although to the extent 
264. See supra Part III.B. 
265. See supra Part I.C. 
266. See supra Part I.B.I; Fallon, supra note II, at 106--4l. 
267. See supra Part I.B.2; Dorf, supra note 11, at 74-83; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 84, 
at 388-418, 444-69. 
268. See supra Parts III.C.2-3. 
269. In discussing these issues with me, Professor Dorf has suggested that under bis 
approacb, courts (including the Supreme Court) would continue to be constrained, 
presumably by justiciability doctrines, to make decisions about core values in the context of 
particular facts. The political branches, however, particularly at the state and local level, 
would be relatively free to determine bow best to implement those values-that is, to 
remediate violations of them. Understood this way, DOli's approach is consistent with 
procedural minimalism, although it is perhaps open to the objection that constitutional 
values articulated in such a contextually confined way hardly deserve to be called "core" or 
"fundamental" in any meaningful sense. 
270. Katyal, supra note 108, at 1710; see also supra notes 109-111 and accompanying 
text. 
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judges can accomplish this through nonbinding dicta the objection is not 
so strong.271 
Narrow judicial decisionmaking, especially in areas wrought with fac-
tual or moral uncertainty, thus is defensible not as a response to the sup-
posedly superior competence of the political branches in making predic-
tive judgments, but simply as a means of reducing the risk of judicial 
error in making such judgments. Combined with the threat to the repre-
sentative legitimacy of adjudication posed by broad or deep judicial deci-
sions, the apparent connection between such decisions and a heightened 
risk of predictive error comprises a fairly compelling juricentric case for 
procedural minimalism. 
C. Procedural Minimalism and Justice Scalia's Rule-Based Formalism 
As 1 have argued more extensively elsewhere,272 the juricentric case 
for procedural minimalism threatens one of the central jurisprudential 
tenets of Justice Antonin Scalia, perhaps the current Supreme Court's 
most intellectually influential member. Justice Scalia has argued off the 
bench in favor of broad judicial rules, and in his judicial opinions he has 
tended to practice what he preaches. In a frequently cited law review 
article, Justice Scalia has made a forceful case for a "law of rules," a juris-
prudential approach by which appellate courts (and particularly the Su-
preme Court) presumptively decide cases broadly, according to "clear, 
general principle [s] of decision. "273 In that article, Scalia catalogues 
what he believes to be the chief benefits of broad rules: avoidance of 
judicial discretion, the like decision of like cases, and the promotion of 
predictability in the ordering of private affairs.274 Eric Segall has shown 
convincingly that Scalia's rule-based formalism is not merely academic, 
but has in fact been a fairly consistent feature of his judicial opinions, 
more consistent even than his (closely related) fondness for 
textualism.275 
271. Neal Devins's brand of discursive minimalism is not so obviously open to this 
objection, as it seems to focus less on "giving advice" through dicta than on providing 
principled reasons for decisions the Court makes. See Devins, supra note 96, at 1990-91. 
Providing principled reasons necessarily adds depth to an opinion, and in this respect can 
have extradecisional effects similar to those produced by a wide decision. See infra notes 
309-314 and accompanying text. But providing principled reasons also is part and parcel 
of what courts do in deciding cases and, more to the point, of what gives courts an 
advantage in making decisions about rights. See supra Part Ill.C. 
272. See Peters, Adjudication, supra note 15, at 401-11. 
273. Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1179. 
274. See id. at 1178-80. 
275. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 
Ceo. Wash. L. Rev. 991, 1005-20 (1994). Of course, six years and quite a few Scalia 
opinions have come and gone since Segall conducted his analysis, but I have no sense that 
Justice Scalia has radically altered his judicial approach during that time span. For Justice 
Scalia's most recent academic statement of his textualist philosophy, see Scalia, Matter of 
Interpretation, supra note 6. 
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Justice Scalia's rule-based formalism, which calls for the rendering of 
wide holdings and opinions, is of course unabashedly nonminimalist. As 
such, if we take a juricentric approach to adjudication (and particularly 
to judicial review), we have strong reason to challenge this aspect of 
Scalia's philosophy. Turning the decisions of particular cases into occa-
sions for the fashioning of broad rules, as Scalia advocates, raises a legiti-
macy problem for the Court, because it involves the decision (or at least 
the attempted decision) of issues not directly before the Court and thus 
the binding (or attempted binding) of dissimilar future litigants and con-
forming nonlitigants. When the nexus of similarity between litigant-
lawmakers and nonlitigant-subjects is attenuated in this way, the legiti-
macy of binding those nonlitigant-subjects becomes attenuated as well. 
This effect should be particularly troubling to Justice Scalia, who justifies 
his formalism and related textualism partly by reference to values of dem-
ocratic legitimacy.276 
As we have seen, the rendering of broad judicial rules also com-
promises the unique advantages enjoyed by courts with respect to the de-
cision of cases on particular facts, advantages that are particularly salient 
in cases involving rights. When the Court renders a broad rule, it acts 
like a legislature, resolving or attempting to resolve ahead of time dis-
putes arising from facts with which it is not directly familiar. The Court 
enjoys no special expertise in making such predictions, and thus there is 
less reason to allow the Court (rather than the political branches) to 
make them. 
Of course, these arguments against Justice Scalia's rule-based formal-
ism can only provide reasons against rendering broad decisions. Those 
reasons may not always, or often, be decisive; they may at times be out-
weighed by the reasons in favor of broad rules. Moreover, a judge or 
court might even take a particularistic, case-by-case approach to the ques-
tion of whether to be minimalist, weighing in each case the advantages of 
minimalism against the advantages of broad rules.277 Thus the juricen-
tric case for procedural minimalism at most seems to shift presump-
tions-awayfromJustice Scalia's presumption in favor of broad rules and 
toward the minimalists' presumption in favor of narrow and shallow deci-
sionmaking. In any given case or type of case, this presumption might 
reasonably be overcome by countervailing considerations. 
276. See Scalia, Law of Rules, supra note 16, at 1179-80 (connecting fonnalism to 
democratic value of constraining judicial discretion); Scalia, Matter of Interpretation, 
supra note 6, at 23-25 (connecting fonnalism, and particularly textualism, to democratic 
values). 
277. This seems roughly to be the course advocated by Sunstein, who suggests that 
"[t]he choice between minimalism and the alternatives depends partly on pragmatic 
considerations." Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 56. 
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V. THE JURICENTRIC CAsE AGAINST SUBSTANTIVE MINlMALISM 
To the extent, then, that the new minimalists prescribe procedural 
minimalism-narrow and shallow decisionmaking that nonetheless in-
volves fully and fairly deciding the case before the Court-this prescrip-
tion is supported by a juricentric approach, even if it is not well sup-
ported by the new minimalists' problematic policentrism. But the new 
minimalists propose substantive minimalism as well-that is, some degree 
of presumptive avoidance by the Court of invalidating challenged govern-
ment action, whether by upholding the action on the merits or by avoid-
ing decision of the copstitutional issue. Sunstein, for example, urges the 
Court to be "wary of recognizing rights ... amid complex issues of fact 
and value."278 Richard Fallon endorses the application of deferential 
"suspect-content" tests in areas characterized by "reasonable disagree-
ment."279 And Michael Dorf proposes that the Court should "give ... 
[some] deference to state policies that arguably infringe constitutional 
rights," and should "permit some doctrinal disagreements among the 
lower courts to go unresolved in order to discern the practical conse-
quences of different legal regimes."280 
My arguments in Parts 11 and 111 go a long way towards undermining 
the case for substantive minimalism. If in fact the Court acts with signifi-
cant democratic legitimacy in its own right, and if in fact it tends to be 
more competent to decide issues of constitutional rights than the politi-
cal branches, then there is little reason for the Court to defer to the polit-
ical branches in making decisions about rights. And unlike with procedu-
ral minimalism, there are no affirmative juricentric reasons for the Court 
to engage in substantive minimalism. Because substantive minimal ism 
does not implicate the width or depth of a decision, it cannot be sup-
ported as necessary to preserve the representative legitimacy or decision-
making competence of the Court. Understanding adjudication as a pro-
cess of participation and representation suggests that Court decisions 
about rights legitimately bind the litigants and those similarly situated to 
them; recognizing the special competence of the Court to make gradual-
istic, fact-specific decisions reduces concerns for potential error in recog-
nizing rights on the facts of a particular case. 
Even given the juricentric picture of the Court as significantly repre-
sentative and specially competent, however, there remains a potentially 
compelling reason for endorsing substantive minimalism in cases involv-
ing rights. It might be thought that such decisions, when made by the 
Court, are significantly more permanent, or durable, than when made by 
the political branches. If erroneous Court decisions involving rights are 
significantly harder to change than erroneous political decisions, then 
the cost of judicial error-if not the risk of that error-might exceed the 
278. Id. at 76. 
279. Fallon, supra note 11, at 88-90. 
280. Dori, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
2000] ASSESSING THE NEW JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 1523 
cost of political error in issues of rights. (Error cost, after all, is a function 
of both the frequency of error and the magnitude of error.) On this 
view, substantive minimalism-judicial reluctance to overturn political 
decisions affecting rights-might make sense after all. 
I doubt my juricentric approach can provide a complete and decisive 
refutation of this "relative durability" argnment. But my approach does 
suggest important weaknesses in the argument-weaknesses that, com-
bined with the analysis underlying the juricentric approach oudined in 
Parts II and 111, in my view shift to the minimalists the burden of demon-
strating that the total cost of judicial error in making case-specific deci-
sions about rights outweighs the total cost of political error arising from 
judicial avoidance of such decisions. 
The weaknesses in the durability argument fall into three categories. 
First, that argument underappreciates the capacity of the common law 
method to minimize the cost of judicial error. Second, it undervalues the 
cost of judicial failures to overturn erroneous political decisions in mat-
ters of rights. And third, it disregards the risk of erroneous judicial assess-
ment of the risk of judicial error. I examine each weakness in turn. 
A. The Common Law Method, Adaptability, Judicial Error, and Rights 
As I argued in Part III. C. 2, the common law method credibly pro-
duces claims of right in large part because of its gradualism, which sup-
plies the element of continuity that seems bound up with the very notion 
of rights. But continuity is only one side of the gradualism coin; the 
other side is adaptability. Because common law decisionmaking proceeds 
on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis, the effects of one erroneous decision 
can be mitigated by limiting or avoiding its application to other cases. 
Examples of this error-mitigation effect of common law gradualism 
are manifold in constitutional law, although for obvious reasons they 
tend not to be as prominent as examples of decisions with far-reaching 
precedential influence. Consider the Slaughter-House Cases, in which the 
Court narrowly construed the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment281 to protect from state infringement only rights 
of a distinctively national character, foreclosing an interpretation by 
which the Clause incorporates some or all of the first eight Amendments 
against the states.282 There are strong arguments that the Court's reduc-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a "practical nullity"283 in 
Slaughter-House was an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution.284 
281. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States ... ." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
282. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74-80 (1873). 
283. Edward S. Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis 
and Interpretation 965 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
284. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Limitations 
on State Power, 1865-1873,51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 329, 347-56 (1984) (arguing thatJustice 
Miller's interpretation of Privileges or Immunities Clause was contrary to intent of the 
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Although Slaughter-House has never been overruled, its effect has itself 
been reduced to a practical nullity by the Court's gradual incorporation 
against the states of most of the first eight Amendments through the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.285 The (arguable) consti-
tutional error committed by the Court in Slaughter-House was mitigated 
over time by the Court's development of an alternative doctrine, Due Pro-
cess Clause "incorporation," to compensate for that error. 
It is true that minimalists like Sunstein and Dorf worry not only 
about the Court's ability to redress constitutional decisions that are erro-
neous when made, as Slaughter-House may have been, but also about the 
Court's ability to adapt to changing factual and moral circumstances-to 
revise decisions that have become erroneous, even if they were not necessa-
rily erroneous ab initio.286 Some of the most celebrated decisions of con-
stitutionallaw, however, have effected precisely such adaptations, chang-
ing doctrinal direction based upon the Court's recognition that factual 
backgrounds or moral understandings have changed. The Court's deci-
sion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, for example, overruled Adkins v. 
Children's Hospita[287 and repudiated the reasoning of Lochner v. New 
York288 largely on the basis of "recent economic experience" that had ex-
posed the inadequacy of an unregulated market to redress the severe dis-
Framers); HowardJay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 
3, 24-38 (1954) (arguing that Justice Miller's interpretation ignored entire antislavery 
debate from 1834 on). 
285. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process oflaw .... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR 
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (incorporating Fifth Amendment right to just 
compensation for takings of property); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1927) 
(incorporating First Amendment rights to free speech, press, and religion); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (incorporating Fourth Amendment right to freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) 
(incorporating Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,6 (1964) (incorporating Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (incorporating Sixth 
Amendment right to confront witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 
(1967) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to speedy and public trial); Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to compulsory 
process); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (incorporating Fifth 
Amendment prohibition of double jeopardy); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) 
(incorporating Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive bail). 
286. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 174-75 (urging "judicial 
caution in invalidating regulatory controls" where "the relevant facts are ... changing very 
rapidly" or where "the legally relevant values are ... in flux"); Dorf, supra note 11, at 26-50 
(criticizing common law method for responding too slowly to changing circumstances). 
287. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Adkins itself had overruled Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 
(1908), on the grounds that "great ... changes ... have taken place since [Muller] in the 
contractual, political and civil status of women." Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553. 
288. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating New York law setting maximum hours for 
bakery employees). 
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parity in bargaining power between low-wage employees and their em-
ployers.289 And the Court in Brown v. Board of Education, relying on the 
purported strength of contemporary social science research suggesting a 
connection between educational segregation and harmful psychological 
effects on children,29o effectively overruled Plessy v. Ferguson. 291 The 
Brown Court expressly refused to "turn the clock back to ... 1896 when 
[the Plessyopinion] was written" and "consider[ed] public education in 
the light of its full development and its present place in American life."292 
Indeed, the Court has been explicit about its willingness to reconsider 
precedents when they have "been found unworkable," when they have 
become "doctrinal anachronism[s] discounted by society," or when their 
"premises of fact have so far changed ... as to render [their] ... hold-
ing[s] somehow irrelevant or unjustifiable."293 
One of the core arguments of the new minimalism, however, is that 
the common law method's capacity to perform long-term doctrinal ad-
justments has become insufficient in light of the apparently increasing 
pace of factual and moral change in our technologically driven and ideo-
logically pluralistic society. As Michael Dorf writes, "life and law occur in 
the short run. Gradualist common law evolution takes place over the 
course of generations."294 On this version of the objection, the problem 
with constitutional adjudication is not so much durability as inertia. 
One answer to this "inertia" version of the objection challenges the 
premise that adjustments in constitutional doctrine necessarily take place 
only in the long term. There are plenty of examples of cases in which the 
Court has corrected in the relatively short run what it believes to be its 
own constitutional errors. Take, for instance, the Court's overruling of 
Muller v. Oregon fifteen years later in Adkins, which was followed by its 
289. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding state law 
establishing minimum wage for women). 
290. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954). 
291. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
292. 347 U.S. at 492. 
293. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992). The Casey Court cited 
West Coast Hotel and Brawn as examples of cases in which changed circumstances justified 
the overruling of precedent. See id. at 861-64. 
294. Dorf, supra note 11, at 45 (citation omitted). In conversation with me, Professor 
Dorf has expressed the tentative view that doctrinal stability might be more important in 
the context of constitutional rights than in other contexts, including statutory 
interpretation, with which Dorf is partly concerned in his Foreword. See id. at 5-7. As 
such, Dorf's critique of common law gradualism may not be intended primarily to address 
decisions involving individual constitutional rights. In his Foreword, however, Dorf is quite 
explicit about his view that the Supreme Court's constitutional rights methodology tracks 
the common law method he critiques: "The common law method, in the sense of case-by-
case doctrinal development, plays an especially large role in the Court's constitutional 
rights jurisprudence." Id. at 29 (citation omitted). I think it is fair, then, to interpret 
Dorf's written critique of common law gradualism as applying to constitutional rights. 
Sunstein's advocacy of minimalism in areas of factual and moral "flux" is in the same vein. 
See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 174-75. 
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overruling of Adkins fourteen years later in West Coast Hotel. 295 Or con-
sider the Court's overruling of National Leaf:':lU of Cities v. Usery296 nine 
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.297 As 
Richard Fallon acknowledges, "the Court not only can overrule its own 
precedents, but actually does so with some frequency."298 Such examples 
of what Fallon calls "extraordinary adjudication"299 illustrate that stare 
decisis in the Court's constitutional cases is at best a presumption, one 
that can be overcome when the Court decides the indicia of error are 
particularly strong.300 
The Court also has shown its capacity to mitigate perceived constitu-
tional errors in the relatively near term by means short of outright over-
ruling. For example, in the quarter century since deciding Roe v. Wade, 
the Court has repeatedly refused to abandon Roe's "central holding" rec-
ognizing a constitutionally protected right to have an abortion,301 but at 
the same time it has adjusted the breadth of !We enough to accommodate 
political experiments limiting the scope of that right.302 
295. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
296. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating application of Fair Labor Standards Act to state 
government employers). 
297. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47, 557 (1985). 
298. Fallon, supra note 11, at 110 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) 
(overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985» and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44,66 (1996) (overruling Pennyslvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989»). 
299. See id. at 126-41. 
300. Michael Dorf has noted in conversation with me that some of these celebrated 
examples of short-term overrulings are perhaps better explained by political realities facing 
the Court (as in West Coast Hotel, which followed Roosevelt's court-packing threat and the 
so-called "switch in time that saved nine"), or by the change of heart of a single justice (as 
with justice Blackmun from National League of Cities to Garcia), than by the Court's good-
faith acknowledgment of prior error. A partial response to this observation is that the 
Court acts only through its members, and thus an overruling that is attributable to the 
conversion of a single justice or to the replacement of old justices with new ones is no less 
a recognition of error by the Court than a wholesale change of heart by a majority of the 
body would be. More fundamentally, the objection misses the point-which has to do with 
the Court's capacity for expeditiously changing course rather than with its motive for doing 
so. Decisions like West Coast Hotel and Garcia challenge the substantive minimalist premise 
that the Court (however motivated) cannot respond to its own constitutional errors as 
quickly as the political branches (however motivated) can respond to theirs. This is not to 
say that these decisions cannot be criticized based on the motivations behind them-only 
that they serve as examples which undermine the objection from inertia. 
301. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (reaffirming 
Roe's "central holding[ 1 that viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest 
in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on non therapeutic 
abortions"); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (plurality 
opinion) (leaving "undisturbed" Roe's prohibition on state interference with abortion right 
prior to viability). 
302. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63 (1976) (upholding 
state statute defining" 'viability'" as "'that stage of fetal development when the life of the 
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
support systems'"); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-81 (1977) (upholding state regulation 
denying Medicaid benefits for non therapeutic abortions); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 
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Might there be some tension in extolling the connection between 
rights and the continuity of the common law method, as I did in Part 
lII.C, while at the same time appealing to the adaptability of the common 
law method, as I have just done in responding to the inertia objection? 
In the context of overrulings of precedent, this tension may indeed exist. 
When the Court overrules its own precedent-at least when it does so in 
fairly short order, as in Adkins and West Coast Hotel-it acts like a legisla-
ture repealing a statute, and thus arguably forfeits some of its credibility 
as a trustworthy decisionmaker about rights. 303 Of course, it can also be 
argued that the Court bolsters its credibility by quickly repudiating deci-
sions that are obviously wrong. 304 
In the context, however, of mere limitations of precedent-the ex-
plicit distinction of prior decisions based on subtle factual differences, or 
even the kind of sub silentio distinction necessary to reconcile Romer v. 
Evans305 with Bowers v. Hardwick306-any tension disappears. The com-
mon law method produces rights by analogy from prior decisions; if the 
Court can reasonably decline to draw such an analogy, then the "right" 
articulated in the prior case simply does not exist in the subsequent one 
(or, as in the Bowers-Romer dyad, the right articulated in the subsequent 
case simply was not precluded by the prior one). It is not as if the Court 
is creating a right and then denying or destroying it, as in the case of 
326-27 (1980) (upholding federal "Hyde Amendment" prohibiting use of federal 
Medicaid funds to perform abortions other than those necessary to save life of mother or 
in cases of rape or incest); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (upholding state 
statute requiring parental notice for abortions as applied to minors living with and 
dependent upon their parents); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 
490-93 (1983) (upholding state statute requiring parental consent for minors' abortions 
but providing alternative judicial consent procedures); Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-11 
(upholding ban on performance of nontherapeutic abortions by state employees, or with 
the use of public facilities); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (upholding 
state statute requiring parental notice and 48-hour waiting period for minors' abortions 
absent court order); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1990) 
(upholding state statute requiring parental notice and 24-hour waiting period for minors' 
abortions absent court order or fulfillment of certain other procedural requirements); 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173,203 (1991) (upholding prohibition on federal funding of 
abortion counseling and advocacy); Cas", 505 U.S. at 878-87 (rejecting Roe's trimester 
framework and upholding, under an "undue burden" standard, state requirements that 
physician inform woman of abortion risks and alternatives at least 24 hours prior to 
performing abortion, that parental or judicial consent be obtained for minors' abortions, 
and that certain recordkeeping and reporting functions be performed in connection with 
abortions). 
303. This possibility underlies the connection drawn by the plurality in Cas" between 
stare decisis and the "need for principled action [by the Court] to be perceived as such." 
505 U.S. at 866. 
304. This is a central message of the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia in Cas". See 505 U.S. at 944, 953-66 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); 505 U.S. at 993-1002 (Scalia,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
305. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
306. See Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 151-52. 
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overruling. All the Court is doing is recognizing a limited, highly context-
dependent right and then declining to extend its limits, or articulating a 
limited, highly context-dependent denial of a right and then declining to ex-
tend the limits of that denial. Continuity is not threatened by reasonably 
limiting rights to the contexts in which they were recognized. It is 
threatened, rather, by reneging on an existing commitment to recognize 
a right in a particular context. 
So common law continuity and common law adaptability need not 
be incompatible. This point suggests a second answer to the inertia ob-
jection: The objection goes more to failures of procedural minimalism by 
the Court than to failures of substantive minimalism. Roe again serves as a 
good example. As Sunstein notes, Roe was an extremely wide opinion, 
famously statute-like (or even regulation-like) in its explicit application of 
the trimester framework to cases not before the Court. 307 As 1 suggested 
above, the Court, for better or worse, has done a pretty decent job of 
trimming back these gratuitous elements of Roe. But the Court's ability to 
adapt would have been much greater if Roe had been a much narrower 
opinion. The Roe Court could have invalidated the Texas law at issue in 
that case, which criminalized all abortions except those necessary to save 
the mother's life,308 without constructing the trimester guidelines that 
vexed the Court for the next two decades, and without broadly barring 
the states from acting on theories of when human life begins. A narrower 
decision would have left more room for the Court to accommodate, in 
future cases, advances in medical technology allowing both for safe abor-
tions later in pregnancy and for the maintenance of fetal life outside the 
womb earlier in prenatal development. It also would have given the 
Court greater flexibility in allowing the political branches to determine, 
in the first instance, whether and how the abortion right should be ap-
plied in different factual contexts-abortions performed on minors, for 
instance, or abortions paid for with public funds. Although the Court 
succeeded remarkably quickly in removing many of these issues from the 
seemingly blunt impact of Roe, the failure of procedural minimalism in 
the Roe opinion did not make this task any easier. 
In sum, when the Court adheres as closely as possible to procedural 
minimalism, it retains the ability to adapt rather quickly to changing cir-
cumstances and to mitigate rather quickly the effects of decisions that are 
erroneous from the start. A willingness by the Court to decide particular 
cases involving rights in areas of moral or factual "flux" or uncertainty 
307. See id. at 17-18; see also, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in 
American Government 113-14 (1976) (the Rne opinion reads "like a set of hospital rules 
and regulations"); Webster, 492 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion) ("[Tlhe rigirl Rne framework 
is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms .... [T]he 
result has been a web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a 
code of regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine."); cf. Sunstein, One Case 
at a Time, supra note 8, at 54 (the Rne Court "laid rlown a set of rules for legislatures to 
follow whenever [the abortion] issue arose."). 
308. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973). 
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does not require such decisions to have broad effects, foreclosing adapta-
tion and limitation in subsequent cases. Substantive nonminimalism does 
not undermine procedural minimalism, and procedural minimalism pre-
serves doctrinal adaptability. 
B. The Costs of Substantive Minimalism 
The durability objection holds that judicial errors in matters of rights 
are likely to be harder to reverse or mitigate than political errors in such 
matters, and that the Court should thus be more reluctant to recognize 
rights (thereby removing the issue from the political process) than not to 
do so (thereby leaving the issue to the political process). The previous 
section suggested that the costs of erroneous judicial recognition of rights 
are not likely to be as great as the minimalists imagine. As I argue in this 
section, there is also reason to suspect that the costs of erroneous judicial 
failure to recognize rights may be greater than the minimalists 
acknowledge. 
As an example, consider the evolution, if it can be called that, from 
Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education. In Plessy, the Court re-
fused to recognize a Fourteenth Amendment right to racially integrated 
accommodations on railroad trains. The Court's decision was quite wide 
in that it purported not merely to validate the particular law at issue, a 
Louisiana statute requiring "equal but separate accommodations" in rail-
road coaches, but to endorse all "[l]aws permitting, and even requiring, 
[the] separation [of the races] in places where they are liable to be 
brought into contact [with each other]."309 The Court's opinion even 
went so far as to mention expressly "the establishment of separate schools 
for white and colored children" as an example of a permissible law.310 
The decision in Plessy also was quite deep in that it provided a relatively 
comprehensive theory of the Equal Protection Clause,311 declaring that 
the Clause "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based 
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality," 
and categorically rejecting the argument that segregation statutes might 
violate the Clause by "stamp[ing] the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. "312 
The Court in Plessy declined to recognize an asserted constitutional 
right, thus leaving the issue of racial segregation to the political process. 
Moreover, the Court did so in a procedurally nonminimalist fashion, im-
pairing the ability of future Courts to recognize the asserted right in 
other contexts. From the perspective of substantive minimalism, Plessy 
thus should be something of a holy grail: a decision leaving the maxi-
mum amount of decisionmaking authority to the political branches, 
309. 163 U.S. 537, 540, 544 (1896) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
310. Id. at 544. 
311. "No State shall ... deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I. 
312. 163 U.S. at 544, 551. 
1530 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1454 
thereby greatly reducing the costs of judicial error.313 On the minimalist 
view, one would have expected the political process eventually to identify 
and correct Plessy's error without the need for subsequent Court 
intervention. 
But of course the political process did no such thing. Fifty-eight 
years later, social and economic life in large parts of the country re-
mained racially segregated by law,314 including segregation in contexts, 
like public education, in which it was much more socially significant than 
in the context of railroad transportation. Legislative change may never 
have come in the South; as recently as 1963, nine years after Brown, Gov-
ernor George Wallace threatened to bar the doors of the University of 
Alabama to black students.315 And legislation did not arrive on the fed-
erallevel until 1964, when the Civil Rights Act was adopted.316 The con-
stitutional error ultimately was corrected not by the political branches, 
but by the Court itself in 1954, when it decided Brown. 
313. The Plessy Court also could have chosen (but did not choose) to practice 
substantive minimalism in a second way: hy denying certiorari to hear the case, thus letting 
stand the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of the 
segregation statute. Substantive minimalism is the refusal to actually decide an issue 
squarely presented in a case out of deference to the decision of that issue reached by the 
political branches. It can take the form either of affirmatively approving, in a rubber-stamp 
fashion, the political branches' decision of the issue out of a reluctance to suhstitute 
judicial for political judgment, or of altogether avoiding passing judgment on the political 
branches' decision of the issue by, for instance, denying certiorari, thus exercising Bickel's 
"passive virtues." 
Either of these choices-upholding the political judgment or simply letting it stand 
via the passive virtues-leaves the political branches free to later revise their decision of the 
issue if they desire. Both choices are "substantively" rather than "procedurally" minimalist 
because they entail refusal by the Court, out of deference to the political branches, actually 
to substitute its judgment for a political one. In contrast, a procedurally minimalist 
decision actually resolves the issue presented in a case, without special deference to the 
political resolution of that issue, but declines to resolve additional issues that are not 
necessary to the resolution of the case. 
Note that the Court's motive for its decision matters to the question of whether that 
decision is substantively minimalist. If the Plessy Court upheld the Louisiana statute out of 
deference to the legislature-saying, in effect, "We defer to your judgment on this difficult 
constitutional issue" -then its decision was substantively minimalist. If, on the other hand, 
the Plessy Court upheld the statute because it independently agreed with the legislature's 
judgment regarding the application of the Equal Protection Clause on the facts of that 
case-saying, in effect, "In this case our judgment happens to accord with yours, although 
we pay yours no special deference"-then it was not a substantively minimalist decision at 
all. 
314. See generally Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle for Black Equality, 1954-1992, at 
3-36 (1993) (discussing the nature and impact of racial segregation in first half of 
twentieth century). 
315. See id. at 145 (quoting Wallace: "'I draw the line in the dust and toss down the 
gauntlet before the feet of tyranny, and I say, Segregation now! Segregation tomorrow! 
Segregation forever!'"). 
316. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000 (1994». 
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Plessy, while procedurally nonminimalist, was substantively minimal-
ist, although perhaps not consciously so. The Court in that case may have 
been "wary of recognizing rights ... amid complex issues of fact and 
value,"317 or it may have been "aware that [the Court's] ... moraljudg-
ments, once announced, may not receive immediate social vindication 
and may instead produce something very different from what [the Court] 
intend[s]."318 Or the Co~rt may simply have decided Plessy as it did be-
cause the majority thought it was interpreting the Constitution correcdy. 
Whatever its motivation, from the perspective of substantive minimalism, 
Plessy should have reduced the costs of judicial error by deferring to the 
political branches. Instead it seems to have increased error costs by con-
demning two subsequent generations of Americans to live with unconsti-
tutional segregation before Brown was decided-by "inflict[ing] unneces-
sary pain" for over half a century, in Mark Tushnet's words.319 The 
Court's erroneous decision not to recognize a right in Plessy proved to 
have its own inertia, and thus ended up producing its own quite severe 
error costs. 
And suppose the political process had corrected' Plessy's error within 
a generation or two, by repealing (or federally invalidating) Jim Crow and 
school segregation laws. In such an alternate universe, the costs of Plessy's 
error would have been no less severe than they actually were; unnecessary 
(and unconstitutional) pain still would have been inflicted upon count-
less innocents in the interim. Indeed, as Tushnet points out in a similar 
context, an 1896 Court decision strongly affirming a Fourteenth Amend-
ment right against de jure racial segregation, viewed from a later perspec-
tive in which the political process has come around to the same view, 
"would seem to have been an act of statesmanship for which the Court 
deserves great credit."320 
To generalize the point: There is strong reason to believe that the 
costs of erroneous judicial failure to recognize constitutional rights can, 
and often will, be at least as severe as the costs of erroneous judicial rec-
ognition of constitutional rights. Constitutional rights, after all, are rights 
against the majority. What reason is there to think that the majority will 
change its mind before the Court does? If the majority does not do so-
and even if it does-what reason was there for the Court not to have 
gotten it right in the first place? 
The new minimalists do not dispute-how could they?-that the 
Court must sometimes stand against the majority to articulate rights.321 
317. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 76. 
318. Id. at 103. 
319. Mark Tushnet, How to Deny a Constitutional Right: Reflections on the Assisted-
Suicide Cases, 1 Green Bag 2d 55,60 (1997) (describing how a Court decision recognizing 
a constitutional right to assisted suicide might be assessed in ten years). 
320. Id. 
321. See, e.g., Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 38 ("[lIt is reasonable to 
think that Brawn requires the [minimalistl thesis to be qualified, perhaps for the most 
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Their contention is softer; they essentially argue that it usually is prefera-
ble for the majority, through politics, to reach correct decisions about 
rights by itself, rather than having decisions about rights imposed upon it 
by the Court. The key qualifier here is correct decisions. The longevity of 
legally mandated segregation after Plessy provides salient, if incomplete, 
evidence that the majority does not always arrive at the correct decision 
about rights without strong judicial intervention. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, there is reason to question the distinc-
tion, implicit in substantive minimalism, between decisions made by the 
Court and decisions made by the majority. On an important level, the 
distinction certainly exists; the Court's constitutional decisions some-
times, and necessarily, go against the wishes of a then-prevailing majority. 
But the Plessy-Brown progression suggests a more complex long-term rela-
tionship between the Court's constitutional decision making and m~ority 
values. A willing Court could have limited Plessy early and often, by refus-
ing, for example, to apply the Plessy dictum regarding school segregation 
in cases actually involving education.322 That the Court declined to limit 
Plessy in this way suggests, to me at least, that most of the Justices shared 
the then-prevailing social view that segregation, at least in schools, was 
neither immoral nor constitutionally forbidden. 323 In other words, the 
supposedly countermajoritarian Court was, in a very real sense, acquiescing 
in the majority's view about constitutional rights.324 
Whether this kind of de facto adherence to majority opinion is ap-
propriate is in my view largely irrelevant, because it is inevitable, to some 
compelling cases where the underlying judgment of (constitutionally relevant) political 
morality is insistent."). Again, abolitionists like Tushnet apparently do not share this view. 
See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
322. The Court had at least two early chances to decline to apply Plessy in the context 
of education, but it took neither of them. See Cumming v. Board of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 
(1899) (upholding a local tax assessment used to support a whites-only public high 
school); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding a criminal statute 
prohibiting the operation of integrated private schools). 
323. As late as 1950, 52% of respondents in a Life magazine poll supported continued 
school segregation either in the South or nationwide. Forty-one percent supported 
nationwide integration, and 7% did not answer or were undecided. Rick Bragg, Ora and 
Her Wonder School, Life, Sept. 1999, at 49, 58 (reprinting results of 1950 poll). 
324. Tushnet, citing the mid-{:entury work of political scientist Robert Dahl, contends 
that over the long run the Court has rarely if ever been successful in persisting with 
constitutional doctrine that runs counter to majority values. See Tushnet, Taking the 
Constitution Away, supra note 7, at 134 ("According to Dahl, the Supreme Court rarely 
holds out for an extended period against a sustained national political majority." (citing 
Dahl, supra note 107, at 285». Of course, there is something of a chicken-and-egg 
problem lurking here: The fact that the Court often seems eventually to "change its mind" 
and conform to majority values does not mean that the majority never "changes its mind" 
in conformity to, or at least partly in response to, decisions of the Court. Indeed, Brown, 
and its eventual vindication in, inter alia, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, may be an example of 
this latter type of conformity. Nevertheless, I have no qualms about conceding Tushnet's 
point that over the long run the Court sometimes, even often, conforms its constitutional 
decisionmaking to majority values, at least to some degree. 
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degree at least. Supreme Court Justices are members of society, albeit 
privileged ones, and it is impossible for them completely to escape the 
tug of prevailing social values.325 Nor is it clear that we would want the 
Justices to do so if they could. As Richard Fallon suggests, 
[W]hen interpreting the Constitution ... the Court appropri-
ately acts in a representative capacity .... The relevant question 
for the Justices is ... how the Constitution ought to be inter-
preted and implemented in light of history and of the diverse, 
more or less intense, and possibly fluid array of reasonable 
moral views within the society.326 
As such, the Court appropriately might answer questions about the exis-
tence and scope of a constitutional right partly by reference to the pres-
ence, absence, or strength of social consensus about the right, or indeed 
by reference to the level of certainty within the Court itself about the 
right's validity. 
There is, however, a crucial difference between this sort of approach 
and substantive minimalism. On a nonminimalist approach, the Court 
might take factors like social consensus and judicial uncertainty into ac-
count in deciding whether or in what form a constitutional right exists. 
But on a minimalist approach, the Court uses such factors as reasons not 
to decide whether or in what form a right exists-as reasons, that is, to 
leave such decisions in the hands of the political branches, either by rub-
ber-stamping a political decision or by avoiding review of it. To the ex-
tent it is able-a key qualifier, as 1 explain in the next section-the Court 
might legitimately consider social and epistemological factors in making 
decisions about rights. But it is much harder to argue that the Court 
should consider such factors in refusing to make decisions about rights at 
all. 
C. The Inescapable Problem of Judicial Fallibility 
The durability argument for substantive minimalism does not hold 
that the fact of judicial fallibility always counsels deference to the judg-
ments of the political branches. It holds only that the Court should take 
judicial fallibility into account in deciding whether to afford such defer-
ence. On the new minimalist account, the potential for judicial error is 
particularly great where society as a whole is divided on a question. Thus, 
for Sunstein, "[t]he case for minimalism is especially strong when the 
area involves a highly contentious question now receiving sustained dem-
325. Indeed, it is unlikely that the Court would remain a viable institution of 
government if, over the long run, it were not profoundly influenced by majority values. At 
bottom, the Court's power exists at the sufferance of the other branches; Congress and the 
President can restrict its jurisdiction, change its composition, or, as a matter of realpolitik, 
simply ignore its decisions. As John Rawls has written, "[ t] he constitution is not what the 
Court says it is. Rather, it is what the people acting constitutionally through the other 
branches eventually allow the Court to say it is." John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in 
Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, supra note 215, at 93, 112. 
326. Fallon, supra note 11, at 144. 
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ocratic attention. In such areas, courts should be aware that even if they 
rely on their own deepest convictions, they may make mistakes .... "327 
In order to determine whether, or how much, the Court should de-
fer to the political branches, the Court must assess the likelihood that it 
will err-an assessment that may require a suhsidiary analysis of the de-
gree of public controversy surrounding the issue. Presumably there will 
be some point at which the Court will conclude that the risk of error is 
too great and consequently will defer to the political branches. Prior to 
that point, the Court will conclude that the risk of error is not great 
enough to justify such deference.328 As Joshua Sarnoff has put it in a 
different context, substantive minimalism thus assumes a "tipping point 
of confidence in judgment," on one side of which the Court will defer 
and on the other side of which the Court will decide.329 
And herein lies a fairly serious analytical problem with substantive 
minimalism. For in order to make an assessment of the likelihood of 
judicial error, the Court must risk judicial error. In order to determine 
whether an issue is so fraught with moral or factual uncertainty that the 
Court should not decide it, the Court must make a judgment that itself is 
fraught with moral or factual uncertainty. The decision not to decide is 
still a decision. By deciding not to decide an issue on grounds of moral 
or factual uncertainty or dispute, the Court is not solving the problem of 
moral or factual uncertainty; it is simply transposing that problem to a 
different plane. Instead of making a (morally or factually fallible) deci-
sion of the issue itself, the Court is making a (morally or factually fallible) 
decision about whether to decide the issue. 
Worse, interjecting the question of social controversy-or the related 
question of the political consequences of a Court decision-into the 
larger question of whether to defer to the political branches does more 
than simply shift the locus of potential judicial error. It asks the Court to 
make exactly those types of decisions that minimalism assumes the Court 
should avoid. As Mark Tushnet writes, "If minimalism is to guide deci-
sion, the justices must make essentially political judgments. They are to 
ask themselves, What is the current state of public discussion of the issue, 
and-if public discussion is on-going-what decision will have the least 
impact on that discussion?"330 But assessments of the state of public dis-
cussion and the impact of ajudicial decision on that discussion inevitably 
will involve the same kinds of "complex issues of fact and value" that mini-
malists assert the Court should avoid deciding.331 Thus, as Tushnet 
327. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 59. 
328. As an example, Sunstein defends the result in Brown v. Board of Education, which 
was substantively nonminimalist, on the grounds that "the underlying judgment of 
(constitutionally relevant) political morality [wa]s insistent" in that case. Id. at 38. 
329. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Equality as Uncertainty, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 377, 403 (1999). 
330. Tushnet, supra note 319, at 59. 
331. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 76. 
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points out, "minimalism calls on judges to make precisely those judg-
ments that its premises assert judges should not make."332 
The juricentric approach suggests there may be good reasons for 
judges to avoid making these judgments, reasons beyond Tushnet's con-
cern that "[a]s a general matter, the American people do not expect jus-
tices to be making politicaljudgments on this level."333 Complex calcula-
tions of the state of public discussion about an issue and of the probable 
effects of Court "intervention"334 are bound to be polycentric problems 
in Fuller's sense; they are unlikely to be amenable to the kind of princi-
pled decisionmaking that the Court is good at.335 As such, at least in 
cases involving rights, a Court decision not to decide an issue because of 
the risk of judicial error or unintended consequences seems more likely to 
be erroneous than a Court decision of the issue itself. 
To the extent it relies on judicial fallibility, then, the argument for 
substantive minimalism either proves too much or it proves nothing at all. 
It proves too much if it holds that the Court should never override the 
political branches' decisions, an extreme to which few of the new mini-
malists would willingly go. But it proves nothing at all if it acknowledges 
that the Court should override the political branches in some cases but 
not others, because there is no infallible way for a fallible Court to distin-
guish permissible decisions from impermissible ones. 
CONCLUSION 
Assessments of judicial review typically suffer from policentrism: 
They assume the Court should play a role subordinate to the political 
branches, and then they defend or attack judicial review on the basis of 
its success or failure in preserving that subordination. The new move-
ment toward judicial minimalism, led by Sunstein, is no exception to this 
general rule. Unlike the work of Alexander Bickel that it evokes, the new 
minimalism demands judicial restraint as a means of permitting as many 
decisions as possible to be made politically and of increasing the extent to 
which those political decisions are deliberative and accountable. 
I have suggested in this Article that the policentrism of the new judi-
cial minimalism is largely misguided. Policentrism rests on the twin as-
sumptions that judicial decisionmaking is significantly less democratically 
legitimate than political decisionmaking, and that it has no significant 
advantage over political decisionmaking in the area of individual rights. 
332. Tushnet, supra note 319, at 60. 
333. Id. 
334. As Tushnet notes, "[n]on-inteIVention is a fonn of inteIVention too, in the sense 
that it allows the discussion to continue against a background set of [existing] laws ... that 
themselves allocate costs." Id. at 59. 
335. See supra Part IlI.C.3; cf. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive 
Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 
I, 5 (1964) (criticizing Bickel for advocating "polluting the (judicial] decisional process 
through excessive preoccupation with the political market place"). 
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Each of these assumptions is vulnerable. Adjudication, even constitu-
tional adjudication, is a form of meaningfully participatory decisionmak-
ing that binds through interest representation. Its participatory and rep-
resentative elements give adjudication a strong measure of democratic 
legitimacy. Moreover, the judiciary generally is better suited than the po-
litical branches to make decisions involving individual rights-partly be-
cause of the judiciary's well-known insulation from majoritarian politics, 
partly because of the opacity of its decisionmaking procedures, and per-
haps above all because of the gradualism and particularism of the com-
mon law method that it employs. 
The juricentric picture of the judiciary-at its pinnacle, the Supreme 
Court-as a democratically legitimate and uniquely competent branch of 
government undermines the premises of the new judicial minimalism. 
On the juricentric view, there is little or no good reason for the Court 
regularly to defer to the political branches on matters of rights. But the 
juricentric view itself provides a different set of reasons for one manifesta-
tion of minimalism-what I have called procedural minimalism, the prac-
tice of deciding that which is necessary to resolve a case but no more. 
Some degree of procedural minimalism is essential to preserving the ties 
of interest representation between precedent-setting litigants and subse-
quent litigants or conforming nonlitigants, and thus to preserving the 
legitimacy of binding those subsequent parties. Procedural minimalism 
also is essential to sustaining the unique advantage enjoyed by the Court 
over the political branches in decisions involving individual rights, an ad-
vantage that depends in large part upon the gradualism and particular-
ism that typically characterize the Court's decisionmaking process. 
At the same time, the juricentric view calls into question what 1 have 
called substantive minimalism, the practice of deferring to the political 
branches in decisions involving rights for fear of judicial error. The 
juricentric view suggests that a Court adhering to procedural minimalism 
can mitigate its own errors and adapt to changing circumstances more 
effectively than the new minimalists suppose. Indeed, it suggests that the 
Court sometimes, perhaps often, can overcome its own constitutional er-
rors faster and with less cost than the political branches can overcome 
theirs. And it highlights the incoherence of requiring the Court to make 
potentially costly fallible judgments about when to avoid making poten-
tially costly fallible judgments. 
Before concluding this Article, I should disclaim any attempt to 
prove more than I want to prove. I do not want to argue that all manifes-
tations of what might be called substantive minimalism are invalid for the 
reasons discussed above. To be sure, there are aspects of the Court's ac-
cepted practice that can be viewed as expressions of substantive minimal-
ism: the Court's preference for avoiding unnecessary decision of consti-
tutional issues; the presumption of constitutionality the Court applies; 
doctrinal tests like "rational basis" review which require the Court to de-
fer to political decisions in contexts not involving strong indicia of rights 
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violations.336 Taken to a logical extreme, my arguments here might he 
read to suggest that these well-pedigreed manifestations of judicial defer-
ence are analytically flawed and should be abandoned. 
In my view, however, these conventions are best understood not as 
techniques of substantive judicial minimalism, but rather as simple obsta-
cles to changing the status quo where doing so would have significant 
costs (much like the garden-variety burdens of proof imposed on plain-
tiffs and prosecutors), or else as rules requiring default to political deci-
sionmaking in cases of substantial evidentiary doubt, or perhaps as combi-
nations of both. Even if viewed as aspects of substantive minimalism, 
norms that simply hold "when in doubt, defer" do not go as far as the new 
minimalists suggest the Court should go in deferring to the political 
branches. The new minimalists ask the Court to defer not only in cases of 
judicial doubt, but sometimes in cases of relative judicial confidence-
cases where the Justices' "own deepest convictions" counsel invalidation 
of a political decision, even cases in which "the Court's resolution [is] 
right, in the sense that the Court identifies the just result."337 If such 
cases "involve [] ... highly contentious question[s] now receiving sus-
tained democratic attention," or the strong possibility that "unintended 
adverse consequences" might follow from the Court's (otherwise correct) 
decision, the new minimalism counsels deference.338 
It is this strong form of substantive minimalism that I have chal-
lenged in this Article. Nothing I have written here is intended to ques-
tion the validity of judicial norms against changing the status quo, or of 
deferring to political decisions in the face of genuine judicial uncertainty, 
or of identifYing and defining rights partly by reference to the extent of 
deep social agreement about their existence and scope. What 1 have 
tried to challenge is the policentric premise of the new judicial minimal-
ism and one of its prescriptive consequences: that the Court, like a 
shrinking violet, should habitually bow to the supposedly superior legiti-
macy and competence of the political branches in matters of rights. The 
Court's role, to which it is uniquely suited, is precisely to make such 
decisions. 
336. See Fallon, supra note 11, at 88-90 (discussing "rational basis" and other 
"nonsuspect-content" tests). 
337. Sunstein, One Case at a Time, supra note 8, at 59. 
338. ld. 
